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ABSTRACT 
Although much research has been done on both asset specificity and 
outsourcing performance, most of the former has focused on the question of 
governance choice, while the latter has mainly concentrated on the skills 
required in managing the buyer-supplier relationship, leaving a glaring gap on 
the role that asset specific, non-redeployable investments made by either 
buyers or suppliers, could play in determining the success or otherwise of 
outsourcing relationships (which for the purpose of this thesis, the author 
defines as relationships characterised by the relocation to external providers 
of company functions previously performed in-house). 
This thesis attempts to begin to fill this gap by empirically investigating the 
impact of asset specificity on outsourcing performance within a disaggregated 
methodological framework that allows the author to discern the specific effects 
of various individual dimensions of buyer-supplier asset specific investments. 
To this end, data were collected by means of self-administered questionnaires 
sent to a randomly selected sample of UK firms operating in four different 
service-related industries. Employing both exploratory factor analysis and 
hierarchical regression analysis, hypotheses on the relationship in question 
developed from the twin lenses of transaction cost theory (TCT) and the 
strategy-based literature were tested. 
The results suggest that whilst all dimensions of buyers' asset specificity have 
a negative impact on outsourcing performance, the effect of suppliers' asset 
specific investments on outsourcing performance varies according to the asset 
specificity dimension examined. In addition, buyer-supplier 'reciprocal specific 
investments' are found to exert a positive effect on outsourcing performance 
while 'trust- and information-based collaborative ties', though found to have a 
direct and positive impact on outsourcing performance, do not seem to play a 
statistically significant moderating effect on the relationship in question. These 
findings have profound theoretical and methodological implications, and are 
also of significance from a managerial perspective. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Chapter overview 
This introductory chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the 
context of this study and its academic background. In so doing, a clear 
research gap will be highlighted. Then, the main research question to be 
addressed in the thesis alongside the associated objectives of the research 
will be specified while clarifying the theoretical boundaries of the study. The 
chapter ends with a brief outline of the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Context, academic background and knowledge gap 
Over the last two decades, outsourcing has emerged as a critical 
competitive strategy that has placed the make-or-buy decision at the top of 
management priorities (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). Survey 
evidence suggests that by 1998, around 85 per cent of European and 
American companies were engaged in some sort of outsourcing (Elmuti et 
al., 1998). This growing trend towards the adoption of outsourcing appears 
to have been mainly driven by a change in the environmental conditions in 
which businesses are operating; conditions primarily characterised by an 
increased level of global competition (Embleton and Wright, 1998) and 
rapid technological growth (Razzaque and Sheng, 1998). These 
environmental developments have forced firms to demonstrate greater 
flexibility and responsiveness to customer needs and, consequently, to 
increasingly engage in outsourcing relationships with specialist suppliers 
(Mclvor, 2005). 
Prima facie, outsourcing appears to offer a number of potential benefits 
which can ultimately provide organisations with the opportunity to enhance 
their competitive positions. First, outsourcing can help organisations realise 
substantial reductions in operational costs by benefiting from the 
1 
economies of scales that are usually achieved by specialist outsourcing 
suppliers and often passed on to outsourcing buyers (Jurison, 1995; 
Sharpe, 1997). Second, outsourcing may enable organisations to gain 
access to external suppliers' specialised knowledge and expertise, and to 
ultimately benefit from 'best in the world' skills and technologies (Bartell, 
1998; Blumberg, 1998; Lankford and Parsa, 1999; Quinn, 1999; 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). Third, outsourcing can also be 
beneficial in terms of freeing up management time and resources, hence 
allowing chief executives to focus on their core functions and on achieving 
key strategic objectives (Lacity, 1993; Kliem, 1999). This enhanced 
concentration on core activities is said to improve the quality of the service 
offered by firms and to enhance their flexibility in responding to increasingly 
volatile market conditions (Razzaque and Sheng, 1998; Canez et al., 
2000). 
Nevertheless, outsourcing seems to have failed to deliver its expected 
benefits, with a growing number of companies having had the need to 
bring back their outsourced activities in-house (Elliot, 1995; Kliem, 1999). 
For example, according to Mclvor (2000, p. 22) "a PA Consulting Group 
found that only 5% of companies surveyed had achieved high levels of 
benefits from outsourcing" : In a similar vein, both Lonsdale (1999) and 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2000) drew attention to the fact that the 
majority of managers were unhappy with the outcomes of their outsourcing 
projects. This was later confirmed by Jennings (2002) who found failure to 
realise cost benefits to be a recurring problem in outsourcing relationships. 
In fact, in sharp contrast to the optimistic coverage of the literature in 
relation to the benefits of outsourcing, many academics have detected a 
number of drawbacks and several potential risks. The first of these risks is 
the loss of critical skills and the consequent handing-over of the firm's 
competencies to outsourcing suppliers who can become potential 
competitors by exerting a forward integration in the market (Bettis et al., 
1992; Welch and Nayak, 1992; Benson and Litter, 2002). Another 
noticeable risk is the creation of a supplier-dependence situation and the 
2 
subsequent danger of hold-up. Other risks include the loss of quality 
control (Downey, 1995), the appearance of hidden costs (Willcocks and 
Currie, 1997), and reduced innovation (Kotabe, 1992). 
The growing prominence of outsourcing together with the increase in the 
number of outsourcing failures (defined as the inability of outsourcing 
relationships to realise expected outcomes) creates a paradox which 
introduces a pressing need for academics to place greater emphasis on 
the still under-researched study of the determinants of outsourcing 
performance. 
Transaction cost theory (henceforth TCT) has arguably emerged as the 
dominant framework to illuminate on the logic behind companies' make-or- 
buy decision (Wang, 2002). Developed primarily by Williamson (1971, 
1975,1985), in a nutshell, TCT posits that under buyer-supplier 
relationship conditions of high asset specificity (non re-deployable 
investments in assets specifically dedicated to the relationship), the higher 
transaction costs to be incurred to safeguard against costly opportunistic 
behaviour make vertical integration, rather than outsourcing, the most 
efficient and, hence, the preferred governance structure. 
Whilst the cost explanation for companies' boundary choice (e. g. 
organisation of firm activities within the firm) versus governance through 
market transactions (e. g. outsourcing) has been widely investigated 
receiving considerable empirical support (see, among others, Anderson 
and Coughlan, 1987; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Klein et al., 1990; 
Levy, 1985; Masten, 1984; Monteverde and Teece, 1982), the TCT's 
implication in relation to outsourcing performance under conditions of high 
asset specificity in buyer-supplier relationships has rarely been subjected 
to empirical scrutiny. This is particularly striking when it is considered that 
although factors influencing the make-or-buy decision are of great 
significance, of no less importance and, possibly, of greater relevance is 
the question of what happens to those companies that do choose to 
outsource under conditions of high asset specificity. Given the well 
3 
publicised difficulties to realise the expected benefits of outsourcing 
projects, this further line of inquiry seems particularly timely. 
Although this line of enquiry is primarily rooted in the TCT's explanation of 
outsourcing, the strategy-related literature, through its competence 
rationale, could also be useful in illuminating on the relationship between 
asset specificity and outsourcing performance. In general terms, this 
literature argues that firms consist of a bundle of competencies that are 
created and nurtured through a number of processes including learning, 
knowledge promotion, inter-personal relations, and the like. While we know 
little as to when such processes could best take place in separate firms (e. g. 
outsourcing relationships involving the interaction of a buyer and a supplier) 
or in one firm (e. g. vertical integration) (Williamson, 1999), the knowledge 
creation reasoning does offer a valuable insight into the relationship 
between asset specificity and outsourcing performance at least by brining 
into the equation the role of knowledge-based considerations and inter-finn 
collaboration which could overcome or at least reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic expropriation (see for example, Hill, 1990; Zajac and Olsen, 
1993; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999). 
The few studies that have considered the question of the extent to which 
the performance of buyer-supplier relationships is affected by non re- 
deployable investments specifically dedicated to the relationship (Artz, 
1999; Heide and Stump, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Rodriquez and 
Padilla, 2005; Wang, 2002) have produced mixed results from which it is 
difficult to discern a conventional wisdom. These studies also brought to 
the fore a number of unresolved methodological and measurement issues 
that constitute gaps in the analysis of the relationship in question. 
1 For the propose of this thesis, the strategy-related literature is used as a nomenclature referring to 
the various strands of the strategy literature (as opposed to the economic-based literature) including 
the resource-based view, knowledge management, intra- and inter-organisational learning, and the 
competence / capability perspective. 
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In this thesis the author aims to address these issues. Specifically, this 
study intends to contribute to this literature and, therefore, add to what has 
gone before, in the following ways. 
First, in previous contributions the buyer-supplier transactional relationship 
was too loosely defined (Artz, 1999; Heide and Stump, 1995), thus failing 
to distinguish between transactions that involve the mere procurement of 
raw materials and/or intermediary inputs, and those which actually entail 
the relocation to external providers of company functions previously 
performed in-house (which - given the purpose of this thesis - is how the 
author defines the buyer-supplier outsourcing relationship). The research 
design of this study enables the author to focus exclusive empirical 
attention on the latter. The only studies that have specifically investigated 
the effects of asset specificity on outsourcing performance in the context of 
a buyer-supplier relationship thus defined (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; 
Wang, 2002; Rodriguez and Padilla, 2005), did not differentiate between 
buyers and suppliers nor did they disaggregate data according to asset 
specificity dimensions. 
Although non re-deployable investments specifically dedicated to a given 
relationship can be incurred by both parties, with three notable exceptions 
(Artz, 1999; Heide and John, 19902; and Heide and Stump, 1995), extant 
empirical investigations have only measured the asset specificity content 
of investments made by one side of the dyad, (i. e. the buyer or the 
supplier, see Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Levy, 1985; Monteverde and 
Teece, 1982; Wang, 2002). While Heide and John (1992) made a clear 
distinction between buyers and suppliers' asset specificity and obtained 
data from both sides, they only investigated the impact of buyers' asset 
specificity on buyers' control over suppliers' decisions. In this study, the 
author measures the impact of asset specificity on outsourcing 
performance while distinguishing between the effects pertaining to specific, 
non re-deployable investments made by both buyers and suppliers. 
2 It should be noted, however, that Heide and John (1990) looked at the extent of reciprocity of 
buyers-suppliers' asset specific investments, without looking precisely at outsourcing performance. 
5 
An additional issue faced by the few studies that have attempted to test the 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance, has 
been the actual measurement of the asset specificity concept. Morill and 
Morill (2003) argued that such a construct is not directly observable, 
requiring the use of multiple indicators, while Wang (2002) attributes the 
inconsistencies emerging from the empirical findings to the differing 
operationalisations of the construct. Yet, as early as 1985, Anderson called 
for a more consistent and comprehensive scale development in an effort to 
reach a better approximation of the construct's multi-dimensional nature. 
This has later been reiterated by Lohtia of al. (1994) who suggested that 
research results based on TCT may vary according to the specific 
dimension of asset specificity. Indeed, as will be thoroughly explained in 
later chapters, asset specific investments can be classified into different 
individual dimensions according to the nature of the investment. 
Though few authors have attempted to inform the asset specificity scale 
development from items related to more than a single dimension of 
specificity (Klein et al., 1990; Levy, 1985; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), 
with the exception of Masten et al. (1989) and Maltz (1993) (who did not 
test effects on outsourcing performance), they all still end up with the 
estimation of a single, albeit composite, asset specificity coefficient. In this 
study, the author goes a step further, by testing the impact of asset 
specificity on outsourcing performance on the basis of a wide menu of 
distinct dimensions of specific, non re-deployable investments made by 
both buyers and suppliers while also taking into account the effect of 
reciprocal investments (measured by the interaction terms of the buyers 
and suppliers' asset specificity dimensions). Special attention is also paid 
to the potential moderating role of collaborative ties while controlling for the 
effect of firm size, type of activity / function being outsourced, and (service- 
sector) industry type. 
To sum up, to the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first attempt 
that sets out to empirically investigate the impact of asset specificity on 
outsourcing performance within a disaggregated framework that allows to 
6 
distinguish the individual effects pertaining to both buyers and suppliers' 
various dimensions of asset specific investments in outsourcing 
relationships (see Table 1.1). In so doing, this study directly addresses 
Lohtia's et al. (1994) call for researchers to pay particular attention to the 
individual dimensions of asset specificity. 
To date, research has treated it [asset specificity] as a 
unidimensional construct. Future empirical operationalisations 
should consider its different dimensions... The theoretical 
ramifications of each of the dimensions and types of 
transaction-specific assets require research attention. It may be 
that research results based on TCE will be dependent on the 
specific type or dimension of the transaction-specific asset used 
in the research setting" (Lohtia et al., 1994, p. 267-268). 
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1.3 Statement of the main research question and associated research 
objectives 
Given the knowledge gap in relation to the predictive power of TCT when 
applied to the question of the effect of asset specificity on outsourcing 
performance, the main question which this research aims to answer is: 
What is the impact of buyer-supplier dimensions of asset specific 
investments on outsourcing performance? 
In order to answer the main research question, this thesis begins by 
offering a synthesis of an extensive critical review of relevant literature 
carried out to: (i) map the theoretical and empirical research on 
outsourcing; (ii) distil a number of theory-based hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance; and 
(iii) develop an empirical framework through which the main constructs of 
the research will be operationalised and tested. 
The main research objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
(i) To empirically assess the effect of the various buyers' asset 
specificity dimensions on outsourcing performance; 
(ii) To empirically assess the effect of the various suppliers' asset 
specificity dimensions on outsourcing performance; 
(iii) To examine the impact of reciprocal investments (measured 
through the interaction terms of buyers and suppliers' asset 
specificity dimensions) on outsourcing performance; 
(iv) To establish whether collaborative ties have a moderating effect on 
the relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance. 
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The above objectives are to be met while controlling for the role of firm 
size, type of activity / function being outsourced, and service-sector 
industry type. 
Finally, relevant implications for theory, for empirical work and for 
managerial practice will be drawn. 
1.4 Clarification of the theoretical boundaries of the study 
Rather than focusing on the potential opportunistic expropriation that could 
stem from a high level of asset specificity, a growing literature in strategy 
(e. g. Teece, 1986; Liebeskind, 1996) argues that the make-or-buy decision 
is actually dictated by the risk of knowledge leakages that could take place 
in the market and the consequent necessity to protect such knowledge 
through internalisation. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the value 
added by this growing stream of strategy-related literature, it should be 
noted that the investigation conducted in this thesis is specifically 
concerned with the impact of asset specificity on outsourcing performance 
and, therefore, it draws from the strategy-related literature only as a 
framework informing the asset specificity-outsourcing performance 
relationship and not as an alternative explanation regarding the reason 
behind firms' decision to internalise. Since the notion of asset specificity 
with its link to opportunistic behaviour is firmly rooted within TCT rather 
than the strategy-related literature, the theoretical backbone, and 
implications of this thesis are, inevitably, more related to the former. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This study tries to empirically assess the impact of asset specificity upon 
outsourcing performance using data collected by means of a self- 
administered questionnaire that was sent to a large sample of UK firms 
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operating in four different service-related industries (hotel, 
telecommunication, IT and banking industry). 
Chapter two maps the outsourcing literature and carries out an extensive 
measurement-comparison review of the operationalisation of the research 
main constructs, namely: (i) asset specificity; and (ii) outsourcing 
performance. 
Chapter three offers a critical review of the literature that dealt with the 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance and 
concludes by formulating the research model which comprises several 
hypotheses to be tested during the course of this research. 
Chapter four discusses the methodology employed in collecting the data 
(questionnaire preparation and administration) and in conducting the 
empirical investigation (factor and regression analysis), explains how the 
hypotheses are tested, and presents the measurement scales employed in 
collecting the required data. 
Chapter five carries out the initial screening of the data collected and offers 
some exploratory data analysis, including a number of descriptive statistics 
regarding key variables. An extended note on the reliability and validity of 
the measurement scales employed in this study is also provided towards 
the end of the chapter. 
Chapter six reports the statistical results obtained using hierarchical 
regression analysis, interprets the findings (also in relation to those 
obtained by previous studies), and provides an insightful discussion of their 
significance. 
Chapter seven concludes by summarising the key research findings and by 
highlighting their implications from a theoretical, methodological and 
managerial perspective. After emphasising the contribution to knowledge 
11 
this thesis makes, the limitations of the study are acknowledged and 
valuable directions for future research avenues are outlined. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF OUTSOURCING THEORY AND 
THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
2.1 Chapter overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on outsourcing. After a brief discussion of outsourcing definitions, the 
chapter begins by mapping and assessing the outsourcing intellectual territory 
in an attempt to synthesise and integrate different strands of outsourcing 
research and findings. Following the identification of a number of empirical 
gaps in the outsourcing literature, attention is then directed to the asset 
specificity construct through a discussion of its various definitions and a critical 
assessment of its operationalisation as articulated in past empirical studies. 
The chapter ends with a brief review that summarises and integrates various 
measurements of outsourcing performance. 
2.2 Mapping the outsourcing literature 
Outsourcing practice has been described by De Vita and Wang (2006, p. 14) 
as "a phenomenon in motion" that has evolved at a great pace. To the author, 
it appears that the velocity by which outsourcing research has developed has 
left little opportunity for researchers to step back, reflect on what has been 
done and draw up an integrated picture of the various streams underpinning 
the research activities undertaken in the field. Indeed, aside from few 
exceptions (eg. Lee et al., 2000) researchers have to date made no attempts 
to organise and integrate the various outsourcing studies from a broad 
perspective. As noted by Razzaque and Sheng (1998, p. 89) although 
outsourcing is a subject that is growing in popularity among practitioners and 
researchers alike, "efforts to organise it [this wide literature coverage] in an 
13 
integrated broad-based body of knowledge have so far been limited". Lack of 
rigorous mapping of this large body of work means that this literature may face 
the threat of becoming `a schizophrenic compendium' of unrelated research 
papers with no common language by which academics in the field can 
communicate with one another (Robey, 1996, p. 402). Thus, in an attempt to 
introduce some tidiness to what sees to be, at first glance, a research area 
with no coherent focus (Cheon et al., 1995), this section tries to develop a 
taxonomy of outsourcing literature that provides a holistic synthesis of various 
research streams. 
To accomplish this remit, an extensive review has been conducted. A closer 
examination of the various research foci and different research approaches 
employed by the various studies reveals the existence of two broad categories 
into which the outsourcing literature can be classified, these being the 
process-oriented literature and the outcome-oriented literature. While the 
former refers to academic papers that concentrate on the outsourcing 
process, the latter concerns studies that focus upon outsourcing performance. 
In line with the method adopted by Ellram and Carr (1994), both categories 
have been divided into empirical and conceptual research according to the 
methodology employed by the studies reviewed (see Table 2.1). While 
conceptual research usually includes descriptive guidelines and conceptual 
frameworks (Meredith, 1993), empirical research involves "soliciting 
participation and data gathering" (Gagnon, 1982, p. 98). 
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2.2.1 The process-oriented literature 
Much has been written about outsourcing practice and its implementation 
process. Authors have tried to cover three important dimensions of 
outsourcing. These being the 'why', 'what', and 'how' of outsourcing. A broad 
and integrated picture of the literature in relation to these three dimensions 
enables us to place them under one common umbrella: the process-oriented 
literature. The following subsections seek to provide a concise critical review 
of the various research streams that fit into the process-oriented classification 
whilst drawing a clear distinction between empirical and conceptual research. 
2.2.1.1 The conceptual process-oriented literature 
The conceptual process-oriented literature refers to the various frameworks 
and models developed with the intention to guide both the make-or-buy 
decision (the 'why' and 'what') and the outsourcing implementation process 
(the 'how'). 
While most conceptual studies focusing on the `why' of outsourcing have 
attempted to develop theoretical models (see for example Bettis et aL, 1992; 
Cheon et al., 1995), other papers were more descriptive in nature, taking 
mainly the form of prescriptive advice and recommended guidelines (Aerston, 
1993; Quinn and Hilmer, 1995; Earl, 1996; etc). 
Among the studies reviewed the emphasis on risk seems to be quite common 
(see Table 2.2). Earl (1996) focuses on the perceived risks of outsourcing and 
the potential danger of hidden costs. He specifically warns of the danger of 
reducing the learning potential prospect within organizations with a 
consequent loss of innovation capabilities. Along these lines, and through a 
theoretical integration of the transaction cost and resource-based theories, 
Duncan (1998) highlights the risk of eroding internal learning skills. 
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However, while recognizing the danger of losing critical and cross-functional 
skills, Quinn and Hilmer (1995) stress that outsourcing enables organizations 
to leverage their internal resources by tapping into new innovative capabilities, 
thus enriching organizational learning capacity. 
Taking a more economics-based view, Aerston (1993) presents cost reduction 
as the prime rationale for outsourcing. Drawing from transaction cost theory, 
he considers both asset specificity and the ease of measurement as the most 
important factors of the make-or-buy decision. Nevertheless, according to 
Bettis et al. (1992) such economics-driven motives of outsourcing can, 
through a process of diffusion, initiate a spiral of decline, which ultimately 
leads to the firm's loss of competence and even, arguably, to industry decline. 
It is also interesting to note from the review that although transaction cost and 
resource-based theories were the most frequently employed, there was also 
evidence of the complementary use of different theoretical traditions. A typical 
example is Cheon's et aL (1995) contingency model of explaining outsourcing, 
which was based upon four different theories, these being the Resource 
Based Theory (RBT), Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), Transaction Cost 
Theory (TCT), and Agency Theory (AT). An additional prominent feature of the 
studies reviewed is their focus on information technology (IT) outsourcing. 
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Table 2.2: Main conceptual studies in relation to the why of outsourcing 
Outsourcing 
Source area Type Focus Theory used 
Prescriptive No specific 
Earl (1996) IS Risk factors 
guidelines theory 
Strategic 
Quinn and General Prescriptive Strategic benefits and Hilmer (1995) terms guidelines management 
risks 
Duncan 
IS Theoretical reasoning Strategic Risk 
(1998) RBT+TCT 
RBT + TCT + 
Cheon et al. Conceptual Model for Determinants of IS RDT + Agency 
(1995) studying outsourcing outsourcing Theory 
Physical 
Aerston Prescriptive Cost 
distribution TCT 
(1993) guidelines minimisation function 
Bettis et al. General The spiral of decline Risk of industrial RBT 
(1992) terms conceptual model decline 
The review of the conceptual literature dealing with the why of outsourcing 
helps us to unveil two distinct perspectives: (i) the economic view and the 
resulting cost minimisation rationale (mainly stimulated by transaction cost 
theory) ; and (ii) the strategic view and the consequent 'leveraging resources' 
motive (inspired by the resource-based theory). These two opposing views on 
the rationale of outsourcing have resulted in the development of a number of 
conceptual frameworks aimed at tackling the often controversial issue of the 
'what' of outsourcing. Following the blueprint provided by De Vita and Wang's 
(2006) taxonomy of outsourcing models, this section classifies the different 
frameworks in relation to the 'what' of outsourcing according to three groups, 
these being the factor-based, process-based, and matrix-type models (see 
Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Main conceptual studies on the what of outsourcing 
Type Model Source 
Strategic sourcing model Welch and Nayak (1992) 
Chesbrough and Teece 
Matching organisation to innovation (1996) 
Matrix-type Models Bowman and Faulkner MBA Matrix 
(1997) 
Strategic options for managing the Venkatraman (1997) 
investment center 
The strategic sourcing process Venkatesan (1992) 
Make-or-buy framework Canez et al. (2000) 
A composite outsourcing decision Factor-based Models Fill and Visser (2000) framework 
Contextual model of outsourcing 
Jennings (2002) 
decision 
A conceptual Framework for 
Mclvor et al. (1997) 
evaluating the make or buy decision Process-based 
A practical framework for Models 
understanding the outsourcing Mclvor (2000) 
process 
Factor-based models refer to the frameworks that try to structurally combine 
various contextual factors that are likely to affect the outsourcing decision. 
Their strength lies into their capacity to synthesise previously unstructured 
thoughts stemming from various waves of literature in one graphical 
representation, thus allowing the reader to gain an overall picture of the 
different factors affecting the make-or-buy decision. Ironically, though, the 
generality of these models which represents their main strength makes them 
vulnerable to potential criticism as they may raise confusion due to their failure 
to offer clear and specific guidelines (De Vita and Wang, 2006). One typical 
illustration of such models is Canez's et aL (2000) make-or-buy framework in 
which various key factors from the outsourcing literature have been captured 
and grouped into categories. Other examples of these factor-based models 
could be found in Venkatesan (1992), Fill and Visser (2000), and Jennings 
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(2002). While Venkatesan's (1992) map of strategic sourcing process focused 
on the strategic / non-strategic classification of sub-systems, both Jennings 
(2002) and Fill and Visser's (2000) models dealt with the strategic and 
economic aspects while also bringing the supply environment factor into the 
'equation'. 
Process-based models offer more practical guidelines than factor-based 
models. Typical examples of such frameworks can be found in Mclvor et al. 
(1997) and Mclvor (2000). Both studies employed decision-tree type models in 
which the make-or-buy decision is divided into sequential stages, starting with 
the definition of the core activities and ending with an analysis of potential 
supplier partnerships. While the last stage adds to the development of the 
outsourcing decision by highlighting the importance of trust and collaboration 
(as opposed to Williamson's (1979) notion of bounded rationality and 
opportunism), the first stage does not actually provide clear guidelines into 
how the distinction between core and non-core activities could be made. 
As far as matrix-type models are concerned, although they could be criticised 
for limiting our analysis of the complex outsourcing decision to only two 
dimensions, such models could be praised for being "visually powerful and 
easy to apply" (De Vita and Wang, 2006, p. 5). Based on the strategic role of 
process technology in the manufacturing sector, Welch and Nayak's (1992) 
strategic sourcing matrix provides clear guidance for the make-or-buy 
decision. The vertical axis of the matrix measures the degree of maturity of the 
process technology across industries while the horizontal axis measures the 
significance of process technology for competitive advantage. The matrix 
postulates that whenever the significance of process technology for 
competitive advantage is low, irrespective of the degree of maturity of that 
process across industries, that technology should be outsourced, even in 
cases where the firm's capability in that technology is higher than that of 
competitors. A similar argument has been put forward by Bowman and 
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Faulkner (1997) through their Make-Buy-Ally (MBA) matrix, which suggests 
that whenever the activity under consideration is of little strategic importance, 
regardless of how proficient the company is at carrying it out itself, that activity 
should be outsourced. It should be pointed out, however, that both matrices 
seem to be disregarding the important role of benchmarking in the outsourcing 
decision, which has been widely emphasised in the literature (see for example 
Cronk and Sharp, 1995; Quinn and Hilmer, 1995; Mclvor et al., 1997). Indeed, 
contrary to what both these matrices are portraying, if the activity cannot be 
performed more efficiently and effectively by outside suppliers, then it should 
not be considered as a good candidate for outsourcing (see, among others, 
Patterson and Haas, 1999). 
A more useful matrix that accounts for the measurement of strategic 
significance and in so doing overcomes the lack of guidance offered by the 
two matrices outlined above is the one developed by Chesbrough and Teece 
(1996). They recommend managers to consider the type of innovation 
involved in the activity under consideration and to assess whether the required 
capabilities to generate that innovation can be obtained externally or must be 
created in-house. According to this matrix, firms should engage in outsourcing 
if, and only if, the innovation under investigation is autonomous and can be 
easily obtained externally. In a similar vein, Blumberg (1998) invokes the 
importance of considering the rate of technological change in the outsourcing 
decision. He contends that if the technology in relation to the activity under 
investigation is either stable with limited future potential or occurs at a rate 
faster than what the firm can sustain, then this activity should be outsourced. 
This brings us back to Welch and Nayak's (1992) matrix, which suggests that 
a technology that is in its maturity stage would be, in most cases, suitable for 
outsourcing since it implies little potential for generating competitive 
advantage, high probability of a broad range of potential suppliers and, as 
argued by Gupta and Gupta (1992), a reduction in exit barriers when the 
technology in question becomes obsolete. 
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The third stream of conceptual literature on outsourcing is concerned with its 
implementation process. As emphasised by Dekkers (2000, p. 4086) 
"outsourcing is not only an issue for decision-making (what), but it also 
demands for implementation and control mechanisms (how)". Despite such 
demands, very few attempts have so far been made in organising the various 
success factors that have been widely cited in the literature (Costa, 2001). 
Table 2.4 tries to address this gap by summarising the various critical factors 
to which firms should pay attention when implementing their outsourcing 
venture. These factors are classified into three broad categories, these being 
contract management, relationship management, and human resource issues 
(see Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4: Key areas in the management of the outsourcing process 
Areas Factors Source 
Contract Management 
Relationship 
Management 
Human Resource 
Issues 
Contract lock-in 
Flexible contract terms 
Provision for transfer of knowledge 
3 types of contracts: 
Turnkey, fixed fee, and risklreward 
Control / flexibility trade-off 
Opportunism versus Trust 
(Agency theory - TCT) 
Partnership: 
"Partnering Discovering" 
Performance indicators `LSA" 
Knowledge and innovation 
exchange 
Power structure 
Information anomalies 
Cooperation versus competition 
A balanced matrix 
Analytical hierarchy process 
technique (AHP) 
Employee transfer 
Legal issues (ERISA Act of 1979) 
Union strike 
'Survivor's syndrome" 
Change management 
Jurison (1995), Quinn and 
Hilmer (1995), Vining and 
Globerman (1999), Cronk and 
Sharp (1995), Bartell (1998), 
Lankford and Parsa (1999) 
Quinn (1999), Franceschini et 
a/. (2003), Bertolini et aL (2004), 
Lee et al. (2000), Saunders et 
al. (1997), Jackson et al. (2001) 
Embleton and Wright (1998), 
Due (1992), Khosrowpour and 
Subramanian (1996), Elmuti 
and Katahwala (2000), 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse 
(2000) 
2.2.1.2 The empirical process-oriented literature 
The empirical process-oriented literature is characterised by the use of 
empirical data processed in order to test hypotheses stemming from the 
conceptual process-oriented literature. Such empirical research inevitably 
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takes a positivist methodological stance (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) and 
typically involves: (i) data collection through survey followed by some 
statistical analysis (Gable, 1994); or (ii) an empirical case study enquiry (Yin, 
1999) involving in-depth interviews or some sort of action research (Rapoport, 
1970). 
A closer examination of the studies presented in Table 2.1, reveals that most 
empirical papers focused on testing hypotheses in relation to the determinants 
of outsourcing and on the effect of asset specificity on the extent of 
outsourcing (see Table 2.5). 
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Table 2.5: Key empirical outsourcing studies within the process-oriented 
literature 
Type of 
Area Findings outsourcing Source 
Imitative behaviour accelerates the Loh and Venkatraman 
adoption of outsourcing IT (1992a) 
Little support for the "kodak effect"' Hu et at (1997) 
positive effect of both external and IT 
internal communication channels 
Loh and Venkatraman 
Outsourcing as a cost minimisation tool IT 
(1992b); Smith et at 
(1998); Sobol and Apte 
Outsourcing (1995) 
determinants 
Financial instability does not increase the IT Teng et at (1995) level of IS outsourcing 
Higher transaction costs negatively affect 
US Banking 
Industry Ang and Straub (1998) 
the outsourcing decision. 
Firms outside the computer industry tend Slaughter and Ang 
to engage more in IT outsourcing than IT (1996) 
firms within the computer industry 
Poppo and Zenger 
The level of asset specificity has a IT 
(1998); Ang and 
Cummings (1997); Effect of negative effect on the degree of 
i Aubert et at. (1996) 
asset 
ng outsourc Zaheer and 
Electronic Venkatraman 1994 
specificity on 
The level of asset specificity has no effect IT Nam et at (1996); Loh the extent of on the extent of outsourcing (1994) 
outsourcing 
Positive relationship between advance 
development or specialised technology IT Nelson et at (1996) 
and outsourcing 
One of the interesting empirical studies that provided a novel rationale for 
outsourcing is the one carried out by Loh and Venkatratman (1992a). Drawing 
from 'innovation diffusion theory' (Rogers, 1983) and using secondary data 
1 The Kodak effect refers to "the influential Kodak-IBM deal which changed the common perception of 
IT outsourcing from an 'arm's length' relationship to one of 'strategic partnership"' (Hancox and 
Hackney, 2000, p. 224). For further details, see Loh and Venkatraman (1992a). 
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based on 60 IS outsourcing ventures for the period 1988 to 1990, they found 
evidence that outsourcing adoption had been stimulated by both internal 
factors and imitative behaviour that accelerated its spread. Hu et al. (1997) 
conducted broader research using a larger dataset that included 175 sourcing 
ventures (from 1985 to 1995). Contrary to Loh and Venkatraman's (1992a) 
findings, their study did not provide any support for the influence of the Kodak 
effect on the outsourcing event and demonstrated the positive effect of both 
external and internal communication channels on the outsourcing decision. 
Focusing on the economic rationale of outsourcing, both Smith et al. (1998) 
and Loh and Venkatraman (1992b) found evidence that outsourcing was 
adopted as a result of weak financial performance, in order to reduce costs. 
Sobol and Apte (1995) found the primary driver for IS outsourcing to be cost 
containment. This finding is at odds with the evidence provided by Teng's et 
a/. (1995) who found a negative relationship between financial instability and 
the level of IT outsourcing. Consistent with Williamson's economic view, Ang 
and Straub (1998) found that while high comparative advantages in production 
costs lead to a greater degree of outsourcing adoption, higher transaction 
costs impact negatively upon the outsourcing decision. 
A different study that examined the determinants of outsourcing is the one by 
Slaughter and Ang (1996). The study showed that firms outside the computer 
industry tend to engage more in IT outsourcing than firms within the computer 
industry; thus highlighting the important role of both the industry type and the 
activity being outsourced in affecting the outsourcing decision. 
It is also worth stressing that although a number of studies have tried to test 
the transaction cost theory's assumption in relation to the effect of asset 
specificity on the degree of outsourcing, results have shown mixed support. 
Indeed, while Poppo and Zenger (1998), Ang and Cummings (1997), Aubert 
et al. (1996), and Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994) supported the idea that 
asset specificity negatively affect the outsourcing decision, Nam et al. (1996) 
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and Loh (1994) found little evidence of that effect, and Nelson et al. (1996) 
find a positive relationship between specialised technology and outsourcing. 
Such contradictions in empirical results over the asset specificity effect could 
be partially explained by the vague and inconsistent use of the concept both of 
which have led to difficulties in its empirical parameterisation (Shelanski and 
Klein, 1995). Nevertheless, a common feature of the above empirical studies 
is that they all focused on IT outsourcing. 
2.2.2 The outcome-oriented literature 
While most outsourcing literature has focused on the process of implementing 
the outsourcing venture, an additional but different stream of work has placed 
emphasis on the post-outsourcing phase drawing on its outcomes and on the 
effects it exerts on the performance of both the activity being outsourced and 
the overall running of the business. The following sub-section tries to shed 
light on this body of work looking at both the conceptual and the empirical 
literature. 
2.2.2.1 The conceptual outcome-oriented literature 
Aside from a few studies, which have offered purely descriptive but valuable 
insights on outsourcing outcomes through the use of illustrative success 
stories (eg: Huber, 1993; Quinn and Hilmer, 1995; Cross, 1995; Zhu et aL, 
2001), the vast majority of published work within this strand of literature has 
concentrated on the characteristics of successful outsourcing arrangements, 
highlighting their potential benefits with little consideration of the feasibility of 
their realisation. 
Drawing respectively on the outsourcing experience of British Petroleum (BP) 
and Continental Bank, Huber (1993) and Cross (1995) described outsourcing 
as a transition phase involving significant elements of change that must be 
carefully managed in order to achieve success. The BP case demonstrates 
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how the criteria concerning the evaluation of outsourcing outcomes can 
actually evolve over time from cost-oriented to quality-focused factors; which 
reflects the importance of both economic and strategic benefits of outsourcing. 
Indeed, a number of authors have categorised the main reasons behind the 
adoption of outsourcing into short-term cost-associated factors and long-term 
strategically driven motives (Elmuti et al., 1998; Canez et a/., 2000; 
Kakabadse and Kakbadse, 2000; Benson and Litter, 2002). The former is 
directly associated with the Transaction Cost Theory which mainly regards the 
outsourcing decision as a trade-off between low production costs and high 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). The latter is related to both the resource- 
based theory and the knowledge-based theory (see Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999) which view outsourcing as a strategy for building organizational 
capabilities, consolidating in-house competencies, and tapping into new 
learning opportunities (Madhok, 2002). 
From an economic view point, one of the important benefits that motivates the 
decision to outsource is cost saving (Finlay and King, 1999; Ketler and 
Walstrom, 1993; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993). The reduction in costs is 
mainly driven from the economies of scale realised by the seller and passed 
on to the client so as to gain competition. Certainly, through greater 
specialization that is enhanced by a process of aggregation among 
customers, the outsourcing supplier will be able to achieve a greater level of 
efficiencies (Judson, 1995; Sharpe, 1997). Nonetheless, Jennings (2002) 
warns that the anticipated cost improvements are not easy to be achieved and 
are subject to the supplier being in possession of three crucial "cost drivers", 
namely, economies of scale, learning curves and low cost locations. Lankford 
and Parsa (1999) make reference to multi-year agreements between the client 
and the outsourcing supplier as a pre-requisite for the promised cost savings. 
This idea is also echoed by Benson and Leronimo (1996) who stress that it 
may take companies some time (usually more than two years) to break-even 
following their engagement in an outsourcing venture. 
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Although, according to Loh and Venkatraman (1992b), theories that are based 
on economies of scale could be considered important tools for explaining the 
decision to outsource, exclusive focus on cost issues deviates our attention 
from the strategic opportunities that could be attained through outsourcing 
relationships (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). Indeed, as emphasised by Fill 
and Visser (2000, p. 43) "outsourcing is not just a costing exercise, it has a 
strategic dimension" The Louisiana State University case, where the success 
of the outsourcing process did not stem from cost saving but from quicker 
response to demand and increased productivity in backlog management, 
illustrates the importance of strategic, non-tactical2 factors in the outsourcing 
rationale (Zhu et al., 2001). Recognising the importance of long-term strategic 
thinking, Di Romualdo and Gurbaxani (1998) challenged the continuous 
applicability of scale economies models in outsourcing emphasising, instead, 
that this traditional rationale is losing its popularity in favour of more strategic 
driven benefits. Therefore, although the economic rationale has dominated the 
outsourcing decision during the last decade (Lacity and Hirchheim, 1993), this 
traditional approach has been recently complemented by a more strategic 
view of outsourcing (Quinn and Hilmer, 1995; Bartell, 1998; Elmuti and 
Kathawala, 2000, Jennings, 2002; Madhok, 2002). 
From a strategic point of view, outsourcing can be beneficial in terms of 
freeing up management time and resources, hence, allowing Chief Executives 
to focus on their core functions and on achieving strategic objectives 
(Blumberg, 1998; Lankford and Parsa, 1999; Kliem, 1999). Indeed, as early as 
1994, research by the PA Consulting Group reported that "freeing up 
management time to focus on core business activities was the third most 
popular benefit quoted" (Fowler and Jeffs, 1998, p. 119). This was further 
corroborated by more recent studies which stressed that outsourcing prevents 
2 Unlike strategic factors (which are always concerned with the long-run), tactical ones are exclusively 
related to short-term decision making. 
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management attention from being distracted (Sharpe, 1997; Embleton and 
Wright, 1998). In turn, this enhanced concentration on core activities is said to 
improve the quality of service offered by firms and enhances their flexibility in 
responding to increasingly volatile market conditions (Jurison, 1995; 
Razzaque and Sheng, 1998; Canez et al., 2000; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2000). In addition, while Quinn et a/. (1990) place emphasis on the benefit of 
outsourcing in reducing functional scope and providing increased 
concentration on core activities, Reve (1990) postulates that outsourcing could 
actually assist companies in increasing product diversification and in achieving 
economies of scope. In this sense, both the reduction in functional complexity 
and the achievement of greater focus could be seen as favourable conditions 
for the development of new products. 
An additional positive strategic outcome of outsourcing is the access to, and 
full utilisation of, external suppliers' specialised knowledge and expertise 
(Bartell, 1998; Blumberg, 1998; Lankford and Parsa, 1999; Kakabadse and 
Kakbadse, 2000; Zhu et aL, 2001). In fact, outsourcing permits access to 
skilled labour (and their specialised output), which the firm might, otherwise, 
find difficult and expensive to attract and retain (Jurison, 1995; Sharpe, 1997). 
The Apple case, where the firm outsourced 70% of its manufacturing process 
and, consequently, vastly benefited from the know-how and the technical 
expertise of its outsourcing suppliers, is a good example of the positive 
outcomes stemming from this accessibility to specialised knowledge (Quinn 
and Hilmer, 1995). 
Nevertheless, Jennings (2002) warns that failure to closely monitor and 
control the service provided by the outsourcing firm may limit the scope of 
quality improvement and may even result in quality deterioration. Along these 
lines, Lankford and Parsa (1999) underline the importance of monitoring and 
evaluating supplier performance on both the technical (quality, response time, 
technology used) and the functional customer service dimensions. Although 
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contractual pre-arrangements may be used to ensure that the performance of 
the supplier meets the criteria set by the service level agreement (SLA) (Lee, 
1996; Greaver, 1999; Zhu et al., 2001; Benn and Pearcy, 2002), Quinn and 
Hilmer (1995) argue that the firm must be adequately close to its supplier to 
ensure that the activity is being well performed. In order to achieve this, Bartell 
(1998) maintains that firms should not treat their outsourcing venture as a 
simple contracting out relationship but as a true partnership. Indeed, most 
academic outsourcing studies agree that the essence of a successful 
partnership is characterised by the presence of mutual understanding, trust, 
co-operation, shared objectives and continuous communication (Patterson 
and Haas, 1999; Hancox and Hackney, 2000; Jackson et al., 2001). Mclvor of 
a/. (1997) highlight the importance of qualitative factors in this new emerging 
form of outsourcing. As such, outsourcing success is described as a direct 
function of the quality of information sharing and the existence of collaborative 
attitudes (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000; Jackson et al., 2001). Unless 
such characteristics are present, the win-win situation called for by Elmuti et 
a/. (1998) would be unlikely to take place. 
As argued by Costa (2001), this notion of partnership in the post-outsourcing 
phase introduces a new set of challenges that have so far been neglected by 
the outsourcing literature. Indeed, the negative view of human behaviour 
which is characterised by self-interest and opportunism (as assumed by both 
Transaction Cost Theory and Agency Theory), raises some serious questions 
about the applicability of the emerging partnership trend in outsourcing 
ventures. Concerning this issue, Jennings (2002) calls for a need to 
understand and carefully assess the existing power structure between the two 
parties since the latter could have serious repercussions on the development 
of the relationship. In cases where the client becomes over-dependent on the 
vendor due to transactional factors such as `asset specificity; difficulties might 
emerge as the buying firm could become vulnerable to potential danger of 
opportunism (Williamson, 1979; 1985). A similar situation could also appear in 
33 
case of information anomalies where the outsourcing supplier is in possession 
of unique information which he is reluctant to share with the buyer (Quinn and 
Hilmer, 1995). Therefore, a true outsourcing partnership depends both on the 
existence of relationships among equals (Bartell, 1998) and on the continuity 
of information transparency between the two parties (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2000). The above set of challenges make the concept of 
partnership and its relation to outsourcing something of an ideal rather than a 
reality (Razzaque and Sheng, 1998), especially if we know that a true 
partnership necessitates a high level of commonality which is likely to be 
inhibited during the outsourcing process due to both parties' incompatible 
profit motive (Lacity, 1993; King, 1994). 
Given this degree of impracticability in relation to the notion of true partnership 
within outsourcing arrangements, Jackson et al. (2001) call for a more realistic 
balance between co-operation and competition within buyer-supplier 
relationships. In order to provide the appropriate environment that facilitates 
the achievement of such balanced relationships, an appropriate, formal 
process of partner selection is required (Razzaque and Sheng, 1998). Mclvor 
et al. (1997) stress the importance of qualitative factors. Indeed, apart from 
quantitative cost factors (discussed earlier), ensuring a good cultural and 
organisational structure match is considered among the most important critical 
success factors in outsourcing (McKeon, 1991 cited in Razzaque and Sheng, 
1998). Elmuti and Kathawala (2000) contend that the partner selection 
process within outsourcing arrangements should be based on both the 
supplier's expertise in the activity to be outsourced and its cultural fit with the 
organisation. This view could be associated with Bowman and Faulkner's 
(1997) cultural fit - strategic fit matrix. Although originally designed for 
application to strategic alliances, the matrix could also be applied to the 
outsourcing case, where a close relationship between the two parties is 
established. Whereas strategic fit would mean the ability of the outsourcing 
supplier to perform the activity being outsourced according to the expectation 
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of the buyer at a reasonable price, cultural fit would involve a suitable socio- 
cultural match in which understanding, mutuality and trust are promoted. 
Therefore, in order to properly manage the outsourcing relationship and yield 
positive outcomes, firms must select wisely their outsourcing suppliers and 
build trust in the relationship while maintaining control through both 
contractual mechanisms and performance-evaluation activities in an attempt 
to safeguard against any unexpected opportunistic behaviour. However, 
despite its importance, a recent study of Taiwanese enterprises engaged in IT 
outsourcing carried out by Hsu and Hsu (2005) showed that post-outsourcing 
performance evaluation is still uncommon. 
While the conceptual outcome-oriented literature highlighted a number of 
positive outsourcing outcomes, studies concerned with the effects of 
outsourcing have produced mixed results (Jennings, 2002). Moreover, hardly 
any studies have attempted to test the outsourcing-performance relationship 
(Gilley and Rasheed, 2000), "the evidence available [over outsourcing 
performance] is still insufficient to draw conclusive inferences from which to 
discern a conventional wisdom" (De Vita and Wang, 2006, p. 5). Although 
mostly based on anecdotal evidence, the conceptual literature reviewed in this 
section could represent an important foundation for further empirical studies 
and could, therefore, be employed as a blueprint for evaluating outsourcing 
performance at the empirical level. The latter could be conceptualised as the 
degree to which the expected outsourcing benefits (which are at the heart of 
the outsourcing motives) have been realised (Aubert et al., 1998; King and 
Malhotra, 2000). 
2.2.2.2 The empirical outcome-oriented literature 
The empirical outcome-oriented literature aims primarily to test elements of 
the 'conceptual wisdom' in relation to outsourcing outcomes. Its main objective 
is to offer empirical evidence (based on observation and / or experiment) to 
enlighten some of the controversial areas that overshadow the outsourcing- 
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performance relationship and to assess the actual realisation of the 
conceptual outsourcing benefits. Gonzalez et al. (2005) is one of the recent 
studies that attempted to empirically investigate various outsourcing success 
factors. In their study of Spanish firms, they found the main outsourcing 
success factors to be, in order of priority, `the provider's understanding of 
clients' objectives, choosing the right provider, and the client's clear idea of 
what is sought through outsourcing" (Gonzalez et al., 2005, p. 399). Even 
though, contrary to other literature, contract management was not included 
among the important criteria, it was actually found to be highly ranked among 
larger firms as opposed to smaller firms. 
A closer examination of the empirical outcome-literature reveals that the focus 
of most studies is on IT outsourcing, with little consideration of the difference 
between the types of activities being outsourced. Table 2.6 summarises the 
key findings of these studies. 
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Table 2.6: Key empirical findings of the outcome-oriented literature 
Outsourcing 
Source Findings Domain 
IS outsourcing success factors: 
Gonzalez et al. i) provider's understanding of client's objectives IS Outsourcing 
(2005) ii) Choosing the right provider 
iii) client's clear idea of what is sought through outsourcing 
(i) Strong positive relationship between the quality of outsourcing 
partnership and business satisfaction 
Lee and Kim (ii) Strong positive relationship between the quality of partnership IS Outsourcing 
(1999) and overall outsourcing satisfaction 
(iii) Trust is found to be a critical predictor of outsourcing success 
Grover et al. Positive role of partnership on the strength of relationship between 
(1996) the degree of outsourcing certain functions (such as IS Outsourcing 
telecommunications) and success 
Saunders et al 
(i) Getting the right mix between type of contract and type of 
. relation with the vendor is one of the important determinant of IS Outsourcing 
(1997) outsourcing success. 
(ii) IS activities could be successfully outsourced even if they are 
perceived to be core to the company (fight contract could be used) 
Poppo and Zenger 
(1998) The more specific the activity, the less satisfied managers are with 
IS Outsourcing 
the performance of the outsourced activity. 
Hotel leisure 
Rodriguez and 
Relationship between specificity of leisure services and activity performance of the activity is not negative, but neither is it 
Padilla (2005) significant. outsourcing 
Wang (2002) Asset specificity shows a negative effect on post contractual IS Outsourcing 
opportunism and a positive effect on outsourcing success 
(i) negative relationship between external sourcing and firm's 
Type of 
return on sales (ROS) activities being 
Mol and 
(ii) Positive relationship between external souring and firm's outsourced was market share 
Gedajlovic (2001) (iii) asset specificity was found to be an insignificant moderator for not considered 
the external sourcing-profitability relation 
(i) Market performance advantage of internal sourcing over global Type of external sourcing increases with increased asset specificity 
Murray and (ii) Asset specificity was significant moderator for financial but not activities being 
Kotabe (1995) strategic performance outsourced was 
not considered 
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(i) No significant direct effect of outsourcing intensity on firm Multiple 
Gilley and performance 
Rasheed (2000) (ii) No firm-level performance impact of outsourcing was detected 
outsourcing 
(iii) Firm strategy and environmental dynamism moderated the activities 
relationship between outsourcing and performance 
HR 
Lever (1997) Outsourcing in one area which may have secondary performance Outsourcing implications for other activities 
Dickmann and 
While key payroll activities were more costly when outsourced, Payroll 
there were efficiency gains in supplementary activities and lesser 
Tyson (2005) investment in IT software and maintenance Outsourcing 
As can be seen from Table 2.7, the studies included in our review covered 
mostly four broad areas, these being the impact of partnership on outsourcing 
performance, the relationship between asset specificity and performance of 
buyer-supplier relationships, the effect of outsourcing on firm performance, 
and key success factors of outsourcing. 
Table 2.7: Classification of the empirical outcome-oriented literature 
Studies 
Impact of 
partnership on 
outsourcing 
performance 
Relationship between 
(AS) and performance 
of buyer-supplier 
relationships 
Effect of 
outsourcing on 
firm performance 
Outsourcing 
key success 
factors 
Gonzalez et aL (2005) X 
Rodriguez & Padilla 
(2005) 
x 
Dickmann & Tyson 
(2005) 
x 
Wan 2002 
x 
Mol & Gedajlovic (2001) X 
Gilley & Rasheed (2000) X 
Ariz (1999) X 
Lee & Kim (1999) X 
Poppo & Zenger (1998) X 
Saunders et a1. (1997) X 
Lever(1997) 
X 
Grover eta/. (1996) X 
Murray & Kotabe (1995) X 
Heide & Stump (1995) X 
Heide & John (1990, 
1992 
x 
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With respect to the partnership, both Grover et al. (1996) and Lee and Kim 
(1999) found a positive relationship between the quality of the outsourcing 
partnership and the overall outsourcing satisfaction and success. Contrary to 
the general consensus in the literature over the effect of partnership, empirical 
evidence on the effect of asset specificity on outsourcing performance was 
inconclusive, with considerable discordance between different findings. 
Indeed, while Poppo and Zenger (1998) found that managers become less 
satisfied with the cost, quality and responsiveness of outsourced activities, as 
the latter become more specific, Wang's (2002) study revealed a positive 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing outcome. Moreover, 
although both Rodriquez and Padilla (2005) and Mol and Gedajlovic (2001) 
found no significant relationship between the specificity of the outsourced 
activity and its performance, Murray and Kotabe (1995) found asset specificity 
to be a significant moderator for financial but not for strategic performance. In 
a different study that focused on the determinants of outsourcing success, 
Saunders et al. (1997) found that IS activities could be successfully 
outsourced even if they are perceived to be core to the company. In such 
case, tight contract were highly recommended. As far as the relation between 
outsourcing level and firm performance is concerned, while Gilley and 
Racheed (2000) found no significant direct effect of outsourcing intensity on 
firm performance, both Levers (1997) and Dickmann and Tyson's (2005) 
studies revealed that outsourcing in one area may have secondary 
performance implications for other activities. 
These inconsistencies in findings coupled with an apparent focus on IT 
outsourcing and a failure of viewing asset specificity from a disaggregated 
angle (that looks at the effect of each dimension of asset specificity from both 
the buyer and suppliers' side), hinder our understanding of the 'true' 
outsourcing-performance relationship in general and, in particular, the effect of 
the degree of asset specificity on outsourcing outcomes. 
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2.2.3 A synthesis of the mapping of the outsourcing literature 
Section 2.3 mapped and assessed the relevant intellectual territory through a 
review of the outsourcing literature that synthesises and integrates different 
academic papers and research findings (see table 2.1). From this, significant 
patterns have emerged, leading the author to several conclusions. 
First, the absence of a common agreement over the definition and the use of a 
certain terminology (particularly asset specificity) led to a mass of often 
contradictory studies, the comparison of which is hindered by a high level of 
inconsistency and vagueness. 
Second, the over-emphasis on IT outsourcing has led to the under- 
representation of other types of activities being outsourced, which remain 
under-researched. Of the 73 outsourcing studies included in our review, 33 
(45%) were IS specific. In addition, of the 40 non-IS outsourcing studies, only 
7 (17.5%) were empirical in nature. Certainly, there are valuable insights to be 
gained by analysing outsourcing in a more empirical manner using different 
control variables. Taking into account types of activities being outsourced 
might reveal trends undetected by extant research. 
Third, an analysis of Table 2.1 shows that although both the process and 
outcome-oriented literature have been widely covered conceptually, few 
empirical studies have been carried out especially at the outcome level and, 
thus, the relationship between outsourcing and performance remains still 
empirically under-developed (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). Indeed, while it is 
empirically demonstrated that over the last decade there has been a dramatic 
increase in the adoption of outsourcing both in the manufacturing and the 
service sectors (Murray and Kotabe, 1999), it is far less apparent whether 
outsourcing actually leads to its expected outcomes. Does it indeed lead to 
improved firm performance through cost savings, greater access to external 
expertise, and enhanced focus and quality? Or does it actually lead to weaker 
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performance through deterioration in quality (King, 1994; Downey, 1995; 
Fowler and Jeffs, 1998), increased hidden cost (Earl, 1996; Embleton and 
Wright, 1998), and even the loss of critical skills and, the consequent, 
'hollowing out of corporations' (Bettis et aL, 1992). Interestingly though, a 
closer look at Table 2.1 reveals that the topic in relation to outsourcing 
performance is gradually gathering momentum. Indeed, while most empirical 
studies in the process-oriented literature took place before 1997, the majority 
of the empirical outcome-oriented literature has been carried out after 1997 
with a pick in year 2005. 
Finally, while TCT was one of the theories that were mostly referred to in the 
outsourcing literature (37% of papers reviewed), there seems to be some kind 
of controversy over the effect of TCT's most important construct (asset 
specificity) on outsourcing, in general, and on its outcomes in particular. 
Therefore, there is certainly sufficient evidence to argue that, in accordance 
with Dibbern et al. 's (2004) finding, outsourcing success is a dependant 
variable that represents a gap in our existing knowledge of outsourcing. 
Certainly, further systematic empirical research in this area is required. A 
precise theme on which more empirical work is clearly warranted is the effect 
of the degree of asset specificity on outsourcing success. 
2.3 Asset specificity 
Since asset specificity is the central theme of this thesis and given its 
widespread application in a variety of different research areas, there is an 
obvious need to first clarify its definition, and then critically review various 
methods of its operationalisation and measurement as employed by previous 
empirical studies. 
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2.3.1 Defining asset specificity 
The concept of asset specificity was initially employed by Marshall (1949, p. 
172) who coined the expression 'specialized ability' in his description of 
materials and processes required for special individual trades purposes. 
Polanyi's (1978) notion of personal knowledge was also linked to asset 
specificity. Along these lines and emphasising on the notion of the uniqueness 
of both tangible and intangible resources, Marschak (1968) strongly questions 
the unchallenged assumption in relation to the ease of replacing firm's certain 
assets with others. The concept of asset specificity, however, did not gain 
prominence until the emergence of Williamson's TCT in which asset specificity 
was argued to be the most important factor (alongside uncertainty and 
frequency) in determining the choice of governance and in explaining firms' 
decisions in relation to vertical integration (Williamson, 1979,1983). Its 
association with the constructs of opportunism and incomplete contracts, 
Klein's et al. (1978) concept of `appropriable quasi rents3° could be seen as a 
development and refinement of the construct of asset specificity that helped 
accentuating its significance as a leading factor in explaining the vertical 
integration rationale. 
Williamson defines asset specificity in terms of "the degree to which an asset 
can be redeployed to alternative uses by alternative users without sacrifice of 
productive value" (Williamson, 1985, p. 95; Williamson, 1988, p. 70). As such, 
the concept refers to: 
`durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular 
transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower 
in best alternative uses or by alternative user should the original 
transaction be prematurely terminated" (ibid, 1985, p. 55). 
3 The quasi-rent value of an asset is defined as "the excess of its value over its salvage value, that is, its 
value in its next best use to another renter" (Klein et al., 1978, p. 298). 
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These investments that characterise asset specificity may take various forms. 
Indeed, Williamson (1983, p. 526) distinguishes four types of asset specificity 
including i) Human asset specificity ii) Physical asset specificity iii) Site 
specificity iv) Dedicated asset specificity, to which both Brand name capital 
(Williamson, 1985,1988) and Temporal specificity (Malone et al., 1987; 
Masten el al., 1991, p. 9; Pirrong 1993) have been added; resulting in a total 
of six types of asset specificity and marking the start of the third stage in 
TCT's development. According to Joskow (1987, p. 170), although all types of 
asset specificity could be seen as "different instances from the same 
phenomenon", the differentiation between each of these types is highly 
valuable when it comes to empirical applications. 
Asset specificity has been presented by Williamson as the defining dimension 
of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975,1985,1986,1991,1996). 
The wide variety of industries and research areas in which this concept has 
been applied is a testament to its significance. In vertical integration, for 
example, asset specificity has been used to explain the make-or-buy 
decisions within the automobile industry (Monteverde and Teece, 1982; 
Walker and Weber, 1984), the aerospace industry (Masten, 1984; Adler et al., 
1998), the electronic industry (Nishiguchi, 1994), and the hotel industry 
(Lamminmaki, 2005; Rodriguez and Padilla, 2005). Other areas where this 
concept has been applied, include integration of the selling function (Anderson 
and Schmittlein, 1984; Anderson, 1985), contract duration in the electric 
generation industry (Joskow, 1987), vertical integration in the aluminium 
industry (Stuckey, 1983; Hennart, 1988), the design of remuneration contract 
(Deegan, 1997), and IT or software outsourcing (Wang, 2002; Aubert et al, 
2003; Dibbern et al., 2005). 
Despite the above, asset specificity has been criticised for being loosely 
defined (Barthelemy and Quelin, 2002), which explains the absence of a 
commonly agreed operationalisation of this concept (Lohtia et al., 1994; 
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Shelanski and Klein, 1995; David and Han, 2004). This problem was further 
highlighted by Fisher (1977, p. 322) who argued that "the concept enjoyed too 
many degrees of freedom". Sharing the same view, Joskow (1988, p. 96-97) 
raised suspicion over its grounding nature as the concept seemed to be fitting 
almost every situation. He states: "my concern was that one could always 
invent a specification of transactions that could rationalize almost anything". 
This weakness has also been acknowledged by Williamson (1979, p. 261) 
who noted that "identifying critical dimensions with respect to which 
transactions [specificity] differs has been a significant omission... The concept 
wants for definition" (1979, p. 233). Consequently, further attention to the 
development and evaluation of the definition of asset specificity and its 
measurement is called for (Shelanski and Klein, 1995, p. 340; Wiggins, 1991, 
p. 619). 
While most papers have chosen to directly quote Williamson's definition of 
asset specificity, a number of authors have tried to redefine the concept using 
their own interpretations (see Appendix 2.1). Although these attempts should 
be praised for trying to enrich our understanding of the concept by directing 
our attention to different individual dimensions of asset specificity, failure to 
systematically organise them in a blended framework leaves ambiguity over 
the complex meaning of asset specificity (David and Han, 2004). Indeed, even 
though existing literature has already pointed to the confusion caused by the 
lack of agreement over the specific understanding of the concept, to the 
author's knowledge, no formal classification of asset specificity definitions has 
yet been developed. 
In an attempt to address this issue and arrive at the specification of an 
operational and measurable construct of asset specificity, it is useful to 
categorise the various definitions according to the distinguishing features 
which they emphasise. According to Pfeffer (1993) such effort should facilitate 
both the systematic advancement of knowledge and the cumulative 
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development of theory, thus fulfilling the prime purpose of all these definitions, 
which is to serve future research (Akehurst, 1987, p. 5). 
Table 2.8: Categorisation of asset specificity definitions according to factors 
emphasised 
Source Kev Characteristics / Dimensions 
Kern (1999) 
13uvik and Anderson (2002) Degree of custontizalion heeded to support transactions 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) relationship Anderson (1985) 
Jurison (1995) 
I leide and John (1988) 
Erramilli and Rao (1993) Uniqueness of assets/investments to task or activity 
Widener and Selto (1999) 
Williamson (1979) The importance of the identity of the two parties in the 
Wiggins (1991) transaction process 
Rodriguez and Padilla (2005) 
Brown and Potoski (2005) Redepl(qment and transferability of assets /inº'estments Morill and Morill (2003) that are needed for supporting a particular transaction John and Weitz (1988) 
or production Murray and Kotabe (1995,1999) 
Aubert et al. (1996) 
Lohtia et al (1994) 
l3routhers and Brouthers (2003) 
1 leide and John (1990) The value of the asset outside a specific transactional 2004) Vining and Globerman (1999, 
relationship Barney and I lesterly (1996, p. 119) 
Walker and Weber (1984) 
Deegan (1997) 
Lamminmaki (2005) Continuing transaction relationship 
Lyons (1995) 
Note: A copy of all definitions considered in this table is included in Appendix 2.1 
As can be seen from Table 2.8, a central dimension that could be related to 
the definition of asset specificity is the degree of customisation needed to 
support the transaction or contractual relationship, including outsourcing 
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(Anderson, 1985; Heide and John, 1988). This involves the resources or 
assets that are devoted, on the one hand, by the supplier in carrying out the 
activity / service being transacted (Kern, 1999) and, on the other hand, by the 
buyer in dealing with a particular provider (Buvik and Anderson, 2002). 
The degree of customisation of these investments (both tangible and 
intangible) is determined by the degree of their uniqueness to the activity / 
service being transacted (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Widener and Selto, 1999) 
and by the extent of their capacity for redeployment and transferability to other 
activities outside the focal transaction relationship (Rodriguez and Padilla, 
2005; Brown and Potoski, 2005; Morill and Morill, 2003; John and Weitz, 
1988; Murray and Kotabe, 1995; 1999). According to Barney and Hesterly 
(1996, p. 119) the latter refers to "the difference in value between an 
investment's first best use (in the current transaction) and its second best use 
(in the some other transaction)". Indeed, the higher the level of asset 
specificity within a transactional relationship, the lower its value outside the 
same relationship (Walker and Weber; 1984; Williamson, 1985; Heide and 
John, 1990; Lohtia et al., 1994; Aubert et al., 1996; Barney and Hesterly, 
1996; Vining and Globerman, 1999; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Vining 
and Globerman, 2004). The difference in value is referred to by Klein et al. 
(1978, p. 298) as "appropriable quasi rents". Hence, the greater the specificity 
level embedded in a transaction relationship, the higher its quasi rent stream 
(Deegan, 1997). 
This reduced value outside the intended transaction relationship reflects the 
importance of the transactional parties' identity (Williamson, 1979). One 
typical and highly illustrative example is the identity of a trading party between 
a building owner and the owner of the land on which the building rests 
(Wiggins, 1991). Under such circumstances, the value of both the land and 
the building depend on continued trade between the two owners. This 
suggests that under conditions of high asset specificity, the value of the asset, 
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customised to the transactional relationship, would be tied up to the 
continuance of the same transaction relationship (Deegan, 1997; 
Lamminmaki, 2005; Lyons, 1995). Consequently, should the relationship 
cease to continue, both parties would be at risk of losing the value of the 
investment initially devoted to that transaction relationship. By way of contrast, 
a continued relationship could create `a lock in situation' that could 
opportunistically be exploited by one party or another to the detriment of the 
potential benefits of the transaction relationship (Williamson, 1979; 1985). 
Indeed, as suggested by the reactance theory4, dependent or locked-in parties 
usually react by trying to resist partner influence attempts, which would result 
in greater relationship conflict and less overall satisfaction (Joshi and Arnold, 
1997). 
In the light of the above discussion, a number of dimensions in relation to 
Williamson's asset specificity can be identified: 
i) Extent of resources devoted by both buyer and supplier for the 
support of the transaction; 
ii) Degree of transferability / redeployment of these resources; 
iii) The difference in value between the investment current use and its 
future best use; 
iv) The importance of the identity of the two parties; 
v) The importance of the continuance of the relationship and the 
consequent, degree of lock-in and dependence. 
4 The reactance theory was introduced by Brehm (1966) and suggests that when constraints on freedom 
are imposed, the party experiencing these constraints will become increasingly motivated to counter 
these restrictions. 
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The identification of the above dimensions along which the degree of asset 
specificity could vary in a transactional / contractual relationship (including 
outsourcing), improves our understanding of the concept and builds a better 
conceptual definition of the term, which ultimately facilitates both its 
operationalisation and measurement. 
One of the main problems faced by researchers in their empirical testing of 
Williamson's Transaction Cost Theory is without doubt the measurement of 
the degree of asset specificity (Wiggins, 1991; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). 
Morill and Morill (2003) argue that such construct is not directly observable, 
requiring the use of multiple indicators capable of capturing its complexity. 
Wang (2002, p. 168) attributes the inconsistencies in TCT's empirical findings 
to the multiple operationalisations of the specificity concept stemming from its 
abstract and multidimensional nature. Sharing the same view, Joskow (1988, 
p. 106) describes the task of measuring the degree of asset specificity as a 
challenging mission stressing that "we are certainly not going to find these 
measures written down neatly in a book of industry statistics. The best that we 
can hope for is more qualitative information on variations in the importance of 
asset specificity". Shelanski and Klein (1995, p. 339) frame the issue well as 
follows "empirical research in TCT is often hampered by confusion about the 
definition, and therefore the empirical parameterisations of key variables [such 
as asset specificity]" Although Williamson (1979) tried to rectify the 
operationalisation "weakness" in relation to the asset specificity construct by 
breaking the degree of specificity into three broad categories (non-specific, 
mixed and highly specific), the measurement of the concept remains a difficult 
task on which Williamson offered little guidance (Lohtia et al., 1994; Mclvor, 
2000). 
As a result, attempts to measure this construct have often been subject to 
profound criticism. While Masten et al. (1991) note that most empirical 
48 
research relied on qualitative and "imprecise proxies" which, according to 
Wiggins (1991), are open to multiple interpretations, both Anderson (1985) 
and Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) call for a more comprehensive scale 
development allowing for better measurements of the concept and, hence, for 
the progress and development of theories relating to it (Churchill, 1979). 
Concerning this issue, Lohtia et al. (1994) noted the uni-dimensionality way by 
which researchers have so far operationalised the asset specificity construct, 
and highlighted the need for future empirical studies to count for its multi- 
dimensionalily and employ measures that are disaggregated by types of 
dimensions so as to be able to shed light on the theoretical ramifications of 
each dimension of transaction-specific assets. 
In the search for such measures, this section reviews various asset specificity 
measures that have been employed by the most significant empirical studies 
across a broad range of contexts and disciplinary areas. Such inter- 
disciplinary interaction should yield better cross-fertilized methods and ideas 
that would, consequently, enhance both the conceptualisation and the 
measurement of the specificity construct. 
2.3.2 An overview of empirical studies of asset specificity 
A review of the empirical literature in relation to asset specificity reveals the 
use of different dimensions through which the concept was measured and 
articulated. These dimensions coincide with Williamson's typology of asset 
specificity, which distinguishes six types of asset specificity (see previous 
discussion in section 2.4.1). Joskow (1987) emphasised the importance to 
consider these multifaceted aspects of specificity so as to ensure consistent 
empirical research on the same construct. While different studies have taken 
into account, to various extents, these types of asset specificity, other papers 
have chosen to measure the concept at the procedural level (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995) or even at a broad level. Table 2.9 presents a list of 
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authors and their works, indicating the measurement levels they have 
covered, the research method they have employed, and the research setting 
adopted in their studies. To the author's knowledge, this represents the first 
attempt to undertake a comprehensive measure comparison in relation to 
asset specificity. 
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In their measurement of the asset specificity construct, most studies reviewed 
made use of mail questionnaires in which they employed the Likert-type 
scales. Nonetheless, the table reveals little uniformity in the number of scale 
steps used as they ranged from 5-point fully labelled rating scale (eg. 
Dragonetti et al., 2003) to 10-point variants labelled only at the extreme and 
midpoints (eg. Monteverde and Teece, 1982). The seven-point Likert scale 
was, however, the most frequently used. While the majority of studies have 
used primary data through survey instruments like questionnaires, interviews 
or a mixture of both (see John and Weitz, 1988; Lyons, 1995; Nishiguchi, 
1994), other studies (Lieberman, 1991; Levy, 1985; Adler et al., 1998; Mol and 
Gedajlovic, 2001; Houston and Johnson, 2000) have relied on secondary data 
sources such as sales reports. 
Even though the human asset specificity factor has been described by 
Williamson (1979,1986) as the most difficult to operationalise due to its 
intangible nature, it is striking to note that in accordance with Lohtia et al. 
(1994) and David and Han's (2004) findings, this factor was the most 
frequently considered in the empirical studies reviewed. This could be 
explained by the fact that direct measures of asset specificity have often 
focused on the people intensive nature of the construct (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997), which could be seen as inevitable since "specific human capital 
is central to transactions" (Williamson, 1979, p. 244). Nevertheless, this over- 
emphasis on human asset specificity seems to have detracted attention from 
considering the other types of asset specificity. Indeed, as could be seen from 
the review of studies (summarised in Table 2.8), apart from physical asset 
specificity (which has received as high attention as the one given to human 
specificity), the other four types have seldom been considered in empirical 
research. 
Moreover, although multi-item scale was widely used, multi-measures of 
specificity have found little application despite their potential to increase 
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reliability and to reduce both measurement errors (Churchill, 1979) and the 
threat of common-method variance (Widener and Selto, 1999). In fact, the 
vast majority of studies has relied on one or two types of specificity in their 
measurement of the entire construct. As such, no attempts have been made 
to provide a comprehensive measure of specificity through the consideration 
of its various types and dimensions. One distinctive exception was 
Lamminmaki's (2005) study of outsourcing in the Hotel Industry. However, 
although his study tried to explore the asset specificity concept through the 
application of Williamson's-six dimensional typology, the research was 
constrained to a single industry, was based only on 11 hotels, relied on 
descriptive qualitative assessment of specificity and, in the end, failed to offer 
any quantitative measures of the construct. 
It is also interesting to note that, in an attempt to measure asset specificity, 
some studies (eg: Aubert et aL, 2003; Brown and Potoski, 2005) relied on the 
direct citation of Williamson's definition of the concept in their questionnaire 
asking respondents to evaluate its level using Likert-type scales. Such broad 
means are unlikely to encapsulate the various and complex underlying 
dimensions of the concept, thus threatening the validity and reliability of the 
measurement. 
Furthermore, although there was agreement in the literature that asset 
specificity involves resources dedicated by both buyer and supplier in support 
of their transactional relationship, with the exception of a few studies 
(Rodriguez and Padilla, 2005; Ghani and Khan, 2004; Bucklin and Sengupta, 
1993; Heide and John, 1990 and 1992), most measures employed focused on 
the degree of investment made by the supplier. This could be due to the fact 
that suppliers are more likely to devote additional resources since they are the 
ones that carry out the activity being transacted or outsourced (Barthelemy 
and Quelin, 2002). More importantly, it is difficult and perhaps unpractical to 
carry out research by surveying both suppliers and buyers. Nevertheless, this 
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issue could be overcome by surveying one party within the relationship (eg. 
buyers) and use their perceptions of the extent of resources devoted by their 
counterpart (providers) for the unique purpose of the relationship. The use of 
buyers' perception in relation to suppliers or providers should not negatively 
affect the measurement validity of the concept since previous studies showed 
that suppliers and buyers share consistent perceptions not only of the 
performance of the exchange relationship (Anderson and Narus, 1990) but 
also of the attributes of exchange (Heide and John, 1990). 
As far as the research context is concerned, it is interesting to note that, in 
agreement with Shelanski and Klein's (1995) claim, few outsourcing studies 
have investigated the asset specificity concept in a multi-industry level and 
across different types of outsourcing. Indeed, most of the studies reviewed 
(see Table 9) were either based on a single industry (Rodriguez and Padilla, 
2005; Anderson, 1985; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984) or were 
predominantly focusing on a single type of outsourcing such as IT outsourcing 
(Wang, 2002; Aubert et al., 2003; Dibbern et al., 2005; Poppo and Zenger; 
1998). Levy (1985) was among the very few exceptions that studied asset 
specificity across different industries and in different types of outsourcing, 
however, his research was based purely on secondary data unlikely to yield 
reliable measurement (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
Given the deficiencies outlined in relation to the multi-dimension coverage of 
the concept, this research seeks to bridge this void through the use of 
measures that represent as much of the construct 'space' or domain as 
possible while trying to simultaneously satisfy key methodological criteria. 
Indeed, according to Sharfman and Dean (1991, p. 712) the use of such multi- 
dimensional measures are "acceptable, and in some cases, essential" as long 
as they meet important methodological criteria. 
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On this basis, in this research, operationalisation issues in relation to each of 
the six specificity types will be taken into account. An additional measurement 
level that will be considered is the degree of the procedural specificity caused 
by the relationship. The discussion of all these measures will not focus on one 
party but will include both buyers and suppliers. 
2.3.2.1 Human asset specificity 
Human asset specificity refers to "the degree to which skills, knowledge and 
experience of firm's personnel are specific to the requirements of dealing with 
another firm" (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995, p. 377). It could be 
characterised as knowledge specific assets (Dibbern et al., 2005) that arise 
from learning-by-doing (Williamson, 1996, p. 105) and which are not 
transferable due to their limited application in other work settings 
(Lamminmaki, 2005). According to Ruchala (1997), human asset specificity 
involves not only the expertise that is required for carrying out a particular 
activity but also the costs of training and the development of a corporate 
culture that facilitates and supports the interaction within the transaction 
relationship. This type of asset specificity was the type most frequently 
considered by the variety of measurement approaches that have been applied 
(see Table 2.10). 
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Table 2.10: A review of human asset specificity measurement approaches 
Party Measurement Approaches Source 
Dibbem et at (2005); Poppo and 
Uniqueness of required knowledge in relation to: Zenger (1998) ; Wang (2002) ; 
i) the activity being transacted, ii) buyer's business; Morill and Morill (2003); Rodriguez 
iii) the industry within which the buyer is operatin. g and Padilla (2005); Anderson 
(1985); Andserson and Schmittlein 
Eg: (Length of time required to become familiar with firm's (1984). Widener and Selto (1999); 
products and customers) Klein and Roth (1990); Klein et at (1990), John and Weitz (1988) 
Degree to which the activity / service is custom-tailored to 
Poppo and Zenger (1998), Wang 
(2002) 
the buyers company 
Walker and Poppo (1991); Masten 
Uniqueness of technical skills and experience required in et at (1991); John and Weitz 
carrying out the activity / service being transacted (1988) 
Monteverde and Teece (1982); 
Amount of effort required in order to carry out the activity Masten et at. (1991) 
E : Estimated Labour his /Estimated cost of the contract) Adler et al. (1998) 
Provider Party Anderson and Schmittlein (1984); 
(supplier) The level of access to confidential information required in Anderson (1985); Widener and Anderson Selto Weiss and (1999); carrying out the activity (use of proprietary knowledge) 
, 
Klein (199 et et at L 0 (1992) 
Wang (2002); Lamminmaki (2005); 
Murray and Kotabe (1995,1999). 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994, 
The level of additional training (in time and money) and the 1995); Widener and Selto (1999); 
cost of extra recruitment required due to the customized Heide and John (1992); Weiss and 
nature of the activity (specialized know-how). Anderson (1992); Bucklin and Sengupta (1993); Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2003) 
Number of subcontractor's employees / Number of its Nishiguchi (1994) 
re ular customers 
Intensity of the RandD activities 
Houston and Johnson (2000) 
Annual hours spent by supplier personnel interacting with Dibbem et at (2005) buyer and the degree of social collaboration between firm 
and supplier 
Cost and time required to switch vendor Rodriquez and Padilla (2005); 
(including: search, contract negotiation, supervising Poppo and Zenger (1998) 
B P t compliance to contract) uyer ar y 
(Company engaging in Hours spent by buyers' personnel at suppliers' plant; Ghani and Khan (2004); Heide and outsourcing) Level of assistance provided to supplier 
John (1992) 
Additional recruited staff uniquely needed to support the Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) 
transaction relationship 
In their measurement of the level of human asset specificity, most studies 
focused on the additional requirements that are placed on the supplier side 
and which are specifically and uniquely tailored to the support of their 
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relationship with clients. In particular, most attention was directed to the level 
of additional but unique training that is required due to the customised nature 
of the activity (Lamminmaki, 2005; Murray and Kotabe, 1995,1999; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1994; Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2003). In addition to the uniqueness of the required knowledge in 
relation to the activity being transacted (Dibbern et al., 2005; Poppo and 
Zenger, 1998; Wang, 2002; Morill and Morill, 2003; Rodriguez and Padilla, 
2005; Widener and Selto, 1999; Klein and Roth, 1990), the extent of 
knowledge about the firm and the industry within which the buyer is operating 
was also employed as a proxy for human asset specificity. Indeed, in 
measuring the specificity of the working relationship between a sales person 
and his or her organization both Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and 
Anderson (1985) have associated the degree of the human asset specificity 
with the level of difficulty that a salesperson faces in learning about the ins 
and outs" of the organisation. The latter has been measured by John and 
Weitz (1988) through their assessment of the length of time a newly recruited 
sales person would need to familiarize himself with the firm's products and 
customers. Morill and Morill (2003) measured the human asset specificity 
involved in the outsourcing of the auditing activity by the extent of the buyer's 
industry specific data that is required by the supplier in carrying out the 
auditing activity. The extent of knowledge concerning the client business and 
industry have also been widely conceptualised in the literature by the extent of 
supplier's accessibility to confidential information (Weiss and Anderson, 1992; 
Klein et aL, 1990; Anderson, 1985; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984). 
Moreover, other authors have made reference to the uniqueness of technical 
skills and experience required in carrying out the activity or service being 
transacted (Walker and Poppo, 1991; John and Weitz, 1988), which has been 
broadly operationalised by both Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Masten et 
a/. (1991) in terms of the amount of effort necessary for the carrying out of the 
activity. This amount of effort could be seen, in turn, as a consequence of the 
60 
degree by which the activity or service is custom-tailored to the buyer's firm 
(Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Wang, 2002). A direct quantitative measure of the 
effort made by the supplier has been employed by Adler et al. (1998) by 
dividing the estimated labour hours required over the estimated cost of the 
contract. In a similar vein, Dibbern et al. (2005) looked at annual hours spent 
by supplier personnel interacting with buyer. The same study tried to include 
also the buyer party in their measurement by considering the degree of social 
collaboration between the firm engaging in outsourcing and its provider. 
Other quantitative measures that could give us an idea about the degree of 
human asset specificity involved but which, in the author's view, should not be 
employed in isolation (due to their broad nature) are the ones presented by 
Nishiguchi (1994) and Houston and Johnson (2000). While the former divided 
the number of subcontractor's employees by the number of its regular 
customers, the latter used the intensity of RandD expenditure in the supplying 
firm as a measure for human asset specificity. This approach, which gives us 
an idea about the degree of knowledge-based assets at the firm's level, was 
employed as a proxy for transaction-level expenditures since it was assumed 
that "fine-level measures are likely highly correlated with the characteristics of 
a given transaction for that firm" (Houston and Johnson, 2000, p. 7). However, 
relying solely on such a measure could make the research results vulnerable 
to potential "misspecification problems" (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003, p. 
1182). 
One common factor about the above measurement approaches is that they all 
focused on the extent of resources devoted by the supplier party within the 
transactional relationship but failed to include other factors. In fact, the extent 
of the redeployment of these resources and the importance of the continuity of 
the relationship (two asset specificity dimensions that were drawn in section 
2.1) were not directly measured. The latter was, however, operationalised by 
few studies that focused on the buyer side through their investigation of the 
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cost and time required to switch vendor (Rodriquez and Padilla, 2005; Poppo 
and Zenger, 1998). Other factors that were employed in the measurement of 
the human asset specificity from the buyer perspective are the additional 
recruitments made by buyers for the unique purpose of the transactional 
relationship (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993) and their level of assistance 
provided to suppliers (Heide and John, 1992). The latter was measured by the 
number of hours spent by buyer's personnel at the supplier's plant (Ghani and 
Khan, 2004). 
2.3.2.2 Physical asset specificity 
While human asset specificity has been described as complex and difficult to 
be quantitatively operationalised, physical asset specificity is typically 
portrayed as an asset specificity type whose assessment is "relatively 
straightforward" (Williamson, 1996, p. 108). Physical asset specificity could be 
defined as investments (made by one or both parties) in physical assets that 
are tailored to that transaction and, hence, have little alternative uses due to 
their specific (design) characteristics (Williamson, 1983; Joskow, 1987,1988; 
Morill and Morill, 2003). One interesting example of such specificity type was 
the one cited by Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and which refers to the 
investments made by a 'Boeing' supplier for wing manufacturing facility. Due 
to the customisation of these wings to a specific Boeing plane, the facility 
would have little value in other wing trading relationships. Another example is 
a pipeline constructed by a mining company from its premises to the property 
of a particular purchaser (Deegan, 1997). This example, however, involves 
also some elements of another type of asset specificity, this being site 
specificity which will be discussed later. 
Among the studies in our review, physical asset specificity was the second 
most frequent type of asset specificity considered in the opeartionalisation of 
the construct. Table 2.11 presents the different measurement approaches that 
were employed. 
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Table 2.11: A review of physical asset specificity measurement 
approaches 
Party Measurement Approaches Source 
Uniqueness and specialization of equipments, Klein and Roth (1990); 
components and facilities that are required for Stump and Heide (1996); 
the purpose of the transaction relationship Walker and Poppo (1991) 
Specificity of the required physical assets to the Masten et at (1991) 
activity or application being transacted 
Scope of work contents of subcontracting Nishiguchi (1994) 
Highly standardised. V. Highly specialised Masten (1984) 
Extent of component complexity 
Monteverde and Teece 
(1982); 
ý Possibility of using the required physical asset Lyons (1995) 
Q Supplier Party in other applications outside the relationshi 
CO 
4" % of supplier equipment that would need to be Ghani and Khan (2004) 
y scrapped should the relationship cease 
N Heide and John (1990); Q Murray and Kotabe (1995, 
7i Extent of investment made by supplier in 1999); Weiss and 
physical assets tailored to the relationship 
Anderson (1992), Klein et 
al. (1990); Lieberman 
(1991); Bucklin and 
Sen u to (1993) 
CL Final contract value / seller-firm sales on year Adler et at (1998) 
contract completed 
Minimum efficient size required / Industry sales Levy (1985) 
Randl) Expenditure 
Extent of investment made by buyer in physical 
Heide and John (1990); 
Heide and John (1992); 
assets that are tailored to the relationship Bucklin and Sengupta 
Buyer Party (1993), 
Extent of the specialised tools required in Heide and John (1992) 
dealing with the supplier 
One obvious way to assess the extent of physical asset specificity is to 
measure the uniqueness of equipments and tools required by the supplier for 
the purpose of the transactional relationship through the use of multi-items 
scale reflecting the degree of their specificity to the relationship in general 
(Klein and Roth, 1990; Stump and Heide, 1996; Walker and Poppo, 1991) and 
to the activity or service being transacted in particular (Masten et al., 1991; 
Nishiguchi, 1994). Nevertheless, given the total reliance of this measurement 
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approach on the perception of respondents, most studies have chosen to 
operationalise the physical asset specificity in terms of the extent of the actual 
investments in physical assets made by suppliers specifically for the purpose 
of the transactional relationship (Heide and John, 1990; Murray and Kotabe, 
1995,1999; Weiss and Anderson, 1992; Klein et al., 1990; Lieberman, 1991; 
Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993). Masten (1984) considered component 
complexity an important factor in reflecting the degree of physical asset 
specificity. Yet, while the complexity feature is in most cases correlated with 
the degree of asset specificity, the two factors remain, according to Malone et 
al. (1987, p. 486), "logically independent". 
Although all these approaches help us to obtain a partial indication of the 
degree of physical asset specificity, such proxies fail to depict whether or not 
investments in physical assets possess an alternative value outside the 
transactional relationship (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Lyons (1995) 
addressed this issue by incorporating in his measurement approach the 
possible redeployment of those physical assets in other applications outside 
the relationship. The extent of redeployment has been negatively linked, by 
Gahni and Khan (2004), to the percentage of the supplier's equipments that 
would have to be scrapped should any of the two parties choose to withdraw 
from the relationship. The little attention that has been given to the 
redeployment criterion could be explained by the fact that in some outsourcing 
arrangements dedicated employees and equipments need to be transferred to 
the vendor, which reduces the importance of the redeployment factor 
(Barthelemy and Quelin, 2002). 
Other attempts to measure the physical asset specificity construct by means 
of secondary data instead of primary data, include the studies by both Adler et 
a/. (1998) and Levy (1985). The former used the relative importance of the 
contract value as a proxy for physical asset specificity by dividing the final 
contract value over the supplier sales of the year the contract was completed. 
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The latter employed similar but much broader industry level measures by 
dividing the minimum efficient required size over industry sales. The same 
study also employed RandD expenditure at the buying firm as a proxy for 
physical asset specificity. This approach informs the degree of innovation 
involved and, hence, could be used as an indicator of the potential degree of 
customisation within the buyer's firm to which the supplier should adopt. 
These measures, though, should be treated with caution as they are vague 
and imprecise. 
Few studies assessed the physical asset specificity construct from the buyer 
perspective. They measured the construct in terms of the specificity of 
physical assets that the buyers had to make in order to support the transaction 
relationship (Heide and John, 1992) and the consequent degree of investment 
they incurred (Heide and John, 1990; Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993). The 
extent of redeployment of these assets has not, however, been considered. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the same redeployment measures 
employed to the supplier party (for example the one proposed by Ghani and 
Khan, 2004) could also be applicable to the buyer party. 
2.3.2.3 Site specificity 
Site Specificity refers to a situation where the buyer and provider are involved 
in a "cheek-by-jowl" relationship with one another due to the importance of 
close proximity in reducing inventory and other related processing costs and, 
hence, facilitating the trading relationship between the two parties. Once in 
place, however, the assets involved are highly immobile and, thus, the cost of 
their relocation is high (Williamson, 1983; Joskow, 1988; Morill and Morill, 
2003; Lamminmaki, 2005). Commenting on the importance of location in such 
relationships, Ruchala (1997, p. 21) sates that "without this site, a very 
inexpensive [transaction] would become very expensive" A typical illustration 
of site specificity is the case of some electric generating plants that have 
chosen to be placed next to particular mines with the expectation of a potential 
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long-term coal supply relationship with these specific mines (Joskow, 1987, p. 
170). Apart from this example of "mine-mouth" plants, another interesting 
example is the outsourcing of restaurant service by hotels where about the 
subcontractor makes custom-tailored restaurant fitting investments that have 
little value outside the hotel site (Lamminmaki, 2005). 
In our review, it was also revealed that site specificity was less popular than 
human asset specificity and physical asset specificity, and concerns more the 
supplier party who is more likely to incur such site-related, non-redeployable, 
investment. Table 2.12 summarises the few measurement approaches 
employed. 
Table 2.12: A review of site specificity measurement approaches 
Party Measurement Approaches Source 
Physical proximity Joskow (1987) 
w 
0 No of kilometers between subcontractor and the Nishiguchi (1994) 
"ý Customer premise Ghani and Khan (2004) 
Supplier Part CL y 
Proportion of inputs shipped within 500 miles of Levy (1985) 
Cl) plant 
Importance of co-location of facilities or Masten (1984) 
processes 
Most studies focused their measurement on the physical proximity between 
the two parties and used the distance between subcontractor and the 
customer's premises as a proxy for site specificity (Joskow, 1987; Nishiguchi, 
1994; Ghani and Khan, 2004). In a similar vein, Levy (1985) made use of 
secondary data to categorise the degree of site specificity of certain 
transactions depending on the proportion of inputs shipped within 500 miles of 
plant. Nevertheless, these studies have not considered in their measurements 
the possibility to relocate the assets involved in the relationship and they did 
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not investigate whether or not physical proximity was specifically due to the 
transactional relationship. Although Masten (1984) touched upon the 
importance of the location of the facilities involved in the relationship, he did 
not explicitly measure the degree of their mobility and the potential outcomes 
of their relocation. 
2.3.2.4 Dedicated asset specificity 
The distinction between physical and dedicated asset specificity is difficult to 
articulate (Marshall, 2001). Dedicated asset specificity refers to those assets 
that are of general purpose as opposed to specialised uses (physical asset 
specificity) but which have been made for a particular transactional agreement 
that is likely to entail long term trading relationship. Should this relationship 
end prematurely, excess capacity will, however, be created (Williamson, 1983; 
Joskow, 1987; Lamminmaki, 2005). A production contract with one large 
customer may cause a firm to expand its capacity to meet demand, which 
would ultimately result in significant over capacity and important financial 
disruption if the customer in question chooses not to renew the contract 
(Ruchala, 1997). 
Although the majority of studies measured this dimension exclusively in 
relation to the supplier party, dedicated asset specificity could under certain 
circumstances be related to an investment made by the buyer (eg. additional 
investment in laboratory accessories that help firm to assess the quality of a 
bigger proportion of goods acquired). 
2.3.2.5 Temporal specificity 
Temporal or time specificity refers to transactional relationships where timing 
and coordination are of high importance (Lamminmaki, 2005). It could be 
linked to site specificity where the criticality lies on a well-timed response from 
on-site human assets (Lohtia et al., 1994). According to Malone et al. (1987, 
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p. 486) "an asset is time specific if its value is highly dependent on its reaching 
the user within a specified, relatively limited period of time" 
Examples of this asset specificity dimension include inputs that must reach the 
manufacturing process at a precise time in order to avoid additional costs. 
One typical illustration of this, which was widely cited in the literature (see 
Masten et al., 1991; Pirrong, 1993; Lohtia et al., 1994; Lamminmaki, 2005) is 
the case of shipbuilding construction where the ability to hold buffer stock is 
limited and, hence, timely delivery within the transaction relationship becomes 
vital to prevent costly delays. In the hotel industry, temporal specificity could 
be described as high in the case of laundry and cleaning outsourcing 
(Lamminmaki, 2005). 
In cases of high temporal specificity, firms engaging in outsourcing might, 
therefore, be vulnerable to opportunistic behavior from the part of suppliers 
who can opportunistically threaten to suspend delivery at last minute (Masten 
et al., 1991, p. 9). 
Our review indicates that only few studies have attempted to measure the 
degree of temporal specificity. Masten et al. (1991) employed the need for 
precise scheduling within the transactional relationship as a proxy for temporal 
specificity. Lamminmaki (2005) associated the construct to the importance of 
timely delivery of clean linen in the hotel industry. In carrying out their survey 
concerning public managers' perceptions of the degree of specificity within 64 
common municipal services, Brown and Potoski (2005) measured temporal 
specificity by asking respondent, using five-point Likert scale, to rate the 
requirement that the service reach the user within a relatively limited period of 
time in order to prevent any deterioration in the quality of the service in 
question. By its nature such investment could only be incurred by the service 
receiver (the buyer's side) who, by engaging in an outsourcing relationship, 
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could run the risk of a last-minute delivery suspension or delay (Masten et al., 
1991). 
2.3.2.6 Brand name capital 
Brand name capital could be directly related to reputation investment. Indeed, 
a transactional relationship, which involves activities that could have a direct 
and high effect on the overall firm reputation, could be described as of high 
brand name capital specificity. In such case, the subcontractor (the supplier) 
could find itself in a position enabling it to intentionally or unintentionally cause 
damage to the firm's (the buyer) reputation (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; 
Lohtia et al., 1994; Lamminmaki, 2005). A typical example of this is the 
outsourcing of restaurants within the hotel industry, where a bad reputation 
could prove to be very costly to the overall hotel business (Lamminmaki, 
2005). Since some industries are more reputation sensitive than others, the 
degree of the brand name dimension's effect could, hence, depend on the 
type of industry within which the transactional relationship is taking place. 
Nevertheless, the idea of reputation could actually be reciprocal as any 
underperformance from the subcontractor side could result in its own 
reputation being affected. As such, and against TCT's line of thinking, the 
presence of capital brand could actually serve to safeguard against, rather 
than encourage, any opportunistic behavior from both sides within the 
transactional relationship since each party has its own reputation to protect 
(Lamminmaki, 2005). Both Levy (1985) and Gatignon and Anderson (1988) 
measured the degree of brand name capital by the extent of advertising 
expenditure intensity calculated using the advertising/sales ratio. 
2.3.2.7 Procedural asset specificity 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995, p. 377) were the first to fully develop and 
measure the construct in an attempt to capture the physical asset specificity 
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dimension in the service industry, where considerable investment in physical 
components and tools are unlikely to be involved. The term refers to the 
organisation routines and workflows that are tailored to a particular transaction 
relationship and which are difficult to modify once created or redeploy to other 
purposes inside the firm without a reduction in their value. The same could 
also be referred to as "relational specificity" which is an equivalent type of 
asset specificity that has been cited by Barthelemy and Quelin (2002, p. 6). 
Although the concept, as articulated by Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995), was 
originally employed to cover for the lack of attention given to the potential 
effect of the asset specificity concept within the service industry, procedural 
asset specificity has found its use stretched to other industries including the 
manufacturing ones. Indeed, with the exception of Barthelemy and Quelin, 
2002, although most papers have not treated procedural asset specificity as a 
separate type of specificity and have not directly stated the term, many 
researchers seem actually to have included, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, this concept in their operationalisation of the asset specificity 
construct despite the fact that their research setting was not specifically a 
service industry (eg: Stump and Heide, 1996; Klein et al., 1990; Heide and 
John, 1992). Table 2.13 recapitulates the procedural asset specificity 
measurement approaches. 
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Table 2.13: A review of procedural asset specificity measurement approaches 
Party Measurement Approaches Source Industry 
Degree of adaptation of the task to be Rodriguez and 
performed to the peculiarities of the Padilla (2005) 
buyer Service Industry 
Degree of customisation of supplier Zaheer and 
hotel industry 
workflows and routines (degree of Venkatraman 
specialised forms, manuals, (1994-1995) 
procedures, etc... ) 
Supplier Extent of investment made by supplier Heide and Component 
in procedures and routines that are John (1990) Manufacturing 
tailored to the relationship 
Difficulty to learn the buyer's ways of 
Klein et al. 
(1990) 
U) doing thins 
Several industries 
ä 
n Required adaptation of the production Stump and a process and system including Heide (1996) MaChemical nufacturing customised routines and procedures Industry 
v 
o Degree of customized product system Heide and 
required to deal with the supplier 
John (1992) Manufacturing 
Industry 
Extent of investment made by the buyer Heide and components manufacturing) in procedures and routines that are John (1990) 
tailored to the relationship 
Buyer 
Extent to which dealing with providers 
implied changes for. 
1) the other employees in the buying Barthelemy 
firm and Quelin (20 Several industries 2) the overall functioning of the client 
firm 
As can be seen from the above table, the procedural asset specificity 
measurement approaches focused on the degree of customisation of the 
supplier routines and workflows to the peculiarities of the buying firm, which 
has been assessed using a multi-item scale approach reflecting the 
respondents' perceptions (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994,1995; Rodriguez 
and Padilla, 2005; Stump and Heide, 1996). Along these lines, Heide and 
John (1990) considered the extent of investments that suppliers had to incur in 
order to develop such customized routines, which has been associated by 
71 
Klein et al. (1990, p. 202) with the difficulty to learn the buyer's ways of doing 
things. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the same situation could be 
applicable to the buying firm which can find itself in circumstances where it 
has to adapt its procedures and routines for the sake of the transaction 
relationship (Heide and John, 1990,1992; Barthelemy and Quelin, 2002). 
Therefore, any attempts to measure procedural asset specificity should take 
into account both perspectives. 
Again, whether or not these customised routines and workflows could possess 
a general purpose and could, therefore, be redeployed to other functions 
within the firm, has not been taken into account in the measurement of the 
construct. 
2.3.3 A validity assessment of asset specificity measurement 
While most studies have operationalised the asset specificity concept focusing 
either on its procedural level or relying on one ore more elements of 
Williamson's typology, a number of authors have chosen to measure the 
specificity construct at its broad level. Such broad measures could be used as 
a kind of validity assessment of the overall degree of asset specificity in a 
given transactional relationship. 
Placing emphasis on the importance of the identity of the two parties, most 
papers tried to assess the degree of dependence involved in the relationship 
and the consequent level of significance in relation to the continuity of that 
relationship. In so doing, a number of authors employed the extent of 
resources (in time and money) required to switch partner as a proxy for the 
degree of dependence and for the extent of the lock-in situation involved in the 
relationship (Heide and John, 1988; Dragonetti et al., 2003; Maltz, 1993, 
Barthelemy and Quelin, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Rodriguez and 
Padilla, 2005), which could be associated with the level of potential difficulties 
raised by one of the partners in case of contract termination (Weiss and 
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Anderson, 1992). While the above studies used primary data in their 
measurement, other studies that relied on secondary data include Mol and 
Gedajlovic (2001). The latter measured asset specificity in broad terms by 
dividing total investments by the industry over total turnover of the industry. 
Nonetheless, although Mol and Gedajlovic (2001, p. 11) argue that this 
method "provides a consistent and theoretically appropriate measure of the 
level of asset specific investments in a given year, such measurement 
approach should be employed with caution since it only provides an 
evaluation of the degree of specificity at the industry level with no regard for 
the specific relationship involved in the transaction. In his study of vertical 
integration by electric utilities into coal production, Joskow (1987) employed a 
similar but more precise measurement approach by dividing the total plant 
utilisation of coal over its total utilisation by the utility. 
2.4 Outsourcing performance 
Given the lack of agreement over outsourcing outcomes and their 
measurement, this section tries to provide a review that synthesises and 
integrates various outsourcing performance measurements that have been 
employed by key empirical studies. Table 2.14 presents a summary of 
different measures employed by different studies. 
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Table 2.14: Summary of outsourcing performance measurement 
methods 
Types of 
Source Measurement Methods measurement Mode Key 
Informant 
Qualitative Quantitative 
strategic accounting 
Goodman et *Overall satisfaction 
al. (1995) 
Product characteristics, Delivery 
pbs, inquiry handling 
(communication), X Questionnaire Not specified 
*Intention to switch vendor 
Poppo and *overall cost 
Zenger *quality of output X Questionnaire Senior (IS) 
(1998) *responsiveness to problems Manager 
Lee and *Impact on business performance 
Kim (1999) (degree of achieving the expected Interview Representativ 
strategic, economic, and preceded by 
technological benefits) questionnaire es in charge 
*User satisfaction of IS 
(reliability, relevancy, timeliness, operations accuracy, currency, and X 
completeness of information 
from the perspective of the end- 
customer 
Grover et *satisfaction with strategic, 
at. (1996) economic, and technological 
outsourcing benefits 
Provider's contribution to: 
i) focus on core business Questionnaire ii) increasing IS competence IS Top iii) increased access to skilled X 
personnel Executives 
iv) economies of scale 
v) control of IS expenses 
vi) avoidance of obsolescence 
risk 
vii) increase access to key IT. 
*service quality 
i) tangible (physical facilities) 
ii) reliability (ability to perform 
service dependable and 
accurately) 
Saunders et 4 dimensions: Managers that 
al. (1997) i) economic signed/ ii) Technological X 
Interview 
iii) strategic administrated 
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iv) overall satisfaction with 1S 
contract outsourcing 
outsourcing success =f (tight agreement 
contract+ partnership) 
Wang Cost and benefits attained by the 
(2002) outsourced activity Questionnaire Chief Based on Grover et al. (1996) X Information 
outsourcing success scale: 
strategic, economic, Officer (CIO) 
technological 
Gilley and Firm performance 
Rasheed 5-point Likert scale 
(2000) Financial indicators 
Return on asset, Return on sales, Questionnaire 
and overall financial performance Double 
compared with similar firms in respondent 
their industry for 2 periods (last (CEO) + 12 months and 5 years ago) 
Another 
Non-financial performance X X Executive 
relative to their competitors 
chosen by the i) process innovation 
ii) product innovation CEO 
iii) employee compensation 
iv) job satisfaction 
v) customer relations 
vi) supplier relations 
Rodriquez *Performance of the activity 
and Padilla being outsourced 
(2005) 7-point Likert Scale 
a) satisfaction with cost X degree to which cost 
improvement was better or worse Questionnaire 
than expected Hotel b) satisfaction with quality 
the extent to which the activity Manager 
needs further improvement 
*Organisation performance 
Subjective measurement 
a) efficiency 
b) effectiveness 
c) adaptability 
d) quality 
e) satisfaction 
Murray and Market performance was defined 
Kotabe relative to the product's three 
(1995) largest competitor's Top and p i) market share 
ii) sales growth rate 
X Questionnaire Middle 
iii) Return on sales Managers 
iv) return on investment 
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Mol and Firm performance 
Gedajlovic a) R. on sales = Net profit/ total 
(2001) sales 
reflects financial performance of 
Secondary (Na) 
business unit 
data Secondary 
X Data 
b) Market share sales this year 
over total sales in 3-digit industry 
market performance of a 
business unit 
Lever 3 subjective measures 
(1997, p. (a) satisfaction with the activity Top HR 
39) (b) effectiveness of the activity X 
Questionnaire 
Executive (c) No of complaints in relation 
to the activity 
Lacity et al. 7 measures for outsourcing 
(1996, p. success 
15) 1. Extent of achievement of cost 
savings 
2. service level maintained or 
improved 
3. satisfaction of client X Interview CIO 4. No of disputes between 
vendor-client 
5. degree of responsiveness and 
attention made by vendor 
6. do outcomes matches 
objectives 
7. was the contract renewed 
Aubert et Degree to which undesirable 
al. (1999) outcomes have occurred or are X Interview CEO 
likely to occur 
Lacity and Degree to which expected cost 
Willcocks savings were achieved (indicator X Interview CEO and IT 
(1998, p. of success) 
367 Managers 
Note: Extracts from questionnaires are included in Appendix 2.4 
As can be seen from the above table, the studies that were included in our 
review made use of two broad types of outsourcing performance 
measurement: quantitative accounting and qualitative strategic type 
measures. While the former deals with cost savings and financial 
performance, the latter relates to strategic benefits, including the quality of the 
service received. 
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As far as the former is concerned, a number of papers (Murray and Kotabe, 
1995; Mol and Gedajlovic, 2001; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000) made use of 
accounting ratios such as return on sales, market shares, sales growth rates 
and return on investment. Since these market-performance measures fail to 
address the outsourcing strategic dimension (discussed earlier in section 
2.2.1) and since performance objectives may differ from one firm to another, 
this kind of measures are unlikely to reflect the true objectives of responding 
firms and, hence, capture the real dimension of their outsourcing performance. 
In addition, these accounting measures should be benchmarked against the 
firm's competitors, which is difficult to do in practice. 
For these reasons, other papers have chosen to rely on more qualitative 
measures, which fall into two broad categories. These are the degree of 
realisation of the expected benefits and the overall satisfaction with 
outsourcing performance (Lee and Kim, 1999). The former was divided in 
most cases into strategic, economic and technological benefits (Saunders et 
al., 1997; Lee and Kim, 1999; Wang, 2002). The latter was divided into three 
subjective measures; these being: (i) satisfaction with the outsourced activity; 
(ii) effectiveness of the activity; and (iii) number of complaints in relation to the 
activity (Lever, 1997; Rodriguez and Padilla, 2005). Nevertheless, since 
different firms might have different reasons for outsourcing (the why), studies 
based uniquely on assessment of benefits realised may portray an unreliable 
picture of outsourcing success. Some studies (eg. Lacity and Willcocks, 1998) 
have even chosen to base the measurement of outsourcing success uniquely 
on the most cited expected outsourcing outcome: expected cost savings. 
Certainly, used alone, such measure cannot encapsulate the full dimension of 
outsourcing success. 
It appears evident to the author that an additional set of measures that take 
into account the post-outsourcing management phase and precisely the 
buyer-supplier relationship should also be considered. Indeed, one recurrent 
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issue that became apparent while reviewing the literature was the clear 
recognition across both process and outcome research streams of the 
strategic role that the buyer-supplier collaborative ties play in outsourcing. 
Therefore, empirical studies willing to investigate a causal relationship that 
involves outsourcing performance should take into consideration the degree of 
collaborative ties (involved in the outsourcing relationship) and ultimately 
control for its effect on outsourcing performance. Measures of collaborative 
ties could include the degree of assistance and information sharing (Ghani 
and Khan, 2004), as well as responsiveness to raising queries and problems 
(Lacity et al., 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
The initial mapping of the outsourcing literature distinguished between the 
process and outcome-oriented studies and highlighted the empirical under- 
representation of the latter. Within this type of literature, Transaction Cost 
Theory and its related notion of asset specificity appeared to be prominent, 
albeit still requiring greater empirical attention. The second part of the chapter 
focused on the notion of asset specificity, clarified its defining features, and 
critically discussed past attempts at its operationalisation. This part of the 
chapter concluded that asset specificity is a multi-dimensional construct 
deserving disaggregated empirical attention. The chapter ended with a 
discussion of the various measurements of outsourcing performance. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH MODEL AND 
HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Chapter overview 
By offering a critical review of the outsourcing-related literature, the 
previous chapter drew attention to the lack of empirical work at the 
outcome-oriented level in general and of the effect of asset specificity on 
outsourcing performance in particular. Studies that deal with asset 
specificity and / or outsourcing performance were, thereafter, discussed 
and a number of issues related to the operationalisation of their various 
dimensions were highlighted. 
Using the twin lenses of the transaction cost theory and the strategy- 
related literature, this chapter distils a number of hypotheses in relation to 
the impact of asset specificity upon outsourcing performance, which will 
then, be used to develop the research model to be tested. 
3.2 Transaction cost theory, asset specificity and outsourcing 
From the critical mapping of the outsourcing literature carried out in the 
previous chapter (see Table 2.1), Transaction Cost Theory (henceforth 
TCT) emerged as the dominant theoretical explanation for the outsourcing 
phenomenon. The theory could be traced back to Coase's (1937) seminal 
work which displayed the first attempt to formulate a theory of the firm and 
to introduce the puzzling dilemma in relation to why economic activities 
were organised within firms. Adding more predictive power to this line of 
thinking, Williamson (1971,1975) complemented the Coasian work by 
firstly linking the transaction to vertical integration and subsequently by 
identifying particular transaction characteristics under which a 'hierarchy' 
would be the preferred governance option (Williamson, 1979,1985). 
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The transaction cost treatment of vertical integration seems to have 
proceeded in stages during which developments in a series of key themes 
have progressively taken place. The first and most influential was the 
general theoretical argument that constitutes a verbal statement of the 
theory basic assumptions and a claim that "a priori case for the vertical 
integration of production exists" (Williamson, 1971, p. 122). This was, then, 
given dimensional characterisation in which a number of transaction 
attributes were described as playing an important role in comparative 
governance choices (Williamson, 1979). Mathematical opeartionalisations 
and empirical elaborations were, thereafter, introduced (eg. Masten, 1984; 
Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Joscow, 1987; Heide and John, 1990; Klein 
et al., 1990; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). 
Williamson presented TCT as a theory that is based on two key 
behavioural assumptions, being opportunism and bounded rationality. The 
former is interpreted as self-interest with guile (Williamson, 1985, p. 47), 
while the latter entails that human actors are intendedly rational but only 
limitedly so (Simon, 1976). The central outcomes or implications of these 
two key behavioural assumptions are: (i) complex contracts are inevitably 
incomplete due to bounded rationality; (ii) relying on contract-as-promise is 
likely to result in hazards caused by opportunism; (iii) added value is 
expected from economising on bounded rationality and safeguarding 
against likely opportunism (Williamson, 1999a). In other words, because 
transacting parties are unable to fully predict all possible future scenarios 
due to bounded rationality, they cannot draft fully specified contracts and, 
hence, contracts will inevitably be incomplete. Under such conditions, one 
party may act opportunistically and exploit contract ambiguities to its own 
advantage and, consequently, at the other party expense. To minimise 
such opportunism, higher transaction costs including costs of drafting, 
negotiating, and maintaining contractual relationships (Ex-ante), and costs 
of monitoring contractual performance, enforcing contractual promises and 
dealing with any potential contract breaches (Ex post), must all be incurred 
(Brown and Potoski, 2005). As such the firm would be regarded as the 
better option given its ability to economise on transaction costs through its 
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natural and more efficient internal control mechanism which stems from 
both its 'constitutional authority' and its 'conflict resolution machinery' 
(Williamson, 1971). Indeed, while within a firm disputes between parties 
can be dealt with by 'fiat'1, in market transaction parties will have to turn to 
law and legal system; which reduces the efficiency of markets as 
compared to firms (Klein et al., 1978). As such, it could be argued that TCT 
is emphasising the role of the firm as an opportunism restrictor (Plunket 
and Saussier, 2003). 
"Distinctive advantage of the firm, however, is the wider 
variety and greater sensitivity of control instruments that are 
available for enforcing intra-firm in comparison with inter-firm 
activities. Not only does the firm have the constitutional 
authority and low cost access to the requisite data which 
permit it to perform more precise own-performance 
evaluations than can a buyer, but its reward and penalty 
instruments are more refined. Especially relevant in this 
connection is that, when conflicts develop, the firm 
possesses a comparatively efficient conflict resolution 
machinery. To illustrate, fiat is frequently a more efficient way 
to settle minor conflicts than is haggling or litigation". 
(Williamson, 1971, pp. 113-114). 
The inclusion of such behavioural assumptions, which were directly related 
to the nature of human beings, was important since it marked a departure 
from a straightforward analytical economic perspective to a more 
psychological one (Foster, 2000). 
1 "Fiat has its origins in the employment contract" (Williamson, 1991, p. 274)... "The contract 
law of internal organisation is that of forbearance according to which a firm becomes its own court 
of ultimate appeal. Firms for this reason are able to exercise fiat that the markets cannot. This [in 
turn] influences the choice of alternative modes of governance" (Williamson, 2002, p. 178) "as 
costly haggling could be avoided" (Williamson 1985: 76). (For more explicit details of the term 
`fiat', see Williamson, 1991, p. 274-275). 
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Upon further reflection and following this general statement which places 
transaction at the heart of firm boundary choices, Williamson (1979,1983) 
added a dimensional characterisation to his initial theoretical statement 
through the identification of three principal attributes with respect to which 
transactions differ and upon which boundary or governance choices would 
be made. These include frequency with which transactions recur, the 
uncertainty to which transactions are subject to, and the level of asset 
specificity involved in transactions. Although all these exchange 
characteristics can be important, this thesis focuses primarily on the latter 
which was subsequently described by Williamson as the most significant 
dimension to which "TCT owes much of its predictive content" (Williamson, 
1985, p. 56) and on which "a good deal of TCT's explanatory power turns" 
(Williamson, 1999b, p. 1089). The importance of asset specificity has been 
empirically backed by Shelanski and Klein (1995) who found that 
governance choices are mainly determined by the level of asset specificity 
involved in the transaction exchange. 
TCT postulates that transactions requiring high level of asset specificity 
increase the risk of opportunistic behaviour that stems from the post- 
contracting bargaining power and the threat of terminating the contract 
(Klein et al., 1978). Given the bounded rationality assumption, firms will 
have to incur extremely high transaction costs in both the formulation of 
appropriate contracts (Ex-ante) and the post-outsourcing close monitoring 
costs (Ex-post) in an attempt to be safeguarded against any potential 
opportunistic behaviour. Thus, the involvement of high asset specificity 
raises dramatically the transaction costs in relation to market governance 
(Williamson, 1985) of which outsourcing is a typical example. 
Failure to be fully safeguarded (not unlikely given the bounded rationality 
assumption which leads to incomplete contracts), would mean that the 
party incurring highly specific investments that are not redeployable in 
nature, will be locked into the transaction, hence leaving itself vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour from the other party which, in turn, could choose to 
use its bargaining power in an attempt to lower the expected quality or 
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raise the agreed price to the detriment of the overall outsourcing 
performance. This creates what Williamson describes as a monopoly 
relationship whereby the disadvantaged party faces the unpleasant choice 
of continuing to work with its opportunistic partner or forgo the expected 
value of its specific investment (Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Anderson 
and Coughlan, 1987). For example, in the flexible packaging industry2, a 
firm could choose to outsource the extrusion activity of its polypropylene 
(PP) products and in so doing may make investments in some kind of 
software program enabling the direct placement of orders as demands for 
PP packaging products from their own customers arise. Given the nature of 
flexible plastic packaging products which require high customisation (due 
to differences in thickness, colour, width, type of printing) and high speed 
of delivery, the program would allow the firm to pass its requirements to its 
outsourcing supplier in a quick manner as orders from their own customers 
come through. However, because of its low salvage value outside that 
particular transaction relationship, such investment makes it costly to the 
flexible plastic packaging company to switch to a new supplier. The 
supplier, knowing that the buyer is somewhat 'locked-in' to the relationship, 
may have an incentive to behave opportunistically. For example, the PP 
plastic rolls supplier could demand price increases and insist on 
renegotiating its contract after the flexible plastic manufacturing (the buyer) 
has had irreversibly committed itself to the exchange. Thus, such 
investments could make the buyer vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour, 
hence negatively affecting the outsourcing performance unless appropriate 
but generally highly costly safeguard mechanisms (due to bounded 
rationality) can be designed (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985). 
An additional example that is worth citing is one to do with software 
outsourcing that requires a high level of specific know-how and, therefore, 
involves high human asset specificity. Such specific investments may not 
only lead to likely opportunistic behaviour from the buyer but also to 
potential underinvestment in human asset specificity from the supplier 
2 The industry in which the author spent two years working 
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during contract execution in an attempt to minimize the extent of potential 
hazard in case of opportunism (Wang, 2002). Such underinvestment may 
well indirectly affect the quality of the service received by the buyer and, 
consequently, negatively affect outsourcing performance. As such, in 
accordance with TCT, it follows that, investments of high asset specific 
content in a given outsourcing relationship may lower the expected benefits 
of the outsourcing transaction to the detriment of the overall quality of the 
relationship. 
On the basis of the above discussion, and disaggregating by buyer- 
supplier asset specificity dimensions as suggested by Lohtia et al. (1994), 
the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis Ia: An increase in buyers' asset specificity across 
different dimensions of non re-deployable investments, in a given 
transactional outsourcing relationship, will negatively affect 
outsourcing performance. 
Hypothesis 1 b: An increase in suppliers' asset specificity across 
different dimensions of non re-deployable investments, in a given 
transactional outsourcing relationship, will negatively affect 
outsourcing performance. 
Nevertheless, many scholars have challenged TCT's basic assumption 
regarding opportunistic behaviour and the resulting hierarchical 
governance structure when highly specific assets are involved in a 
transaction. According to Hill (1990), the transaction cost rationale for 
internalisation has been overstated and has not taken into account the fact 
that, in the long run, the invisible hand of market forces 'erases' actors 
whose behaviour is habitually opportunistic. In fact, over time, cooperative 
rather than opportunistic behaviour will prevail since any mal-adaptation 
that hinders the transactional relationship or any internalisation as a 
response to the threat of opportunism, is likely to ultimately dissipate some 
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of the quasi rent that is inherent in a transaction supported by specific 
asset investments. An additional critique places emphasis on the important 
role that suppliers' reputation could play in minimising opportunistic 
behaviour in case of high specificity involvement in the outsourcing 
transaction relationship (Joskow, 1985; Coase, 1988; Ring and Van De 
Ven, 1992). Indeed, as argued by Klein and Leffler (1981) both parties in 
an exchange have their reputation to protect and any attempt to renege on 
the contract is likely to be accompanied by an adverse effect on their 
reputation. Moreover, although the value of incorporating concepts, such 
as partnership and trust into the transaction cost reasoning, is debatable 
(Williamson, 1993), recent studies highlight the importance of these 
concepts in increasing our understanding of outsourcing performance (Lee 
and Kim, 1999; Murray, 2001). Furthermore, Conner and Prahalad (1996) 
stress that opportunist-free behaviour will not necessarily lead to market 
contracting. Knowledge-based considerations must also be taken into 
account. They argue that it is differences in knowledge rather than the 
presence of opportunism which dictates the decision of the governance 
mode. A common theme that cuts across the above critiques is that they all 
come from the strategy-related literature which would be considered in 
more detail in the following section. 
3.3 Strategy-related literature, asset specificity and outsourcing 
At the opposite end of the economic explanation of the firm and its 
boundaries (which places emphasis on transaction efficiency) we can 
position the strategic literature inspired by Penrose's (1959) seminal work 
in management research on resources and competencies. Within this 
tradition, researchers have been trying to analyse the effect of strategies 
such as outsourcing on firm's competitiveness, from a range of 
perspectives in terms of concepts such as strategic competency (Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1990; Cox, 1996), the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996), 
dynamic capabilities (Teece, et al., 1997), and the learning organisation 
(Nonaka, 1994). For the purpose of this thesis and in order to prevent any 
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confusion, the author has chosen to assemble all of these distinct yet 
interrelated theoretical streams under one common umbrella called the 
strategy-related literature. The multifaceted application of these concepts 
and the lack of consistency in their use could partly be explained by the 
fact that the strategy literature is still far from being a coherent perspective 
(Foss, 1996). This, in turn, could be due to both its epistemic content 
(Foss, 1996) and its eclectic nature. This terminological ambiguity within 
the strategy-related literature has also been noted by Tsang (2000, p. 216) 
who wrote: 
"There is a considerable amount of terminological ambiguity 
in the RB literature. Theorists have used concepts such as 
resources, assets, competencies, and capabilities in a rather 
liberal manner and sometimes, different meanings are 
attached to the same concept by different theorists" 
Although this collection of strategic concepts does offer significant insights 
with respect to outsourcing beyond the economic considerations of TCT 
(see section 3.2.1), the strategy-related literature does require further 
analysis since it offers various streams each of which could potentially 
complement and enrich the transaction cost explanation of the role of asset 
specificity in outsourcing. This study identifies three different streams of 
strategy-related literature that could inform the relationship between asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance. 
The First stream of strategy-related literature: "The core competence 
approach" (Asset specificity as a core competence) 
The first stream of strategy related literature redefines asset specificity in 
terms of a core competence that distinguishes the firm from its rivals 
(Reve, 1990; Cox, 1996). The idea of core competence and its relationship 
with outsourcing decisions could be originally related to the study of Hamel 
and Prahalad (1990) in which they warn of the potential danger of 
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measuring competitiveness in terms of price. This has been followed by the 
work of Quinn and Hilmer (1995) where the need for firms to focus its 
resources on a set of core competence is clearly underlined. Schoemaker 
(1992) contends that core competences have to be distinctive, durable, 
controllable and able to generate success. This view has been echoed by 
Grant (1996) who argues that higher specificity generates specific 
knowledge, culture, and routines that are difficult to imitate and the 
accumulation of which results in core competence that enhances internal 
efficiency and coordination. Indeed, Sony's core competence in 
miniaturisation and Canon's core capabilities in optics and imaging, for 
instance, have allowed the two companies to become significant players in 
their respective markets (Mclvor of al., 1997; Mclvor, 2000). Capitalizing on 
the work of Reve (1990), Cox (1996, p. 61) defines high asset specificity as 
follows: 
"High asset specificity refers to the skills and expertise that 
are the core competences of the firm in sustaining their 
position to make profit in a market. These transactions should 
always be undertaken within the firm if it is to retain its ability 
to make profits". 
The above quote clearly demonstrates that at least one strand of the 
strategy literature equates the notion of asset specificity to that of core 
competence. Whilst this could be seen as a gross distortion of the TCT 
meaning of asset specifcity, the same idea has been put forward by 
Espino-Rodriguez and Padron-Robaina (2006, p. 55) who contend that: 
"The RBV considers that the firm must possess unique 
resources that enable it to achieve competitive advantage. This 
uniqueness can be seen in terms of specificity (Williamson, 
1991)... Therefore, when the activity to be outsourced comprises 
idiosyncratic resources, relying on external sources to develop 
those specific relationships may be very costly... Thus one can 
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conclude that both perspectives [TCT and RBV] determine the 
organizational boundaries depending on the possession of 
specialised assets, equipment or routines, and specific skills, 
although they differ in their approaches. " 
Indeed within this stream of the strategy-related literature, firm's advantage 
over market has been described as having nothing to do with mitigating 
opportunism hazard. Instead, it is said to derive from the firm ability to 
supply shared values, language and coding schemes (the 'higher order 
organizing principles' described by Kogut and Zander, 1992) which the 
market supposedly cannot supply. Indeed, according to Coff (2003) 
transfer within the firm is facilitated by shared language which generates a 
bundle of distinctive capabilities, the accumulation of which creates core 
competence. The latter must be protected by firms by 'sticking to their 
knitting' and, therefore, outsource only those activities which are 
considered 'non-core' (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990; Quinn and Hilmer, 
1995; Razzaque and Sheng, 1998). Based on this line of thinking, the 
reason for internalising an activity shifts from market failure (highlighted by 
opportunistic behaviour according to TCT) to firm's superior capabilities 
stemming from the distinctive ways through which activities are performed 
within firms (Teece et at., 1997) which in turn can be a valuable source of 
competitive advantage (Conner, 1991; Barney, 1991). As such, the 
rationale for internalising an activity or a function has been redefined from 
"an avoider of a negative" (avoider of opportunism) to "a creator of a 
positive" (Conner, p. 1991, p. 139). 
If we were to distill any hypothesis based on the above stream of thinking, 
it would be: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the 
internalisation of activities, under asset specificity conditions 
(core competence) and firm performance. 
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Nevertheless, since our primary focus in this thesis is directed towards 
outsourcing rather than internalisation, it becomes particularly useful for 
the purpose of this research to consider the mirror-image of hypothesis 2 
so as to re-direct attention from the benefit of internalising highly asset 
specific activities (in terms of core competence) to the danger of 
outsourcing such activities. As such, it should be noted that although the 
idea that core competences should not be outsourced is questioned by 
Alexander and Young (1996, p. 117) who argue that "the conclusion that 
such activities should not be outsourced is at least open to challenge", 
most academic studies warn of the danger of outsourcing a core 
competence (eg., Willcocks et al., 1995; Quinn and Hilmer, 1995; Cox, 
1996; Quinn, 1999; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). As highlighted by 
Rodriguez and Padilla (2005, p. 400) "activities that are specific should not 
be outsourced because they are the ones that enable competitive 
advantage to be developed". One example illustrating the danger of 
outsourcing core competence is the case of IBM, where the company 
outsourced semiconductor ships to finally find itself at a serious 
disadvantage vis-ä-vis its competitors (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). 
Indeed, according to researchers within this tradition, companies should 
only outsource activities that do not form part of its core competences 
(Quinn and Hilmer, 1995). This has been backed up by Quinn (1999, p. 12) 
who contends that: 
"Once a company develops a true best-in-world core 
competency, it should never outsource it and may even have to 
build defensive rings of essential competencies that customers 
insist it have or that protect its core"". 
The danger of outsourcing a core competence has been further 
corroborated by Poppo and Zenger's (1998, p. 872) research which found 
that "significant performance losses accrue as firms choose to coordinate 
: firm-specific [core competence] IS activities in the market" 
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Therefore, based on the above and in accordance with the inference made 
by Rodriguez and Padilla (2005, p. 400), if asset specificity is to be 
redefined as a core competence, then the following hypothesis (which 
could be regarded the mirror-image of hypothesis 2) could be made: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between the 
specificity (core competence) of the outsourced activity and 
outsourcing performance 
Nevertheless, the idea of core competence protection through 
internalisation could be criticised for its asset immobility assumption which 
could become a potential source of rigidities and inertia (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989) failing to account for the process by which both individual 
and common capabilities could be developed through close outsourcing 
relationships between suppliers and buyers (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999). Indeed, while outsourcing may in some occasions bring about the 
risk of undermining the isolating mechanisms for protecting competencies, 
it can represent a valuable source of new knowledge, generating, hence, a 
positive externality (Baden-Fuller et aL, 2000). 
These above critiques gave birth to a second stream of the strategy-related 
literature which, through its emphasis on both the learning potential of 
outsourcing and the importance of relational capability, seems to introduce 
a new protection mechanism that differs from the internalisation option that 
is promoted by TCT when high asset specificity is involved. Indeed, this 
second stream regards outsourcing as an opportunity for learning by which 
performance would be enhanced through a process of close relationship 
and cooperation that would serve as safeguard mechanisms under 
conditions of high asset specificity (as defined by TCT). 
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The second stream of the strategy-related literature: Relational 
exchange and inter-firm collaboration 
The potential benefits and capabilities stemming from interactions among 
firms have only recently begun to attract attention (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999). As such, a growing literature in the strategic management domain 
has started to focus on the importance of looking beyond the internal firm 
competence in the search for new resources and capabilities (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000) bringing about the appearance of the dynamic 
capabilities concept which as a coordinative management process opens 
the door to the potential for inter-organisational learning" (Teece and 
Pisano, 1994, p. 545). This is said to have provided a platform upon which 
a theory of inter-firm collaboration can be built (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 
2004). At the heart of this perspective is the idea that in order to keep pace 
with the changing environment, firm capabilities must constantly be 
redefined and so do firm's input-output relationships (Loasby, 1998). The 
implication of this idea on outsourcing has been clearly exemplified by De 
Vita and Wang (2006) who, drawing on the case of the PC maker Dell, 
have demonstrated how the velocity of change within industries have 
brought about the appearance of a new generation of outsourcing that is 
characterised by less rigid boundaries and where both information and 
knowledge sharing are facilitated by trust-based cooperative relationships. 
This emphasis on organizational networks (of which outsourcing could be 
an example) as a vehicle for knowledge creation (Grant, 1996) and as a 
stimulus for capability development, learning and innovation (Axelsson and 
Easton, 1992; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Powell et al., 1996) raises 
questions over TCT's opportunistic assumption which does not take into 
account the benefits that can be attained and deployed through intensive 
relationships that could take place in outsourcing ventures (Zajac and 
Olsen, 1993; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2000). Such 'relational govemance, as described by Poppo and Zenger 
(2002), is likely to positively affect transactional exchange (outsourcing) 
performance (Saxton, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
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Indeed, according to Argyres and Liebeskind (1999) the net economic 
surplus through the tying up of exchange relations could offset the costs 
associated with the specific investment in exchange relations in which case 
"opportunism-independent knowledge-based considerations can outweigh 
opportunism-related ones" (Conner and Prahalad, 1996, p. 489). Bearing 
this in mind and based on the notion of the "shadow of the future" (Axelrod, 
1984, p. 126), parties within the transaction are, therefore, likely to act with 
the expectations of future economic relations, which would restrict 
opportunistic behaviour in the current period. This line of thinking has 
brought about general agreement between scholars on the assumption that 
an increased level of relational content in an exchange is likely to 
encourage cooperation between transactors and thus discourage 
opportunistic behaviour (Noordeweir et al., 1990). For example, Hill (1990) 
challenges the recommendation that integration is the best way to deal with 
opportunism issues that arise due to high specific investments and instead 
suggests that the construction of a long-term relationship based on 
cooperation and trust could be optimal. This has been backed up by 
Chiles and McMackin (1996, p. 88) who maintain that "the introduction of 
trust in the TCE model can alter the efficient boundaries of the firm" by 
decreasing both the ex-ante and ex-post contracting costs and, hence, 
economising on the overall transaction costs. Similarly, in the search for an 
alternative view to Transaction Cost, Zajac and Olsen (1993) make 
reference to a transactional value perspective that is based on joint value 
maximization and which proposes a set of dimensional processes relevant 
to creating and claiming value in inter-organisational exchange 
relationship. In so doing, they claim that: 
"Strategic and learning gains often increase transaction value 
while simultaneously increasing transaction costs, [but] the 
value gains often outweigh the transaction costs efficiency 
losses [emphasis added]" (Zajac and Olsen, 1993, p. 143). 
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Williamson (1999b), himself, acknowledges the importance of learning that 
stems from close relationships by rejecting TCT's critics in relation to both 
its static nature (Langlois, 1992) and its over-emphasis on opportunism 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996) while admitting the limited contacts which 
TCT makes with the learning perspective. 
"A predictive theory of economic organization will be enriched 
by making more provision for the many ways in which learning 
influences the inter-temporal governance choice calculus" 
(Williamson, 1999b, p. 1104) 
As such, the relational exchange stream of the strategy-related literature, 
which directs attention to the inter-organisational learning and the potential 
collaborative ties in the buyer-supplier relationship, could offer in some 
ways a valuable extension to the TCT by taking into account the somewhat 
neglected notion of transactional value and its potential positive effect on 
outsourcing performance. Hence, while investments of high asset 
specificity in a transactional relationship (e. g. outsourcing) may lower 
outsourcing performance as maintained by TCT (hypothesis 1), 
collaborative ties among the concerned parties can moderate this 
relationship and improve outsourcing performance. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4: Collaborative ties in the buyer-supplier 
relationship will positively moderate the relationship between 
asset specificity [non-redeployable investments] and outsourcing 
performance. 
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The third stream of the strategy-related literature: Asset specificity 
leads to collaborative ties which in turn enhances outsourcing 
performance 
An additional strand of the strategy-related literature goes even further by 
arguing that the conditions under which learning influences the inter- 
temporal governance choice calculus are outsourcing transactions that are 
characterized by high asset specificity and which, paradoxically, constitute 
a significant source of opportunism and inefficiency according to TCT's 
logic. Indeed, in contrast to the predictions of internalisation under 
conditions of a high level of asset specificity, empirical studies within this 
tradition have shown that firms increasingly choose to carry out knowledge- 
specific transactions through inter-firm close outsourcing relationships 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). Along these lines, in his comparative study of the 
Japanese and the American automobile industry, Dyer (1996) presents 
greater level of asset specificity within transaction as a differential factor 
that shapes Japanese competitive advantage over their US competitors 
and predicts that asset specificity increases productivity. Concerning the 
same issue and capitalising on the work of Baker et al. (2002), Kvaloy 
(2003) argues that an increased level of asset specificity reduces rather 
than increases the temptation to renege on outsourcing contracts as the 
benefit of external trade is diminished due to the high level of specific 
investment already made. The predicted relationship between asset 
specificity and close relationship has been empirically backed up by Ghani 
and Khan (2004, p. 85) study where "asset specificity was found to be 
significantly correlated with inter-firm linkages as suppliers who have 
invested in relationship-specific assets tend to have stronger relationships 
with their main customer' and where asset specificity was linked to good 
relationships in terms of assistance, information sharing and trust. Similar 
empirical findings were put forward by Anderson and Weitz (1992) where 
high specific (idiosyncratic) investments in a transaction relationship 
between two parties were found to be positively related to the commitment 
of both parties in that relationship. Additional empirical backing can also be 
found in Chun's (2004) study of e-commerce where asset specificity was 
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found to be a significant factor in the utilisation of e-commerce leading to a 
more collaborative relationship between buyers and suppliers. 
Since, as outlined in the previous discussion leading to hypothesis 4, a 
close outsourcing relationship minimises opportunistic behaviour and 
enhances transaction value through the promotion of learning and 
knowledge creation, and given the assumption that asset specificity 
positively correlates with the creation of a close outsourcing relationship 
(as backed up in the above-mentioned empirical studies), a positive 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance could, 
hence, be expected. Such prediction is supported by Dyer and Ouchi 
(1993) who, in relation to the Japanese-Style Partnerships (JSP) which 
Japanese automobile manufacturers employ with their subcontractors, 
explained the superiority of Japanese firms over their American 
counterparts by the difference in the level of willingness to make significant 
customised investments. In so doing, they demonstrated that customised 
investments in specialized assets by the exchange partners do create 
incentives for cooperation leading to improvement in exchange 
performance: 
"JSPs generally require various types of investments in customized 
assets (investment specifically related to the relationship) by one or 
both firms in order to optimize the production and flow of goods and 
services. Three types of customized investments are employed: 1) 
site-specific investments; 2) Physical investments; 3) Human capital 
investments. These partner-specific investments create substantial 
buyer and supplier switching costs and, once made, make the two 
parties highly interdependent... However, the investments also create 
value substantially beyond what could have been achieved without 
them... outweigh[ing] the costs (risks) associated with being dependent 
on outside parties. " (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993, p. 56). 
Thus disaggregating by buyer-supplier asset specificity dimensions, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
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Hypothesis 5a: An increase in buyers' asset specificity 
across different dimensions of non re-deployable investments 
will positively affect outsourcing performance. 
Hypothesis 5b: An increase in suppliers' asset specificity 
across different dimensions of non re-deployable investments 
will positively affect outsourcing performance. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the extent of possibility that the 
expected transactional value would be achieved through close relationship 
and cooperation depends on the skills involved in managing the exchange 
relationship (Madhok, 2002). Indeed, as argued by Lorenzoni and Lipparini 
(1999, p. 320) "the ability to interact and share knowledge with other 
companies is a distinctive organisational competence". Plunket and 
Saussier (2003, p. 7) make reference to the absorptive capacity which 
transaction parties must be in possession of and in the absence of which 
knowledge transfer would be too costly to be implemented. In addition, a 
critical concern in relation to inter-firm cooperation and close relationship is 
the leakage of knowledge and the risk of losing intellectual property control 
which could ultimately favour vertical integration over outsourcing (Teece, 
1986; Liebeskind, 1996). 
3.4 Williamson's TCT extension: the effect of reciprocal investment 
Although Williamson (1979, p. 241-242) admits that "specific exchange 
relationships which feature personal trust will survive greater stress and 
display greater adaptability, he convincingly challenges the exclusion of 
opportunism from the explanation of the boundaries of the firm (eg. 
Conner, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992) as it eliminates the need for 
contract drafting, problem monitoring and reputation investment (Foss, 
1996), and, therefore, assumes myopia (Williamson, 1999b). 
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"As between myopia and foresight, the competence perspective 
mainly emphasizes the former... much of the competence 
literature displays an active aversion to opportunism and places 
emphasis on what Diego Gambetta3 has referred to as elusive 
notion of trust" (Williamson, 1999b, p. 1094). 
Without rejecting the argument that customised investments in 
transactional relationships should increase the likelihood of co-operation as 
advocated by many studies (e. g. Kvaloy, 2003; Ghani and Khan, 2004; 
Anderson and Weitz, 1992), Heide and Miner (1992) warn against the 
potential negative effect that co-operation could sustain in instances of 
asymmetrical customised investments. 
"Customization should enhance the chances of 
cooperation... Customization should also have a negative effect 
on cooperation, however. In asymmetrical relationship, the 
dependency may not be reciprocal, so that one partner has 
power over the other but not vice versa. In that case, exploitation 
rather than cooperation might result" (Heide and Miner, 1992, p. 
270). 
On the other hand, in a significant extension of Williamson's original 
framework, Klein and Leffler (1981), Williamson (1983), and Williamson 
(1996) recognise the increased level of cooperation that is likely to occur 
when asset specificity is involved and acknowledge the limitation of 
opportunism as the sole and sufficient explanation for internalisation. In so 
doing, they describe bilateral exchanges that are characterised by 
reciprocal investments made by both parties (buyers and suppliers) as an 
alternative safeguard mechanism. They argue that such reciprocal 
investments can signal credible commitment by both parties in an 
exchange relationship and, hence, moderate any potential trading hazard 
(that could arise from asset specificity) through the creation of "a mutual 
3 Here Williamson (1999b) refers to the work of Gambetta (1988, p. xi). 
97 
reliance relation" (Williamson, 1983, p. 528). For example, if X and Y each 
invest in high asset specificity in approximately the same magnitude, then 
the potential for opportunistic hold up from one party or the other would be 
highly reduced by such offsetting investments and would enhance the 
extent of mutual cooperation (Conner, 1991). 
"The offer of hostages [caused by highly specific investment] 
poses a hazard of expropriation. One way to deter this is to 
expand the contracting relationship from one of unilateral to 
bilateral exchange... Reciprocity in these circumstances is thus a 
device by which the continuity of a specific trading relation is 
promoted with risk attenuation effects" (Williamson, 1983, p. 
530-532). 
Thus, based on the above discussion, and in line with the notion of 
reciprocal exposure, the following hypothesis could be made: 
Hypothesis 6: Reciprocal non re-deployable investments in a 
given transactional outsourcing relationship will have a positive 
impact on outsourcing performance. 
3.5 The research model 
Figure 3.1 provides a schematic summary of the various hypotheses that 
were distilled using the twin lenses of both the economic transaction cost 
theory and various streams of the strategy-related literature. Figure 3.1 
also highlights which are the hypotheses that fall within the scope of this 
thesis and will therefore be subjected to empirical scrutiny. 
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Figure 3.1: Summary of the various hypotheses distilled from both 
economic and strategy-related perspectives 
Traditional view of TCT 
Economic 
perspective 
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Extended TCT 
(reciprocal exposure) 
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firm collaboration) 
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Relationship 
between Asset 
Specificity (AS) 
and Performance 
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--0 Hypothesis to be tested 
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As can be seen from the above figure, six different hypotheses were 
distilled from the review of both the economic and the strategy-related 
literature. 
On the one hand, the transaction cost (economic) perspective offers two 
hypotheses. While the traditional view predicts a negative relationship 
between buyers-suppliers asset specificity dimensions and outsourcing 
performance (Hypothesis la, 1b), the extended version of TCT, based on 
the notion of reciprocal exposure, leads to the suggestion that reciprocal, 
non-redeployable, investments will have a positive impact on outsourcing 
performance (Hypothesis 6). 
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Additionally, three different streams were identified from the strategy- 
related literature. The first stream redefines asset specificity as core 
competence and predicts a positive relationship between asset specificity 
and the performance of internalization (Hypothesis 2) and a negative 
relationship between the specificity of the outsourced activity (core 
competence) and outsourcing performance (Hypothesis 3). The second 
stream sheds lights on the relational exchange notion and leads to the 
hypothesis that collaborative ties in the buyer-supplier relationship will 
positively moderate the relationship between asset specificity [non- 
redeployable investments] and outsourcing performance (Hypothesis 4). 
The third and final stream in relation to the strategy-related literature 
postulates that highly specific investments across buyers-suppliers 
dimensions in a given transactional relationship leads to collaborative ties 
which in turn enhances outsourcing performance (Hypothesis 5a, 5b). 
As previously explained, hypothesis 2 falls out of the scope of this thesis as 
it deals with performance of internalisation as opposed to outsourcing 
performance that is the primary focus of this research. Similarly, although 
hypothesis 3 could be seen as one which leads to the same conclusion as 
the one drawn from hypothesis 1 over the effect of high asset specificity on 
outsourcing performance, this thesis has also chosen to discard it for a 
number of reasons. First, while the idea of making an analogy between 
high asset specificity and core competence could be described as 
important since it throws a strategic element into the equation, it actually 
shifts the entire unit of analysis for studying asset specificity from the actual 
transaction, which involves both buyers and suppliers, to the activity being 
outsourced and, consequently, to the buying firm. Yet, the criticality of the 
activity should not be considered in isolation since the supplier side might 
be in possession of an accumulated knowledge of the activity that reduces 
its specificity when transacted (Reve, 1990). Second, even though it has 
been convincingly affirmed that core competences are always of high asset 
specificity (Reve, 1990; Cox, 1996), this does not necessarily imply that an 
asset of high specificity is a core competence. Third, given the little 
guidance and uniformity in the literature concerning the definition of the 
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term (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000; Quin and Hilmer, 1995), 
differentiating core competences from non-core ones has been widely 
regarded as the most challenging task (Venkatesan, 1992; Mclvor et aL, 
1997; Blumberg, 1998; Javidan, 1998; Lankford and Parsa, 1999). Indeed, 
as argued by Williamson (1999b), the core competence perspective suffers 
from rather vague and somewhat unclear definition, the essence of which 
relies primarily on success stories. 
"There is no apparatus by which to advise firms on when and 
how to reconfigure their core competences, the argument relies 
on ex-post rationalization: show me a success story and I will 
show you a core competence" (Williamson, 1999b, p. 1093). 
The non-consideration of hypothesis 3 in addressing the research question 
set out in this thesis does not, however, mean the complete elimination of 
the core competence notion from our analysis as the level of core 
competence of the activity being transacted could have an effect on the 
degree of specificity in any given outsourcing relationship. 
By focusing solely on boundaries choices rather than investigating the 
performance of such choices (as clearly shown from the mapping of the 
outsourcing literature), the majority of the empirical studies conducted have 
failed to address and test the above-mentioned hypotheses that were 
distilled from both the TCT and the strategy-related literature and which 
touch upon the relation between asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance. Commenting on this deficiency in the outsourcing literature, 
David and Han (2004, p. 53) conclude that: 
"There was very little attention or support for TCT 
propositions regarding the relative perfonnance of 
governance forms. While there is evidence that asset 
specificity leads to the choice of hierarchy over markets, we 
have no evidence (either way) on whether this choice is 
somehow `efficient. We found this lack of empirical attention 
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troubling, given the central position that the comparative 
performance of governance forms occupies within the TCT 
Sharing the same view and commenting on the lack of the required 
empirical work, Williamson (1999b, p. 1091) contends that: 
"Transaction cost economics is remiss in empirical respects: 
awaiting empirical testing... Transaction cost economics will 
benefit from more and better empirical work" 
In an attempt to bridge this gap and respond to calls for more empirical 
research, this thesis seeks to examine the effects of the level of asset 
specificity on outsourcing performance using the twin lenses of both 
opportunism and resource-based considerations. Indeed, rather than trying 
to directly test predictions from one theory or the other, this research tries 
to explore the link between asset specificity and outsourcing performance 
using inferences distilled from both theories to better understand the 
significance of empirical outcomes. 
"While competence research on learning and path 
dependency is especially good at uncovering biases, the lens 
of TCT affords comparative institutional perspective. Both are 
needed... I see the relation between competence and 
governance as both rival and complementary - more the 
latter than the former... Healthy tensions are posed between 
them. Both are needed in our efforts to understand complex 
economic phenomena as we build towards a science of 
organization" (Williamson, 1999b, p. 1105-1106). 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
Informed by the twin lenses of the transaction cost theory (TCT) and 
strategy-related literature (SRT), the various hypotheses which this thesis 
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tries to empirically test are summarised in the following table (see Table 
3.1). 
Table 3.1: The research model: predicted relationships between asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance 
AS definition Predicted relationship To be 
Theoretical tested 
perspective Non- Performance 
core redeployment of Outsourcing 
competence investment internalisation performance Yes No 
T Original version X Hla (-) X 
Hlb(-) 
C 
T Extended H6 (+) 
version 
X (reciprocal X 
investment) 
X H2 (+) X 
Strategic 
competencies 
X H3 (-) X 
'o 
d 
H4 (+) 
X moderation X 
Relational collaboration 
Cn exchange 
X H5a (+) X 
H5b (+) 
By studying the relation between asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance while exploring the interaction between value-based 
considerations and opportunism-related factors, this thesis shifts the 
debate from one which tries to demonstrate the superiority of one factor 
over another to one that investigates the weight brought by each of the two 
theoretical perspectives (the transaction cost theory and the strategy- 
related literature) in informing the relationship between asset specificity 
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and outsourcing performance. As such, the approach that this study takes 
deviates from the reductionist approach that only seeks to explain 
governance choices (the process-oriented literature) by also investigating 
empirically the post-outsourcing phase (the outcome-oriented literature). 
Such an integrated approach is motivated by both the existing empirical 
gap in the outcome-oriented literature (see section 2.3.3 in the previous 
chapter) and the desire to gain a fuller appreciation of the role of asset 
specificity in outsourcing, by accounting for the potential impact of 
reciprocal investments and by also assessing the moderating effect of 
collaborative ties. 
Whereas the main objective of this research is to examine the relation 
between asset specificity and outsourcing performance while taking into 
account the impact of reciprocal investments and also assessing the 
moderating effect of collaborative ties, this thesis seeks to fulfill some 
additional sub-objectives. 
By employing a disaggregated method in testing the hypotheses through 
the acknowledgement of the asset specificity's multi-dimensional 
characteristics and the consequent consideration of its various dimensions 
from the perspective of both buyers and suppliers, this research allows for: 
i) the investigation of the contributing effects of each dimension in its 
relationship with outsourcing performance; and ii) the testing of any 
potential impact that could arise from the interaction among the dimensions 
of buyers' and suppliers' asset specificity (reciprocal investments). 
Besides, the importance of accounting for appropriate control variables in 
the context of outsourcing has been underlined by David and Han (2004) 
who make reference to the crucial role such variables may have in 
affecting both organizational governance choice and performance. Among 
these variables, Mol and Gedajlovic (2001) emphasise the importance of 
controlling for both firm size and industry type when trying to examine a 
causal relationship involving performance as a dependent variable, which 
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matches our case. Accordingly, the author has chosen to control for these 
two variables (firm size and industry type) for a number of reasons. 
As far as firm size is concerned, it could be regarded as important since it 
is likely to have an effect on both the scale by which a firm can produce if it 
chooses to internalize, and the bargaining power that large firms could 
enjoy while dealing with outsourcing suppliers (Ono and Stango, 2005). 
With respect to industry type, since the way in which the specific form of 
inter-firm cooperation is implemented varies among industries (see Ingham 
and Thompson, 1994), it is important to consider hypotheses distilled from 
both transaction cost theory and strategy-related literature while controlling 
for the industry in which the firm engaging in outsourcing operates. This 
argument is supported by Powell et al. (1996, p. 142) who, drawing on their 
research within the biotechnology industry, found that "in a field of rapid 
technological development, the locus of innovation is found within the 
networks of inter-organisational relationships that sustain a fluid and 
evolving community. Moreover, while it has been argued that cooperative 
behaviours that take place within industries characterized by high 
uncertainty are unable to deal with opportunism as future expectations and 
predictability become difficult to be effectively achieved (Conner and 
Prahalad, 1996; Williamson, 1999b), Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996, 
p. 147) found that "strategic and social factors could dominate / outweigh 
transaction costs, especially in high-velocity industries and innovative 
processes". 
Finally, the author also control for the type of activity being outsourced 
since this may play a role as far as asset specificity investments are 
concerned. 
To the author's knowledge, this is the first study to empirically test the 
effect of asset specificity on outsourcing performance whilst controlling for 
industry type, firm size, and type of activity being outsourced. In this 
respect, the thesis is likely to make a significant and original contribution to 
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academic knowledge. To date only very few studies have touched upon 
this area (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Artz, 1999; Mol and Gedajlovic, 2001; 
Wang, 2002; Rodriguez and Padilla, 2005) and their findings have been 
mixed. While Poppo and Zenger (1998) found that managers do actually 
become less satisfied with cost, quality and responsiveness of the activity 
being outsourced when high asset specificity is involved, Wang (2002) 
showed a positive relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance. Other studies (e. g. Mol and Gedajlovic, 2001; Rodriguez and 
Padilla, 2005) found no significant relationship between the degree of asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance. Apart from their conflicting results, 
all these studies have failed to control for industry type, the type of activity 
being outsourced and firm size simultaneously. Besides, they all relied on 
the measurement of one dimension of asset specificity even though there 
is a consensus in the literature that asset specificity is a multi-dimensional 
construct. Differentiating between buyers-suppliers' asset specificity 
dimensions while counting for their interacting effect is *an additional 
important and original contribution which this thesis is set to make. Indeed, 
those who tried to differentiate between buyers and suppliers in their 
measurement of asset specificity, did so only in an aggregate fashion 
without distinguishing between the construct's various dimensions (see for 
example Artz, 1999). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Chapter overview 
The previous two chapters drew attention to the lack of empirical research at 
the outcome-oriented level of the outsourcing literature and distilled a number 
of hypotheses on the relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance. This chapter discusses the methodology employed to conduct 
the empirical investigation through which the generated hypotheses are 
tested. 
According to Sumner and Tribe (2004), for a well considered research design 
two important and intimately related issues should be addressed: (i) "the 
epistemological choice"; and (ii) "the methodological choice". While the former 
deals with the philosophical assumptions underpinning the nature of 
knowledge and the methodological foundation of the research (Montague, 
1962 cited in Von Krogh et al., 1994, p. 53; Nodoushani, 2000), the latter 
refers to the more practical side of it (Trochim, 2006). Along these lines of 
thinking, this chapter begins by exploring the nature of the research according 
to its purpose and context while also offering a critical discussion of its 
epistemological assumptions. After a statement on the research approach and 
on the strategy adopted, a discussion of the rationale underpinning the 
selection of the data collection method will be offered. The sampling strategy, 
the selection of the sampling method and frame will, thereafter, be presented. 
The chapter continues with an outline of the questionnaire structure and 
design, and a discussion of the issues of construct operation alisation and 
pilot-testing. The final section of the chapter will consider aspects of 
conducting the main survey. 
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4.2 Understanding the nature of the research 
One way to gain an understanding of the nature of the research is to explore 
the position it occupies within the "basic-applied research continuum" 
(Saunders et al., 2000; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) and to try to study its 
overall purpose using a three-fold classification that differentiates between 
three different groups of research, namely: (i) exploratory, (ii) descriptive; and 
(iii) explanatory research (Robson, 1993; Neuman, 2003). 
As far as the basic and applied type of research are concerned, while the 
former is generally undertaken within academia and aims mainly at increasing 
knowledge and our understanding of business phenomena; the latter is 
primarily aimed at applying solutions in relation to specific organisational 
problems (Sekaran, 2000; Saunders et aL, 2000). Since this research, which 
is undertaken as a part of a doctoral program within a university setting, aims 
to make a contribution to academic knowledge by investigating the 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance, it is 
located more towards the basic end of the research spectrum. Nevertheless, 
given the fact that this research cannot be seen in isolation of its practical 
implications on outsourcing practice within organisations and since its 
outcomes could be of great value to managers, it also contains elements that 
push its purpose towards the other end of the (applied) research spectrum. 
As noted earlier, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of the 
research, one should try to understand its purpose using the three-fold 
classification that differentiates between exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory types. Exploratory research answers the question of "what is 
happening" (Robson, 1993, p. 42) and could be a valuable means of finding 
out "what's going on" (Schutt, 2006, p. 13). It tends to look for patterns and 
hypotheses and helps the researcher gain an insight and become more 
familiar with a subject area through the adoption of mainly qualitative 
techniques for gathering data (Neuman, 2003; Schutt, 2006) via, for example, 
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a literature survey (Saunders et al., 2000). Descriptive research focuses on 
providing an accurate picture of a particular event, situation or relationship 
(Robson, 1993; Neuman, 2003). It involves the adoption of mainly quantitative 
data-gathering techniques (Neuman, 2003). Finally, explanatory research 
tends to answer the "why" question by identifying the reason of something 
through, for example, the establishment of causal relationships between 
variables. It typically involves testing theoretical predictions or hypotheses 
using statistical techniques (Saunders et al., 2000; Neuman, 2003; Schutt, 
2006). 
In line with Robson's (1993) argument, which suggests that the purpose of 
enquiry could change over time, the research undertaken during the course of 
this doctoral thesis began as exploratory and then moved towards an 
explanatory nature. Indeed, following an initial exploratory mapping of the 
outsourcing literature, a specific area that required a more rigorous 
investigation became the focus of the research. This led to the identification of 
two somewhat contradictory predictions over the causal relationship between 
asset specificity and outsourcing performance, which are to be subjected to 
empirical scrutiny in this study through hypothesis testing and statistical 
inference. 
4.3 The epistemological framework 
Epistemology, which originates from the Greek word "episteme", could be 
defined as a philosophical concept that is related to the nature and scope of 
knowledge (Trochim, 2006). It "provides the philosophical underpinning which 
legitimises knowledge and the framework for a process that will produce, 
through a rigorous methodology, answers that can be believed to be valid, 
reliable and representative" (Sumner and Tribe, 2004, p. 03). Although it tends 
to be overlooked (Saunders et al., 2000) or simply reduced to the task of 
choosing between paradigms (Campbell, 2002, p. 479), discussing the 
epistemological underpinnings of a given research project has become 
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increasingly important and somewhat unavoidable (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
Blaxter's et al., (2001, p. 59) frame the issue well as follows: 
"The question `which method is best? ' is not solely about whether, 
for example, to use interviews, questionnaires or observations. 
Underpinning these research tools are more general philosophical 
questions about how we understand social reality... " 
Since the choice of the research philosophy has a direct implication on the 
overall research approach employed and ultimately on the data collection 
method to be used (Collis and Hussey, 2003), it is important to begin with an 
exploration of the epistemological perspectives and philosophical stance of 
the research (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; Saunders et al., 2000). 
The research methodology literature makes reference to two diametrically 
opposed research philosophies. These being the positivist-empiricist and the 
constructivist-phenomenological (Jean Lee, 1992; Saunders et al., 2000; 
Bryman and Bell, 2003; Fawcett and Hearn, 2004). While the former is likely 
to be based on logical reasoning, empirical evidence and used as means for 
establishing causal relationships between variables (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; 
Collis and Hussey, 2003), the latter tends to be useed in qualitative research 
concerned with interpreting human behaviour and employed as a means to 
understand the complexities of the social world (Remenyi et aL, 1998; 
Saunders et al., 2000). These two research philosophies could be associated 
with Burell and Morgan's objectivism-subjectivism locus where at one end of 
the spectrum the researcher is independent of the object of investigation 
(objectivism) and where, at the other end, we find a more involved researcher 
trying to understand the rich and complex world he or she is part of (Burell and 
Morgan, 1979). With reference to the nature of reality, the two above 
mentioned philosophical stances, which occupy two extreme poles in the 
research paradigm debate, could be linked to the representationalism- 
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nominalism ontological dimension (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). While 
representationalists contend that truth could be determined by means of 
prediction-testing, which matches the positivists' position; nominalists assume 
that truth could be better explored by referring to the labels and names we 
attach to experiences and events (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 32) 
matching, hence, the phenomenologists' end. 
Viewed within its dominant basic explanatory nature as highlighted in the 
previous section (although it contains elements of both applied and 
exploratory research purposes) and given its attempt to investigate the causal 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance by means 
of prediction-testing, the philosophical orientation underpinning the author's 
research takes, overall, a positivist stance and leans towards a rather 
representationalist ontological position. 
Nevertheless, as noted by Saunders et al., (2000, p. 86), in practice "research 
rarely falls neatly into the positivist and phenomenological camps" This is 
echoed by Hammersley (1996) who contends that research cannot always be 
seen as strictly qualitative or quantitative or also as purely subjective or 
objective (Trochim, 2006). As such, although this research takes an overall 
positivist stance, it also contains phenomological elements that allow for an 
explanation of the phenomena under investigation (through the author's 
interpretation of the gathered data) hence leaning towards what Molteberg 
and Bergstrom's (2000) describe as middle ground pragmatism. The latter 
reflects the feasibility to employ different methodological approaches that are 
judged to suit particular research problems (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
Finally, it should be noted that even though the above discussion on the 
epistemological stance of this study seems to be solely guided and informed 
by its suitability to the nature of the research and the type of question to be 
addressed, it could also be influenced by the author's epistemological 
commitment that was at the origin of the development of the research 
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question in the first place (the underlying belief that there exist data patterns 
or empirical regularities on the relationship examined that could be 
uncovered). This idea is clearly captured in Johnson and Duberley's (2000, p. 
1) statement: 
"How we come to ask particular questions, how we assess the 
relevance and value of different research methodologies so that 
we can investigate those questions..., all express and vary 
according to our underlying epistemological commitments" 
The statement resonates with Wilden's (1972) suggestion that "there are 
always causes that cause causes to cause causes" (Wilden, 1972 cited in 
Jean Lee, 1992, p. 90), which, in turn, mirrors Moldoveanu and Baum's (2002) 
emphasis on the need to produce researchers who are informed about their 
epistemological commitments and consequently on the importance "to 
consider not only what beliefs researchers hold but also how researchers 
believe their beliefs... " (p. 744). 
4.4 The methodological framework 
The notion of methodological framework relates to the way methods are 
combined in order to generate appropriate research data that could ultimately 
form the response to the research question (Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Creswell, 1994). Consequently, it represents the "operationalisation of the 
research question" (Sumner and Tribe, 2004, p. 11) which, in turn, requires 
reaching a decision on both the research approach and the research strategy 
to be adopted. 
4.4.1 Research approach 
Research approaches can be broadly classified into two categories: deductive 
and inductive (Saunders et aL, 2000; Neuman, 2003). This classification 
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provides us with a clear schema for the examination of the relationship 
between theory and research (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Indeed, while the 
deductive approach, which could be associated with a theory-testing process 
(Hyde, 2000), moves from a general theory to a specific case (Kovacs and 
Spens, 2005) indicating a "top-down" progressive sequence (Trochim, 2006), 
the inductive approach is characterized by its theory-building process (Hyde, 
2000; Saunders et al., 2000) that involves drawing "generalisable inferences 
out of observations" (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p. 12). 
Since this study moves from the articulation of hypotheses to empirical testing, 
it is the deductive method of enquiry which best describes the approach 
pursued in this research project. In fact, focusing on the transaction cost and 
strategy-related literature in relation to outsourcing; a number of hypotheses 
on the relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance 
were firstly distilled and then tested using data from companies. As pointed 
out by Neuman (2003, p. 51), the deductive approach can be regarded as a 
move from "a logical relationship among concepts" toward "concrete empirical 
evidence" (see Figure 4.1) 
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Figure 4.1: The process: Dominant deductive research approach 
Outsourcing Literature 
Transaction Cost Theory Strategy-related literature 
Guided by the review of the academic literature, a number of hypotheses regarding the 
impact of asset specificity upon outsourcing performance were distilled. 
Main research question 
What is the impact of buyer-supplier dimensions of asset 
specific investments on outsourcing performance? 
Data Collection 
Findings 
Confirmation / Rejection of hypotheses 
Theory-enrichment: Feedback from findings to theories 
Source: Adapted from Bryman and Bell (2003, p. 11) and applied to the author's research. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that although it might be useful to classify 
research approaches into deductive and inductive categories, this distinction 
has been criticised for its inability to reflect the actual approaches adopted by 
researchers in practice (see Hyde, 2000). Sharing similar views, Blaikie (1993) 
denied the existence of pure deductive or inductive forms of research and, 
consequently, proposed a third "abductive approach" that contains some 
elements of both approaches, hence reflecting a more eclectic form of 
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research that recognises "the intertwined nature of different activities in the 
research process" (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p. 555)1. Such an eclectic view, 
therefore, highlights the importance of regarding research approach as a 
phenomenon in motion rather than as a static well-defined process. As stated 
by Dubois and Gadde (2002, p. 555) "a standardised conceptualisation of the 
research process as consisting of a number of planned subsequent phases 
does not reflect the potential uses and advantages of ... research" 
The same 
view seems to be shared by Saunders et al. (2000, p. 90) who recognise that 
any "rigid divisions between the two approaches [deductive and inductive] to 
research... would be misleading". 
4.4.2 Research strategy and data collection method 
Research strategy could be described as a general plan that, with due 
consideration to the researcher's resource constraints, clarifies how the 
research question is to be addressed, how the research objectives are to be 
met, and how required data are to be collected (Saunders et a/., 2000). The 
research methodology literature makes reference to a variety of research 
strategies including experiment, survey, case study, grounded theory, 
ethnography and action research (Robson, 1993; Saunders et al., 2000; Baker 
et al., 2002; Bryman and Bell, 2003). According to Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2002), most research strategies could be associated with different research 
approaches. Indeed, while the survey strategy is often related to the 
positivistist-deductive approach, strategies such as ethnography or grounded 
theory are described to fit better with a constructivist-inductive research 
I Academics who share the same view might argue that while this research adopts dominantly a positivistic 
hypothetical-deductive method (as it is referred to by Parry 2003, p. 258), it also employs a kind of abductive 
approach in its first stage during which two different theories were used for explaining the relationship between 
asset specificity and outsourcing performance, leading to the derivation of a number of hypotheses that are later 
tested using a deductive research approach. In addition, since the results of the hypothesis-testing are to be fed 
back into the theories that prompted the whole process, this research, in its final stages, takes a rather inductive 
approach that contributes to the enrichment and development of the theories involved. 
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approach (Saunders et al., 2000; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Nevertheless, 
although these connections between research approaches and research 
strategies might help researchers selecting the right strategy in their research 
journey, these associations alone are regarded to be over-simplistic since the 
final decision should mainly be guided by the research question(s) and 
objectives (Saunders et al., 2000). 
The main purpose of this research is to test the causal relationship between 
asset specificity and outsourcing performance and to try to identify if the 
nature of the relationship is influenced by the industry type, firm size, and the 
kind of activity being outsourced. This requires gathering information from a 
large number of firms, with different sizes, operating in different industries and 
outsourcing different types of activities. As such, given the purpose of the 
research, the survey strategy was selected as the most appropriate research 
method among competing alternatives. First, the chosen method provides 
access to a wide population sample in a highly economic way (Saunders et 
a/., 2000; Fowler, 2002). Second, it is a common approach for carrying 
business and management research and it is usually associated with the 
deductive approach that is dominantly employed in this research (Remenyi et 
a/., 1998; Saunders et al., 2000; Neuman, 2003). Third, it allows for the 
collection of quantitative data that allows for statistical analysis to be carried 
out (Frankel et al., 2005). This enables the author to fulfil the main objective of 
this study which essentially involves empirical prediction-testing. 
Within the survey category, most of the research methodology literature 
distinguishes between three data collection techniques, namely: i) structured 
observation; ii) structured interviews; and iii) self-administered questionnaires 
(Saunders et al., 2000; Easterby-Smith et aL, 2002; De Vaus, 2002). 
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Structured observation is often associated with organisation and methods 
(O&M) research (Saunders et al., 2000) and is most frequently used as part of 
experiments (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
Structured interviews involve asking standardised questions to all interviewees 
either face-to-face or through telephone (Collis and Hussey, 2003), allowing 
the researcher to make sure that the respondent is the particular person to 
whom they wish to administer the survey (Hair et al., 2003). It should be noted 
though that this data collection method requires skills similar to those related 
to in-depth and semi-structured interviews (Saunders at al., 2000). 
As for self-administered questionnaires, they usually provide access to wider 
and more dispersed samples while being accomplished with minimal staff and 
facilities. They allow respondents time to think about their answers (Fowler, 
2002), provide greater anonymity (Blumberg, et al., 2005) and, hence, are less 
likely to result in respondents being tempted to provide 'pleasant' answers 
(Dillman, 2000). For these reasons, and given the author's resource 
constraints (eg. non-availability of qualified interviewers to assist), the self- 
administered questionnaire was selected as the most appropriate data 
collection method (within the survey category) to be employed. Self- 
administered questionnaires could be delivered and returned electronically 
through email (online questionnaire), by mail post or could also be physically 
handed to and collected from each respondent (Saunders et a/., 2000). In this 
research the postal method was chosen for a number of reasons. First, online 
questionnaires could be technically-demanding and could face the threat of 
being regarded as junk emails ('spam'). Second, personal email addresses 
can be difficult to obtain, which could lead to the use of the companies' 
general enquiry email and hence reducing the questionnaires' chance of 
reaching the intended recipient. Third, given the large number of companies to 
be targeted, the option of handing the questionnaires physically was 
considered both unpractical and time consuming. 
117 
However, although considered as the most appropriate data collection method 
for this research, the self-administered questionnaire method suffers from a 
number of drawbacks which researchers must be aware of. Indeed, this 
method has been primarily criticised for its low response rate generation 
which, in turn, could be responsible for introducing non-response bias 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003; Neuman, 2003; Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Langdridge, 2004; Blumberg et al., 2005). In addition, the self-administered 
questionnaire method usually raises the risk of missing data occurrence as 
questionnaires are returned partially uncompleted (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
Moreover, while this data collection method limits the type of questions to be 
employed (for example open questions should be avoided), it also prevents 
the researcher for further probing, restricting the extent of topic coverage 
(Hoinville et a/., 1978; Bryman and Bell, 2003; Neuman, 2003). Finally, an 
additional limitation of the self-administered questionnaire is the lack of the 
researcher's control over the conditions under which questionnaires are 
completed (Hoinville et al., 1978; Neuman, 2003), an aspect which could 
potentially affect the reliability of the results. 
Given the above-mentioned limitations, the author paid particular attention to 
the sampling strategy and to the questionnaire structure, design and content 
so as to reduce bias and enhance the reliability and validity of the research. In 
so doing, attempts were also made to increase the potential response rate 
and reduce the risk of missing data. 
4.5 Sampling strategy 
A sample consists of "a subset or a segment of population that is selected for 
investigation" (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p. 93). The extent to which the 
characteristics of a sample represent those of the population from which the 
sample is drawn dictates the ability to generalise from the sample to the 
population (May, 2001). Such generalisation process, which is typically related 
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to the positivistic hypothetical-deductive tradition, calls for a probability 
sampling approach which is, in turn, commonly associated with survey-based 
research (Dillman, 2000; De Vaus, 2002; Hair et al., 2003). While probability 
sampling does not completely eliminate sampling error, it allows the 
researcher to employ tests of statistical significance that allow generalised 
inferences to be made (Bryman and Bell, 2003). However, this would require 
an adequate definition of the population, an appropriate sample frame, and a 
properly selected sample (De Vaus, 2002). 
4.5.1 Population 
In a survey-based research, population consists "of all of the units (individuals, 
households, organisations) to which one desires to generalise survey results" 
(Dillman, 2000, p. 196). It refers to "the universe of units from which the 
sample is to be selected" (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p. 93). In this research, the 
population consists of all companies operating in the UK and belong to one of 
the following service-related industries: (i) Banking and Finance industry, (ii) 
hotel industry, (iii) IT industry, and (iv) telecommunication industry. There are 
three main reasons for selecting these industries as the population of this 
study. First, all four industries are service-related, thus enabling the 
researcher to draw inferences about outsourcing among companies operating 
in this kind of setting as opposed to those operating in the manufacturing 
sector (traditionally regarded as being the sector most involved in outsourcing, 
see for example Wang, 2002). Second, although companies operating in the 
service-related industries were initially regarded as outsourcing providers, 
recent statistics have shown their increasing engagement in outsourcing (see, 
for example, Embleton and Wright, 1998, p. 97). Third, the selection of these 
four different industries would enable the researcher to control for industry 
type within an overall service-related context in a single study. 
Finally, as opposed to past studies which limited their samples to single 
industries (e. g. Zaheer & venkatraman, 1995; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; 
Goodman et al., 1995) we aimed to improve external validity of this research 
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by obtaining data from a broader population of firms operating in four different 
industries. Collectively these industries are typically service-related, hence, 
enabling the authors to complement other studies that focused on 
manufacturing-related firms (e. g. Artz, 1999). 
Therefore, surveying companies operating in industries such as banking and 
finance, IT, telecommunication, and hospitality provides an original context 
from which to examine the effect of asset specificity on outsourcing 
performance while accounting for industry effect. 
4.5.2 Sample frame 
A representative sampling technique requires the consideration of a sampling 
frame which entails listing all the cases in the population from which the 
sample is to be selected (Saunders et aL, 2000; Bryman and Bell, 2003). In 
defining the sample frame, this study makes use of the Financial Analysis 
Made Easy (F. A. M. E) database. This database provides comprehensive 
information on 3.1 million companies operating across all industries in the UK 
and Ireland without imposing any restriction to particular type of companies. 
Two steps were taken in building of the sampling frame. First, companies 
which are operating in the UK (except those located in Channel Islands and in 
the Republic of Ireland) and whose industry of belonging corresponded to the 
UK Standard Industrial Classification (UK SIC 2003) Primary Codes of the four 
targeted industries (banking and finance, IT, hotel, and telecommunication) 
were selected (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Industry coverage of the sampling frame 
Industry UK SIC (2003) codes Location 
IT 722 The only locations that were 
Telecommunication 642 excluded are Republic of Ireland 
Banking and Finance 651 and 
the Channel Islands 
and Isle of white G Hotel 551 , uernsey, 
( 
Jersey). 
In the second step, a further revision and refinement of the obtained list of 
companies was carried out so as to double check on the accuracy of the 
information (including addresses and contact details) and to eliminate any 
existing duplication. While an important number of duplicated addresses were 
found (as some companies operating under the same registered address had 
different SBU's which were separately mentioned in the FAME database) and 
had to be eliminated, a random double-checking carried out by the author on 
50 companies from each industry, confirmed the accuracy of the information 
as presented by FAME. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that names of 
directors were very difficult to check as these were very rarely indicated in the 
companies' websites. Those double-checked against the information 
presented in the website were, in all cases, accurate. Finally, a total of 3,717 
companies were selected to make up the sample frame corresponding to the 
UK SIC Primary Codes of the four above-mentioned industries (see Figure 
4.2). 
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Figure 4.2: Composition of the sample frame 
Companies operating in the 
UK within the IT industry 
(1664) 
Companies operating in the Companies operating in the 
UK within the hotel industry UK within the telecom 
(950) industry (600) 
Companies operating in the 
UK within the banking & 
finance industry (623) 
The sample frame consists of 3,717 companies operating in the UK: 1664 
companies operating within the IT industry; 600 within the telecommunication 
industry; 850 within the hotel industry; and 623 operating with the banking and 
finance industry. There is no overlapping company between subgroups of the 
sample frame. 
4.5.3 Sample size 
Sample size can play a critical role in affecting the statistical significance, the 
reliability and the validity of the results. Indeed, while a small sample size may 
mean limited statistical power for the tests and may result in hindering 
genera Usability (Hair et al., 1998), a large sample size may require 
considerable resources and may result in making statistical tests overly 
sensitive as weak relationships could reach a significant level when in fact 
they may not be significant (Sekaran, 2000). Reaching a decision about the 
required sample size is a process that should take account of a number of 
considerations. One important criterion that has been frequently mentioned in 
the research method literature is the need for precision and the consequent 
sample error to be tolerated (Dillman, 2000; Hair et a/., 2003). 
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One of the methods that factors in the extent of the sampling error to be 
tolerated and which could be used in estimating the minimum sample size is 
the formula that has been suggested by Saunders et al. (2000, p. 463): 
2 
Z 
n=p% x q% x ----- --- e 
Where n is the minimum sample size 
p% is the proportion belonging to the specified category 
q% is the proportion not belonging to the specified category 
z is the z value corresponding to the level of confidence required 
e% is the margin of error required 
Since it is difficult at this stage of the research to estimate the proportion of 
responses expected to have a particular attribute and following De Vaus's 
(2002) recommendation of `playing safe' and considering the worst scenario, 
50% will be allocated to both p% and q% (as this will give us the greatest 
diversity in the sample). Accordingly, assuming a 95% level of confidence 
(associated z value being 1.96) and a 9% sampling error, the minimum 
computed sample size will be [50 x 50 x (1.96/9)2] = 118. 
However, while the importance of the sampling error criterion should not be 
underestimated, Fowler (2002) warns against its isolated consideration and 
calls for taking into account other factors. This point is echoed by Bryman and 
Bell (2003, p. 101) who stress that "since sampling error will be only one 
component of any error entailed in an estimate, the notion of using a desired 
level of precision as a factor in a decision about sample size is not realistic" 
Other factors that could dictate the choice of sample size include: (i) time and 
cost constraints; (ii) the extent to which there is variability or diversity in 
population (taken into account by the above formula); (iii) the type of analyses 
to be undertaken and the number of different variables examined 
simultaneously in data analysis, and (iv) the size of the total population from 
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which the sample is being drawn (Saunders et al., 2000; Sekaran, 2000; De 
Vaus, 2002; Bryman and Bell, 2003; Neuman, 2003). As such, the decision 
over the sample size to be reached becomes "a matter more of judgement 
than of calculation" (Hoinville et al., 1978, p. 61). In reaching a decision about 
the optimal sample size, Sekran (2000, p. 296) suggest the following rule of 
thumb: 
"1. Sample size larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate 
for most research. 2. Where samples are to be broken into sub- 
samples (males/females, juniors/seniors, etc), a minimum sample 
size of 30 for each category is necessary. 3. In multivariate 
research (including multiple regression analyses), the sample size 
should be several times (preferably 10 times or more) as large as 
the number of variables in the study"". 
As far as this study is concerned, and given the resource constraints, the 
number of variables to be examined (13 variables in totale) and the number of 
industries to be targeted (4 different service-related industries), a final sample 
size of 130 could be regarded as adequate (13 x 10 = 130). Nevertheless, in 
order to account for the likely degree of non-response (that is becoming 
increasingly common in self-administered questionnaires, see Cycyota and 
Harrison, 2006), it is necessary to draw an initial sample that is larger than the 
adjusted minimum sample size as well as to employ techniques for enhancing 
the response rate (Saunders et al., 2000; De Vaus, 2002). Therefore, if we 
consider an expected 6% response rate return3 (see for example, Collis and 
Hussey, 2003, p. 175, who argue that response rates of less than 10% are not 
uncommon), the number of questionnaires to be sent would be around 2166 = 
[(130 * 100) / 6]. 
26 buyer asset specificity dimensions +4 supplier asset specificity dimensions +2 outsourcing 
erformance variables +1 collaborative ties 
A number of recent studies, including Koch and McGrath (1996) and Lepak et al. (2003), have 
reported a response rate as low as 6.5 %. 
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4.5.4 Sampling method 
As can be seen from Table 4.2, there are four main types of probability 
sampling methods namely i) simple random sampling; ii) systematic sampling; 
iii) stratified sampling; and iv) multistage cluster sampling. Among the four 
types of probability sampling, for this study the author chose to employ the 
stratified sampling method since it is more likely to be representative and can 
produce a more accurate sample than what would be achieved by simple 
random sampling (Churchill, 1999). 
Table 4.2: Types of probability sampling 
Type of sampling Method 
Simple Random Sampling Creation of sampling frame for all cases and the 
subsequent selection of cases using a purely 
random process. 
Systematic Sampling Creation of a sampling frame, calculation of the 
sampling interval, choice of random starting place, 
selection of cases for every interval 
Stratified Sampling Creation of a sampling frame for each of several 
categories of cases, drawing of a random sample 
from each category, and the subsequent 
combination of the several samples. 
Multistage Cluster Sampling Creation of a sampling frame for larger cluster units, 
drawing of a random sample of the cluster units, 
creation of sampling frame for cases within each 
selected cluster unit, and the subsequent drawing of 
a random sample of cases. 
Source: Adapted from De Vaus (2002), and Neuman (2003). 
In addition, since significant strata in our sampling frame can easily be 
distinguished (the four different industries), the adoption of the stratified 
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sampling method could be judged as the most appropriate (Saunders et al., 
2000). 
Since the sampling frame in relation to the telecommunication industry stratum 
consists of only 600 companies, in an attempt to obtain a total sample size 
that marginally exceeds the required minimum sample (to be on the safe 
side), a random sample of 600 companies will be drawn from each stratum 
adding up to a total sample of 2400 companies to be targeted (600 companies 
from each industry) (see Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Summary of the sampling process 
Companies operating in UK and 
Population belonging to IT, hotel, 
Telecommunication, or banking & 
finance industry 
Banking & 
IT Telecom 
(: 
Hotel Finance 
Sample frame 
(3,717) 1664 600 850 
623 
" Stratified Sampling 
Method 
" Random Selection in 
Strata 
Drawn sample 
(2,400) 
600 600 600 600 
" Mail self-administered 
questionnaires 
" Expected response rate: 
6% 
Anticipated 
final sample 
(144) 
36 36 36 36 
4.5.5 Unit of analysis 
"The unit of analysis is the unit about which we obtain information: it is the unit 
whose characteristics we describe" (De Vaus, 2002, p. 30). Since the main 
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objective of this study is to identify the impact of buyers-suppliers asset 
specific, non-redeployable, investments upon outsourcing performance, the 
unit of analysis in this study is the individual organisation that was engaging in 
outsourcing project at the time of the mail survey and which responded to the 
mail questionnaire. A key informant from each organisation (buyer) provided 
information on his (her) organisation's asset specific non-redeployment 
investments, commented on the performance of the outsourcing project 
undertaken by his (her) organisation, and offered the organisation's perception 
of asset specific investments made by its supplier. 
4.6 Questionnaire structure, design and content 
Given the limitations of the mail questionnaire method (as discussed in section 
4.4.2), considerable efforts were made in order to enhance the reliability and 
validity of results by attempting to increase response rate while reducing 
potential errors and biases. Following a brief reminder of the research aim and 
objectives, this section discusses the measurement development process 
adopted and outlines the content of the questionnaire and the different items 
through which the research variables will be operation aIised. Various methods 
of reliability and validity assessments are, thereafter, discussed. Issues 
related to the structure, design, and pilot-testing of the questionnaire will also 
be expanded upon. 
4.6.1 Research aim and objectives 
This research investigates the impact of asset specificity on outsourcing 
performance in the context of IT, banking and finance, hotel, and 
telecommunications industries in the UK. Specifically, it aims to empirically 
test the number of hypotheses that were distilled in the previous chapter (see 
section 3.5 of the previous chapter) by trying to explore the impact of buyers- 
supplier asset specificity dimensions upon outsourcing performance while 
controlling for firm size, industry type and type of activity being outsourced. It 
also investigates the moderating effect of collaborative ties on the relationship 
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in question while assessing the impact of reciprocal specific investments on 
outsourcing performance. As such, this research delineates four types of 
variables, namely: (i) independent variables; (ii) dependent variable; (iii) 
control variables; and (iv) moderator variable (see Figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.4: Composition of research variables 
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4.6.2 Scale development and research instrument generation 
Since the publication of Churchill's (1979) work, there has been an increase in 
the number of studies which showed greater interest in improving the quality 
of measurement (see reviews made by Peter, 1979,1981; Peterson, 1994). 
Indeed, in his seminal work, in which he calls for more attention to be paid to 
measure development and variable operationalisation, Churchill (1979) places 
particular emphasis on the importance of the rigour with which the rules are 
specified in the process of operationalisation. He notes that "progress in the 
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development of science certainly will depend on the measures [researchers] 
develop to estimate the variables of interest to them" (Churchill, 1979, p. 73). 
Churchill also proposes a paradigm for measurement development, consisting 
mainly of four phases aiming at satisfying validity and reliability factors through 
successive development and testing. These phases include: (i) construct 
domain specification; (ii) items generation; (iii) measure purification and 
instrument refinement; and (iv) data collection. The approach adopted by this 
study in developing and validating the instrument of the research followed 
similar patterns. The overall picture of the measurement developing process 
together with the purpose of undertaking each stage is shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Summary of the development and validation process of the 
research instrument 
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Working within Churchill's (1979) influential tradition and in line with 
Templeton's et aL, (2002) methodology, this research goes a step further by 
adopting a more rigorous approach that also takes Malhotra and Grover's 
(1998) Ideal Survey Attributes (ISA) (see Table 4.3) as additional criteria 
against which the quality of instrument development is to be assessed. 
Table 4.3: Malhotra and Grover's (1998) Ideal Survey Attributes (ISA) 
Types of error Ideal survey attributes (ISAs) 
ISA-1 Is the unit of analysis clearly defined for the study? 
ISA-2 Does the instrumentation consistently reflect that unit of analysis? General 
ISA-3 Is the respondent(s) chosen appropriate for the research question? 
ISA-4 Is any form of triangulation used to cross validate results? 
ISA-5 Are multi-item variables used? 
ISA-6 Is the content validity assessed? 
ISA-7 Is field-based pretesting of measures performed? 
Measurement ISA-8 Is reliability assessed? 
error ISA-9 Is construct validity assessed? 
ISA-10 Is pilot data used for purifying measures or are existing validated 
measures adapted? 
ISA-11 Are confirmatory methods used? 
ISA-12 Is the sample frame defined and justified? 
ISA-13 Is random sampling used from the sample frame? Sampling error ISA-14 Is the response rate over 20 per cent? 
ISA-15 Is non-response bias estimated? 
Internal validity 
ISA-16 Are attempts made to establish internal validity of the findings? 
error 
Statistical ISA-17 Is there sufficient statistical power to reduce statistical conclusion 
conclusion error error? 
Source: Malhotra and Grover (1998, p. 418-420) 
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As clearly shown in section 4.5 (sampling strategy), the respondents chosen 
for this study addressed the ISA-3 (appropriate sample respondents), ISA-12 
(sampling frame was justified), and ISA-13 (random sample extracted from 
each stratum of the sampling frame). 
The next sections will highlight the other ISA attributes that were satisfied at 
each stage of the instrument development process. 
4.6.2.1 Domain specification and conceptual definition of main 
constructs 
In this research, two main constructs occupy the central focus of the 
investigation, namely: (i) asset specificity; and (ii) outsourcing performance. 
Since according to Churchill (1979, p. 67), "it is imperative... that researchers 
consult the literature when conceptualising constructs and specifying 
domains ; the conceptual definition of both asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance was determined by conducting an extensive review of related 
literature. The selected literature included mainly academic articles that even 
merely touched upon asset specificity or outsourcing performance across 
several disciplines. Bibliographies of the initial selected articles were reviewed 
to further explore important concepts. Table 2.9 and 2.14 (in chapter 2) 
present a list of authors and their works, along with their specific contribution 
in articulating respectively the asset specificity and the outsourcing 
performance constructs. 
As far as the asset specificity construct is concerned, a review of the various 
definitions as presented in the selected articles revealed the absence of a 
uniform definition and hardly any systematic attempt to organise the array of 
various definitions in a blended framework that would alleviate the ambiguities 
over the already complex meaning of asset specificity (see Appendix 2.1). 
Consequently, the author tried to categorise the various definitions according 
to the distinguishing features which they tried to emphasise (see Table 2.8 in 
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chapter 2). This process resulted in the articulation of a number of key 
characteristics, these being: (i) the extent of resources devoted by both buyer 
and supplier for the support of the transaction; (ii) degree of transferability / 
redeployment of these resources; (iii) the difference in value between the 
resources investment current use and its future best use; (iv) the importance 
of the identity of the two parties; and (v) the importance of the continuance of 
the relationship and the consequent, degree of lock-in and dependence. 
The review of the literature also revealed six dimensions of asset specificity to 
which the author, in line with Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995), added another 
dimension (procedural asset specificity) which is primarily aimed at capturing 
the physical asset specificity dimension within the service industry: (human 
asset specificity, physical asset specificity, site specificity, dedicated asset 
specificity, temporal asset specificity, brand capital, and procedural asset 
specificity). 
At this point it should be noted that for the purpose of defining asset 
specificity, it is important to distinguish between what the concept is and what 
it is not. The research on asset specificity could be divided into (1) works that 
define asset specificity based on Williamson's (1979) original work and (2) 
works that redefine asset specificity in terms of core competence. For the 
reasons that were discussed in section 3.4 (chapter 3), this research falls 
within the first category which considers the actual transactional outsourcing 
relationship as the unit of analysis and not the activity being outsourced. 
As for outsourcing performance, a review of studies (see Table 2.14) revealed 
the presence of two broad dimensions that characterise the definitions of 
outsourcing performance. These include the quantitative accounting and 
qualitative strategic characteristics. While the former generally concerns cost 
savings and financial performance, the latter involves strategic benefits such 
as the quality of service being received. 
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As such, for the purpose of this research, outsourcing performance is defined 
as the degree to which the outsourcing project objectives, as set by the 
outsourcer, have been met and the extent to which the latter has been 
satisfied with both the qualitative and quantitative benefits obtained from 
outsourcing a given activity or function. 
The above-mentioned lengthy process of conceptualisation clearly addressed 
the ISA-I quality attribute by specifying the unit of analysis and clarifying the 
definitions and key characteristics of key variables under investigation (asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance). 
4.6.2.2 Item generation 
In an attempt to generate the appropriate measurement items in relation to the 
key variables, an original and extensive measure comparison effort that tries 
to review, report and categorise past papers according to their asset 
specificity operationalisation methods was undertaken (see Table 2.9). This 
was followed by the identification of various items that were employed in 
measuring each dimension of asset specificity (see section 2.4.2). Both 
procedures revealed a number of deficiencies in relation to the multi- 
dimensional coverage of the concept, which this research sought to address 
through the use of measures that represent as much of the construct 'space' 
or domain as possible while trying to simultaneously satisfy key 
methodological criteria. With regard to outsourcing performance, a review 
synthesising and integrating various outsourcing performance measurements, 
as employed in past studies, was also carried out (see section 2.5). 
In the light of this measure-comparison procedure (as discussed above), 
which clearly fulfilled both ISA-2 and ISA-5 quality attributes, items aimed at 
measuring both asset specificity and outsourcing performance have been 
generated. Most of the questions were either directly derived or fairly faithfully 
adapted from previous academic studies. However, on few occasions, in the 
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absence of studies measuring a particular dimension, new items were 
developed by the author drawing from theoretical insights. All the 
measurement scales used in this research were rated on a seven-point Liked 
scale, from 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree. 
Tables 4.4 through to 4.11 summarise the operationalisation of key research 
variables by presenting the questionnaire items and indicating the source from 
which they were derived. 
Dependent variable: Outsourcing performance 
As discussed in chapter two (see section 2.5), when measuring performance 
of the relationship (including outsourcing performance), a number of studies 
have made use of quantitative accounting measurements (such as sales 
growth rates, market shares, and return on investment) which are unlikely to 
capture the real dimension of the outsourcing performance construct due to 
their failure to cover the outsourcing strategic dimensions. Other studies that 
have attempted to achieve a better articulation of the outsourcing performance 
construct have made use of more qualitative measures. In so doing, they 
focused either on the degree of realisation of outsourcing benefits, or on the 
overall satisfaction with respect to outsourcing performance (with particular 
emphasis being placed on governance efficiency). In order to capture both 
dimensions, this study treats outsourcing performance as a composite 
construct based on the realisation of expected benefits, and on buyers' overall 
satisfaction of the performance of the relationship (see Table 4.4). 
Buyers' overall satisfaction with their outsourcing project was measured by 
four items mainly adapted from the literature and intending to mainly capture 
buyers' satisfaction with the quality of received service (Goodman et aL, 1995; 
Lacity et al., 1996), and with their suppliers' responsiveness to problems and 
queries (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
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Buyers' realisation of outsourcing objectives was measured by seven items 
designed to capture the extent to which the expected outsourcing benefits 
have been realised. These include access to skilled personnel, economies of 
scale, higher quality, greater focus on core activities, and reduction in the risk 
of technological obsolescence (Grover et al., 1996; Lee and Kim, 1999). 
Table 4.4: Operationalisation of the outsourcing performance construct 
Sources 
Dimension Items (from which items 
were adapted) 
1. Your company is very satisfied with the overall benefits 
obtained from outsourcing this activity. 
The author 
2. Your company is very satisfied with the quality of the service Goodman et al. 
Buyers' overal l 
received in terms of consistency, timeliness and accuracy. (1995, p. 1323) 
satisfaction 
3. Your company is very satisfied with this supplier's Poppo and Zenger 
responsiveness to problems or queries. (2002, p. 715) 
4. The service level received from this supplier has exceeded Lacity et a!. (1996, 
your company's expectations. P. 15) 
1. Outsourcing the activity of reference has allowed your 
company to concentrate own resources on (e. g. staff) on core 
activities. 
2. By outsourcing the activity, your company has benefited from 
higher quality. 
3. By outsourcing the activity, your company - via your supplier Grover el al. (1996, 
- has benefited from better access to skilled personnel. p. 
115) and Lee and 
Kim (1999, p. 59) 
4. By outsourcing the activity, your company has benefited from 
Buyers' realisation greater scale economies achievable by your supplier. 
of outsourcing 
objectives 5. By outsourcing the activity, your company has removed the 
need to invest in certain equipment (now under the governance of 
your supplier) and reduced the risk of technological 
obsolescence. 
6. Your company has NOT achieved the target level of cost 
savings expected by outsourcing this activity. 
The author 
7. Overall, the objectives set by your company in relation to the Lee and Kim (1999, 
outsourcing project have been met. 
P. 59) 
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Although the author has tried to adjust for any weaknesses which past studies 
have shown in their measurement of the performance of the outsourcing 
relationships, it should be realised that selecting the appropriate measures 
remains a difficult task which would inevitably be subjected to a number of 
limitations that must be acknowledged. Indeed, in their study of organisational 
performance measurements, Parnell et al., (2006) note that: 
'... It is important that researchers vigorously acknowledge the 
shortcomings in the approaches they take to performance 
measurement. Such a practice may limit the findings found in many 
of the studies, but will result in a more precise contribution to the 
literature from each investigation". 
Accordingly, the main limitations of this research in general (including those to 
do with outsourcing performance measurement) will be acknowledged in 
chapter seven. 
Independent variables (buyers-suppliers asset specificity dimensions) 
As highlighted in section 2.4, the measurement of asset specificity has been 
one of the most challenging tasks faced by researchers in their empirical 
testing of transaction cost theory. Although there is a general agreement in the 
literature recognising the multi-dimensional nature of asset specificity, only 
few studies have so far tried to employ measurement that are capable of 
capturing more than one dimension of the construct in a single study, while 
most of these studies still end up with a single, though composite, asset 
specificity coefficient. This study tries to rectify this operationalisation 
'weakness' in relation to asset specificity by disaggregating the construct into 
various buyers and suppliers' asset specificity dimensions. From the buyer's 
side, this study covers six specificity dimensions, namely: (i) human asset 
specifcity; (ii) physical asset specificity (iii) dedicated asset specificity; (iv) 
temporal asset specificity; (v) procedural asset specificity; and (vi) brand 
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capital. From the supplier's side, four specificity dimensions are considered: (i) 
human asset specificity; (ii) physical asset specificity; (iii) dedicated asset 
specificity; and (iv) site specificity. In this research efforts were made to 
measure all seven AS dimensions from buyers and suppliers' sides. However, 
some dimensions were excluded since, conceptually, they only appeared to 
apply and be relevant to one side of the buyer-supplier dyad (e. g. buyers' site 
specific investments are, at best, very rare; see section 2.4.2). 
Human asset specificity could be characterised as knowledge specific 
assets (Dibbern et aL, 2005) that arise from learning-by-doing (Williamson, 
1996, p. 105) and which have limited transferability due to their limited 
application in other work settings (Lamminmaki, 2005). This type of asset 
specificity was the type most frequently considered by the variety of 
measurement approaches that have been applied. In this study, this 
dimension was measured from the perspective of both buyers and suppliers 
as each party of the transaction can be faced by the necessity to incur such 
human asset specificity investments for the sake of the relationship (see Table 
4.5). 
Buyers' human asset specificity was measured by three items which were 
adapted from the measures employed by Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) and 
Heide and John (1992). These items intended to capture the degree to which 
skills, knowledge and experience of buyers' personnel are specific to the 
requirements of dealing with the outsourcing supplier (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). 
Suppliers' human asset specificity was measured using four items that were 
directly adapted from the literature. These measures were designed to capture 
buyers' perception of the extent of non-redeployable, knowledge-related 
investments that were made by the supplier in terms of customization of 
workflows and routines (Rodriguez and Padilla, 2005; Zaheer and 
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Venkatraman, 1994), and level of adaptation made through training for 
example (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). 
Table 4.5: Operationalisation of the human asset specifcity construct 
Sources 
Dimension Items (from which items 
were adapted) 
1. Your company has recruited additional staff for the sole 
Bucklin & Sengupta 
purpose of managing the outsourcing relationship. (1993) 
2. Your company has acquired new knowledge in order to Heide and John 
(1992); Poppo and 
adapt to the specific technological norms of your supplier. Zenger (1998); 
Buyers' human Rodriguez and Padilla 
asset specificity (2005) 
3. Your company has invested considerably in the training Zaheer and 
Venkatraman (1994); 
of personnel for the purpose of the relationship with your Brouthers and 
supplier. Brouthers 
(2003) 
1. Your supplier has customized its own workflows and Zaheer and 
Venkatraman (1994); 
routines to the peculiarities of your company. Rodriguez and Padilla 
(2005) 
2. Your supplier faced initial difficulties in learning and Klein et al. (1990) 
adapting to your company's way of doing things. 
Suppliers' human 3. Your supplier has made a high degree of adaptation (e. g. Zaheer and 
asset specificity Venkatraman (1994); 
via training) in order to provide the customized service Brouthers and 
required by your company. Brouthers 
(2003) 
4. If you were to change your supplier, it would take a long Maltz (1993) 
time for a new supplier to serve as well as the current one. 
Physical asset specificity can be defined as tangible investments that are 
specifically tailored to a particular transaction between buyers and suppliers 
and the alternative use of which could have little value outside that 
relationship (Williamson, 1983; Joskow, 1987; Morill and Morill, 2003). Since 
this kind of investments can be made either by suppliers or buyers, this 
research measures this dimension of asset specificity in relation to both the 
buyer and the supplier's side (see Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6: Operationalisation of the physical asset specifcity construct 
Sources 
Dimension Items (from which items 
were adapted) 
1. Your company has invested in highly specialised Heide and John (1992) 
equipment for the sole purpose of dealing with this supplier Bucklin and 
Sen u to (1993) 
Buyers' physical 2. A significant amount of your company's equipment 
asset specificity 
would need to be scrapped should your outsourcing Ghani and Khan (2004) 
relationship with this supplier cease. 
Walker and Poppo 
(1991) 
Klein and Roth 
(1990); 
Stump and Heide 
(1996) 
1. Your supplier has invested in highly specialized Masten et aL (1991) 
equipment and facilities that were required for the purpose 
Nishiguchi (1994) 
Heide and John 
Suppliers' of the relationship with your company. 
(1990); Murray and 
Kotabe (1995, 
physical asset 1999); Weiss and 
specificity Anderson (1992), 
Klein et al. (1990); 
Lieberman (1991); 
Bucklin and 
Sen u to (1993) 
2. Your supplier has invested in highly specialized 
equipment and facilities that cannot easily be used in other Lyons (1995) 
applications outside the relationship with your company. 
Buyers' physical asset specificity was measured by two items that were 
adapted from Heide and John (1992), Bucklin and Sengupta (1993), and 
Ghani and Khan (2004). The items were designed to capture the specificity of 
the physical equipment invested by buyers vis-ä-vis the buyer-supplier 
relationship and the value of such investments outside that particular 
relationship. 
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Suppliers' physical asset specificity was measured by two items using a scale 
that is similar in composition to the preceding one, except that it describes 
physical, non-redeployable, investments made by the supplier rather than the 
buyer. 
Dedicated asset specificity refers to those assets that are of general 
purpose as opposed to specialised uses (physical asset specificity) but which 
have been made for a particular transactional agreement that is likely to entail 
a long term trading relationship. Should this relationship end prematurely, 
excess capacity will, however, be created (Williamson, 1983; Joskow, 1987; 
Lamminmaki, 2005). Although dedicated asset specificity could be seen as an 
investment that can only be incurred by the supplier, under certain 
circumstances, this dimension can be related to an investment made by the 
buyer (eg. additional investment in laboratory accessories that help firm to 
assess the quality of a bigger proportion of goods acquired). Accordingly, 
efforts were made in this research to measure this dimension of asset 
specificity in relation to both the buyer and the supplier's side (see Table 4.7). 
Buyers' dedicated asset specificity was measured by three items that were 
originally developed by the author from the review of the literature and 
particularly from the discussions conducted by Williamson (1983), Joskow 
(1987), and Lamminmaki (2005). 
Suppliers' dedicated asset specificity. Given the lack of studies offering items 
intending to measure this construct, five items had to be originally developed 
by the author based on the conceptual discussions offered in the literature 
while one item was adapted from (Dyer, 1996). 
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Table 4.7: Operationalisation of the dedicated asset specificity construct 
Sources 
Dimension Items (from which items 
were adapted) 
dedi Ib: For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your 
company has made additional investments that would result 
in excess capacity in the event of contract termination. 
The author based 
on the discussion dedi2b: For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your 
conducted by 
company has made additional investments in quality control 
Williamson (1983), 
Buyers' dedicated facilities which are likely to result in excess capacity in the 
asset specificity event of contract termination. 
Joskow (1987), and 
Lamminmaki 
dedi3b: In order to cope with the ̀ weight' of the relationship 
(2005). 
with this supplier, your company has made additional 
investments in communication facilities that are likely to 
result in excess capacity in the event of contract termination. 
DediIs: Your supplier has made extra investments in order 
to expand its production capacity and to be able to meet 
your needs. The author 
Dedi2s: Your supplier has expanded its production capacity 
in the hope of a long-term relationship with your company. 
Dedi3s: Your supplier's sales to your company represent an Suppliers' 
dedicated asset important share of your supplier's total sales. 
Dyer (1996) 
specificity Dedi4s: Your supplier could easily re-sell extra output or 
make use of additional capacity in other applications outside 
the outsourcing relationship with your company. 
Dedi5s: Should your outsourcing relationship cease, your The author 
supplier would be left with substrantial unsold output or 
excess capacity (e. g. extra staff). 
Site specificity refers to a relationship that requires close proximity for 
reducing inventory and/or other processing costs. Once in place, however, the 
relocated assets involved are highly immobile and, thus, the cost of their 
relocation is very high (Williamson, 1983; Joskow, 1987; Morill and Morill, 
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2003; Lamminmaki, 2005). As discussed in section 2.4.2.3, while most studies 
that tried to operationalise the site specificity construct have tended to use the 
distance between the subcontractor and the customer's premises as a proxy 
(Joskow, 1987; Ghani and Khan, 2004), few studies have actually tried to 
investigate whether or not physical proximity was specifically due to the 
transactional relationship. To adjust for this measurement 'weakness', the 
scale employed in this research was designed to measure buyers' perception 
of how important close proximity is to the supplier, and the extent to which the 
supplier's relocation decision (if any) was specific to the outsourcing 
relationship (see Table 4.8). Since in most cases site specific investments 
(involving relocation) are incurred by the supplier with the aim of securing a 
long term relationship with its customer, decision was made in this research to 
measure site specificity only in relation to the supplier side. The supplier site 
specificity scale was measured by four items that were mainly developed from 
Masten (1984), Joskow (1987), and Nishiguchi (1994). 
Temporal specificity refers to transactional relationships where timing and 
coordination are of high importance (Lamminmaki, 2005). According to 
Malone et al. (1987, p. 486) "an asset is time specific if its value is highly 
dependent on its reaching the user within a specified, relatively limited period 
of time". Due to its link to the timing of a service (or goods) delivery, most risks 
involved through temporal AS are on the buyer's side of the relationship. 
Buyers' temporal asset specificity was based on a four-item scale that was 
designed to capture buyers' perception of the importance of timing in the 
transactional relationship (see Table 4.9). Two of these items were developed 
from the measurements proposed by Brown and Potoski (2005) and Masten 
et al. (1991). 
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Table 4.8: Operationalisation of the site specificity construct 
Sources 
Dimension Items (from which items 
were adapted) 
Site Is: Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its 
operations for the purpose of being nearer to your company 
since close proximity is important to the outsourcing 
relationship 
Site2s: Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its 
operations for the sole purpose of the outsourcing Masten (1984) 
Suppliers' site relationship with your company and, hence, this relocation Joskow (1987); 
specificity has little value outside this relationship. Nishiguchi (1994). 
Site3s: Your supplier has relocated some of its operations or 
assets in order to improve its services towards your 
company. 
Site4s: The outsourcing relationship requires your supplier 
to be located near your company. 
Table 4.9: Operationalisation of the temporal specificity construct 
Sources 
Dimension Items (from which items 
were adapted) 
Temp Ib: The product or service provided by your supplier Brown and Potoski 
requires timely delivery. 
(2005) 
Temp2b: In the relationship with your supplier, precise Masten et al. 
scheduling is very important. (1991). 
Temp3b: Punctual delivery from your supplier is crucial; 
Buyers' temporal 
specificity 
hence any delay will result in a significant cost to your 
company (e. g. loss of clients). The author based 
tual th Temp4b: In the event of delay from your supplier, your 
on e concep 
discussion provided 
company can easily get the same product / service from in the literature 
another supplier. 
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Brand Capital can be directly linked to reputation investment. An outsourcing 
relationship of high capital specificity is a relationship which involves functions 
that could have a direct and significant impact on the overall firm reputation. In 
such circumstances, the outsourcing supplier could find itself in a position 
enabling it to intentionally or unintentionally cause damage to the firm's 
reputation (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Lohtia et al., 1994). Clearly this 
asset specificity dimension is more likely to be a concern for buyers in 
outsourcing relationships. The Buyers' brand capital scale was measured by 
three items which were originally developed by the author drawing from the 
work of Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Levy (1985), and Lohtia et al. (1994) 
(see Table 4.10). These items were intended to capture the level of buyers' 
reputation investment that could be put at risk when engaging in outsourcing. 
Table 4.10: Operationalisation of the brand capital construct 
Dimension Items 
Sources 
(from which items 
were adapted) 
1. In the industry in which your company operates, you 
cannot afford receiving a low quality product or service The author drawing 
from your supplier since this will negatively affect your own mainly on the 
reputation. 
discussion 
conducted by: 
Buyers' brand 2. Given the importance of your company in the market, 
capital your supplier must do its utmost to maintain the quality of 
Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988); 
service provided to your company. Levy (1985); 
3. Any underperformance from your supplier will result in a 
Lohtia et al. (1994) 
highly negative effect on your company's reputation. 
Procedural asset specificity: As highlighted in section 2.4.2.7, the business 
process asset specificity construct was initially developed and measured by 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994,1995) in an attempt to capture the physical 
asset specificity dimension in the service industry, where considerable 
investment in physical components and tools are, less likely to be involved. 
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The term, which was originally coined by Malone et al. (1987, p. 492), refers to 
organisational routines and workflows tailored to a particular relationship and 
which are difficult to modify once created, or to re-deploy to other purposes 
inside the firm without value loss or reduction. This study measures 
procedural specificity from the buyers' side (see Table 4.11). Buyers' 
procedural asset specificity was measured by four items, two of which were 
very much in line with the measures used in Barthelemy and Quelin (2002), 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994,1995) and Heide and John (1990,1992). 
Table 4.11: Operationalisation of the procedural asset specificity 
construct4 
Sources 
Dimension Items (from which items 
were adapted) 
1. Your company has established procedures and routines Heide & John (1990); Zaheerand 
tailored to the relationship with your supplier. Venkatraman (1994, 
1995) 
2. The outsourcing relationship has entailed no changes for The author (item 
employed to test for 
your employees (reversed item). any potential 
B ' response set) uyers h d B l 
procedural asset 3. The outsourcing relationship 
has entailed significant art emy an e 
specificity your changes for the overall operations of company. Heide le and d John n 
(1992) 
4. The outsourcing relationship has entailed significant The author based on 
restructuring and downsizing (e. g. redundancies) in your the review of the 
literature 
company. 
° The measures employed by Heide and John (1990,1992) were initially intended to capture the asset 
specificity construct in general and not specifically the procedural asset specificity construct which was 
not directly measured until Zaheer and Venkatraman' s (1994,1995) empirical studies. 
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Reciprocal specific investments 
The effect of reciprocal specific investments is assessed through the resulting 
interactions between all buyers and suppliers' asset specificity dimensions. 
This approach is consistent with that recommended by Jaccard et al. (1990). 
Moderator variable 
This study investigates the moderating effect of collaborative ties and 
measures it using seven-item scale that was designed to capture the degree 
of collaboration involved in the buyer-supplier transactional relationship (see 
Table 4.12). These items were mainly adapted from Noordeweir et al. (1990), 
Mohr and Spekman (1994), Goodman et aL (1995), Lee and Kim (1999), and 
Poppo and Zenger (2002). 
Table 4.12: Operationalisation of the collaborative ties construct 
Sources 
Items (from which items 
were adapted) 
1. Your company and the supplier have an extremely collaborative 
relationship. Heide and John (1992); 
dZ 2. Your company and the supplier share both short- and long-term enger 
Poppo an 
(2002) 
goals. 
3. No major disputes have so far taken place between your company 
and this supplier. 
Lacity et at (1996) 
4. When your company has queries in relation to the service or 
product provided, the supplier's employees respond with promptly 
Noordeweir et at 
(1990); 
accurate information. Mohr and Spekman, 
(1994); 
Goodman et al. 1995 
5. Your company and the supplier do NOT generally keep each 
others promises. 
dK 6. Your supplier is always willing to provide assistance to your 
Lee an im (1999) 
company. 
7. Your company would be inclined to switch to an alternative supplier The author with a 
if the latter could provide a service comparable to the one offered by slight adaptation 
from 
Noordeweir et at 
the current supplier at a slightly lower price (reversed item) (1990) 
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Control variables 
In line with most empirical research on vertical integration using the 
transaction cost approach, this study includes firm size as a control variable 
(without explicitly hypothesizing any specific direction in our model). Indeed, 
larger firms may be in possession of higher level of resources allowing them to 
invest in higher collaborative ties (Martin et al., 1995). Scherer (1980) 
suggests that firm size is an important factor to control for since it can have an 
effect on firm performance for reasons of scale and scope economy, market 
power aspirations, and the ability to aggregate inputs (see Anderson & 
Schmittlein, 1984, p. 388). Firm size was also found to affect organizational 
boundary decision such as outsourcing (Pisano, 1990, cited in Ang and 
Straub, 1998, p. 538). For example, since smaller firms tend to be more 
resource constrained than larger ones (Robinson, 1982), their limited 
capabilities and lack of vendors' efficiencies may place them into the necessity 
to seek additional resources from other organisations. Also, small firms could 
be more prone to opportunistic behaviour due to their limited resources which 
do not allow them to opt for some safeguard mechanisms (Heide & John, 
1988). Following Poppo and Zenger (1998), Lazzarini et al. (2008) and Perez- 
Nordtvedt et al. (2008), this research uses the total number of employees in 
the buyers' companies as a proxy for firm size. 
In addition, because our sample includes companies that are outsourcing 
various different activities, the author tried to classify them according to the 
activity they are outsourcing in five categories (HR-related activities other than 
payroll, IT maintenance and development, payroll, housekeeping, and any 
other type of activity). As such, five dummy variables were used to control for 
any activity-related effects. 
Since our sample consists of companies operating in four different industries, 
the author used four industry dummies so as to control for industry 
differences. Indeed, Williamson (1985, p. 143) recognises the important role 
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which the environmental setting can play in affecting vertical scope inferences. 
He points out that "the study of economic organisation in a regime of rapid 
innovation poses much more difficult issues than those addressed here". 
4.6.3 Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire was designed following Dillman's (2000) tailored design 
method. Knowledgeable academics (academics familiar with the term 
outsourcing and asset specificity and experts in the field of research methods 
and questionnaire design from within Oxford Brookes University) and twenty 
five representative CEOs and human resource directors from a sample of fifty 
companies reviewed, filled-in, and critiqued initial versions of the survey for 
both content and clarity of the questions. The revised mail questionnaire 
consisted of a cover letter, a tear-off detachable participant information sheet, 
and the set of questions to be answered by the respondents. The survey 
cover letter, which included information about the researcher and all contact 
details, promised confidentiality and anonymity, described the objectives of 
the study, and emphasised the voluntary nature of participation in the survey. 
The letter also defined the term outsourcing and stressed the importance of 
understanding the factors likely to affect outsourcing performance. As an 
inducement to reply, respondents were promised summarised results on the 
findings of the study (respondents were asked to complete and return the tear 
off sheet provided at the end of the questionnaire). The tear-off detachable 
participant information sheet reiterated the objectives of the study, defined 
again the term outsourcing, emphasised the importance of the survey, and 
provided respondents with a brief description of how to complete the 
questionnaire. 
In line with most empirical studies that have tried to measure asset specificity 
and outsourcing performance, scale questions were employed almost 
throughout the questionnaire (except the screening and general questions), 
allowing the author to collect the required attitude and belief data in relation to 
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both asset specificity and outsourcing performance. The seven-point Likert 
scale, which was identified in the literature review as the most frequently used 
rating scale in the asset specificity measurement (see section 2.4.2), was 
consistently employed so as to avoid confusing respondents. Respondents 
were asked to rate each item on the provided seven point response options 
(1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree). Here, particular care was taken to 
avoid the use of items that poorly discriminate between high and low scores 
(Langdridge, 2004). However, in an attempt to prevent the potential 
occurrence of the response set problem, both positive and negative 
statements were included so as to 'force' the respondent to think carefully 
about each question (Oppenheim, 1992; Saunders et al., 2000; and 
Langdridge, 2004). Throughout the questionnaire, open questions were kept 
to a minimum use (Saunders et al., 2000) and were, consequently, only 
employed as part of the screening (filtering) and general questions. In 
addition, in designing the questionnaire, attempts were made to avoid 
exceptionally lengthy items, multiple negatives, double barrelled items and 
jargon (DeVellis, 1991). Careful attention to the wording of items was also 
paid so as to help reducing item ambiguity (Tourangeau et al., 2000). 
Respondents were asked at the beginning of the questionnaire to identify one 
of the most significant activities that is being outsourced at the time of 
questionnaire. This activity then served as the referent for all remaining 
questions. 
Although the full questionnaire might appear to be relatively lengthy5, special 
care was taken to enhance the format, the appearance, and the overall layout 
of the questionnaire through the use of different font sizes and styles. While 
there seems to be an overall agreement in the research methodology 
literature over the negative effect of a lengthy questionnaire on response rates 
(Tull and Hawkins, 1990), Hoinville et aL (1978) stress that short 
S It is worth noting, however, that the length of the questionnaire employed in this research is still 
within the acceptable range of number of A4 sides suggested by Hoinville et al. (1978). The latter 
suggest no more than eight to ten sides. 
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questionnaires do not necessarily encourage response rate and could actually 
look superficial and fail to capture the data required especially when dealing 
with complex subjects (asset specificity could be regarded as one example). 
Hoinville et al., (1978, p. 127) suggest that "More important perhaps than the 
length of the questionnaire is its appearance". A copy of the questionnaire 
together with its covering letter is included in appendix 4.1. 
4.6.4 Pilot-testing 
An extensive pilot-testing process has been carried out. This process involved 
the consultation of experts in the field, and the administration of the 
questionnaire to a sample of 50 companies from which 25 responses were 
obtained, coded and analysed. As a result, questions that were not providing 
useful data were discarded, ambiguous areas were clarified, definitions were 
added, and the final revisions of the questionnaire were made. This procedure 
clearly addressed both ISA-7 (pre-testing) and ISA-10 (pilot-testing). 
While the consultation of experts achieved both face and content validity by 
ensuring that items in the questionnaire reflected the `content universe', the 
administration of the questionnaire to a sample of 50 companies ensured that 
content of questionnaire was understandable to target respondents, and 
helped determining the extent to which constructs were demonstrating an 
acceptable level of reliability (through the running of the Cronbach Alpha test). 
Such procedure fulfilled the ISA-6 requirement in relation to content validity. 
Further discussion about validity and reliability issues in relation to this study 
will be provided in the next section. 
The pilot-tested questionnaire included a separate evaluation form offering 
respondents (including the experts reviewing the questionnaire) an opportunity 
to critique the instrument on matters important for good questionnaire design, 
such as content, format, clarity of questions, terminology as well as ease and 
speed of completion. In addition, respondents were asked to identify specific 
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questions with which they experienced difficulties. Finally, respondents were 
also invited to make any suggestions for enhancement (for further details on 
specific adjustments carried out during the pilot-testing process, please see 
appendix 4.2). 
4.6.5 Reliability and validity considerations 
The research methodology literature makes reference to two important criteria 
that can assist researchers in assessing their measurement tools, namely: (i) 
reliability; and (ii) validity. In addition to these two factors, which represent the 
scientific requirement for sound measurement instruments, practicality could 
be seen as a third criterion, reflecting operational requirements (Blumberg, et 
al., 2005). This section summarises the literature on the three above- 
mentioned criteria and discusses the relevant methods chosen to maximise 
both reliability and validity of this research while considering the practicality 
criterion. The statistical assessment of these aspects will be further discussed 
in chapter five. 
4.6.5.1 Reliability 
Reliability can be defined as 'the correlation between a measure and itself" 
(Peter, 1981, p. 136). It reflects the degree to which the measures employed 
provide stable measurement (Sekaran, 2000; Langdridge, 2004). As noted in 
Table 4.13, the research methods literature often refers to three common tests 
by which reliability can be assessed namely: (i) test re-test; (ii) alternative or 
parallel form; and (iii) internal consistency. 
The test re-test approach provides indication of stability of measures by 
administering the questionnaire twice to the same respondents (Saunders et 
a/., 2000; Langdridge, 2004; Blumberg et al., 2005). Among the problems 
associated with this method, we can mention the difficulty of convincing the 
same respondent to participate in the same questionnaire twice (Saunders et 
al., 2000) and the fact that reliability usually diminish as the time interval 
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grows (Bohrnstedt, 1970). In addition, as highlighted by Mitchell (1996, p. 201) 
`if a change in the phenomenon occurs between the first and second 
administrations it is very difficult to distinguish between change and 
unreliability". As such, the test re-test approach has limited applications 
(Blumberg et al., 2005) and most of the literature does not recommend its use 
as a sole measure for testing reliability (see for example Mitchell, 1996; and 
Saunders et al., 2000). For these reasons the test re-test approach was not 
employed in this survey. 
The alternative or parallel approach tries to assess reliability by looking at the 
"degree to which alternative forms of the same measure produce same or 
similar results" (Blumberg e/ a., 2005, p. 385). It is obtained by applying two 
equivalent questions and then comparing responses to both of them. This 
approach can be criticised for the difficulty that researchers might face to 
ensure that two questions are truly equivalent. Besides, this method increases 
the length of the questionnaire and respondents could realise the similarity in 
the two questions and could hence refer back to their previous answer. For 
these reasons, this approach is not often recommended. Nevertheless, in 
certain circumstances (such as the case in this current research) the 
alternative or parallel approach could be employed as check questions in few 
parts of the questionnaire (Mitchell, 1996; Saunders et al., 2000) (see for 
example section C, question 11 in page 7 of the questionnaire). 
The most popular and widely used method for assessing reliability is the 
internal consistency approach. This approach enables to evaluate the 
consistency of responses across all or a sub-group of questions included in 
the questionnaire by estimating the inter-correlation among the scores of 
items (Mitchell, 1996; Saunders et a/., 2000). A sophisticated form of this 
method, which was used in this research, is Cronbach's Alpha which adjusts 
for the limitations of the basic split-halves form by calculating a mean of all 
possible split-half coefficients (Mitchell, 1996; Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
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Although different authors use different figures to denote an acceptable level 
of internal reliability, commonly values of less than 0.6 are considered 
unsatisfactory (Nunnally, 1978). Cronbach's Alpha values obtained following 
the final data collection will be reported in the following chapter. This process 
clearly addressed the ISA-8 quality attribute. 
Nevertheless, care was taken, at the early stage of the preparation and testing 
of the questionnaire, not to rely heavily on internal consistency using 
Cronbach Alpha so as to avoid the elimination of potentially important items 
and the consequent disturbance of the potentially complex factor structure 
(Flynn and Pearcy, 2001). Other preventive procedural, non-statistical, 
methods that were employed in this research to ensure reliability include the 
employment of the multi-item measures, the borrowing of items from 
published studies, and the minimisation of source of unreliability through a 
pre-testing procedure that ensured the non-inclusion of ambiguous and 
misleading words (De Vaus, 2002). 
While reliability is a necessary condition for measurement validity, it is not, on 
its own, sufficient and must be complemented by other forms of validity 
(Churchill, 1979). 
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Table 4.13: Reliability and validity measures 
Types of reliability & validity 
Reliability 
Stability 
Consistency 
Content Validity 
Face Validity 
Concurrent 
Validity I Criterion 
validity 
Construct 
validity 
validity 
Predictive 
validity 
Convergent 
validity 
(Measure I Discriminant 
validation) or Divergent 
validity 
Description 
Extent to which measures 
maintain stability over 
time. 
Extent to which measures 
are internally consistent. 
Extent of 
representativeness and 
suitability of the questions 
in addressing the concept 
under investigation 
The degree to which the 
measures are true from 
the perspective of the 
judgement of others. 
The extent to which the 
measures agree with pre- 
existing measures that 
are judged to be valid. 
The extent to which 
measures predict future 
events that are logically 
related. 
The extent to which two 
items measuring the 
same or theoretically- 
related concepts correlate 
The extent to which a 
measure has a low 
correlation with a variable 
that is supposed to be 
unrelated to it. 
Approach 
Test re-test; alt 
or parallel form 
Split-half reliability; 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Obtaining comments 
from experts. 
Obtaining comments 
from colleagues, friends 
or potential 
respondents (generally 
refers to non-expert 
Comparing measures 
to existing ones. 
The use of future 
criterion measure 
against which the 
validity of our measure 
would be examined. 
Principle component 
factor analysis (Extent 
of factor loadings) 
Principle component 
factor analysis 
(examination of item 
loadings across 
constructs) 
Source': Synthesis drawn from: Mitchell, 1996; Saunders et al., 2000; Bryman and 
Bell, 2003; Neuman, 2003; Langdridge, 2004; and Blumberg et al., 2005. 
6 One exception is the definition put forward by Neuman (2003, p. 183) which made reference to "a 
judgment by a scientific community". 
In the light of the absence of a unified framework that brings together different academic inputs in 
relation to both reliability and validity issues, this table could be seen as among the rare attempts to date 
that tried to distill a synthesized framework on the topic. In so doing, the author consulted an important 
number of research methods books while referring back to the seminal works of Heeler and Ray (1972), 
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4.6.5.2 Validity 
Validity refers to "the extent to which a test measures what we actually wish to 
measure" (Blumberg et al., 2005, p. 379). There are generally four types of 
validity tests that are commonly reported in the research methods literature 
(see Table 4.13). 
Content validity reflects the extent of representativeness and suitability of the 
questions in addressing the concept under investigation (Saunders et al., 
2000; Blumberg et aL, 2005). It could be assessed by inviting an expert or 
group of experts to comment on the comprehensiveness of the measurement 
instrument and the sampling adequacy of the included items, which could 
quantitatively be turned into content validity ratios (Mitchell, 1996; Blumberg et 
a/., 2005). The consultation of experts at the pre-test stage of the 
questionnaire was employed with the aim to achieve this. 
Similarly, face validity could be assessed by referring to the subjective 
evaluations of non-experts (e. g. colleagues, friends) on the appropriateness of 
the items included in the questionnaire (Landridge, 2004; Mitchell, 1996; 
Saunders et al., 2000); which was also fulfilled at the pre-test stage of the 
questionnaire. 
Both face and content validity were also optimised through an extensive 
review of the literature and by trying to employ, whenever possible, measures 
that have been previously tested. 
Criterion validity employs construct indicators, the validity of which is checked 
by comparing it with another measure of the same construct over which a 
researcher has confidence (Neuman, 2003). As shown in Table 4.13, criterion 
validity is composed of concurrent validity and predictive validity. While the 
Churchill (1979), and Peter (1981) which have been later comprehensively put into operation by 
Mitchell (1996). 
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former indicates the extent to which the measures agree with pre-existing 
measures that are judged to be valid, the latter refers to the extent to which 
measures predict future events that are logically related (Neuman, 2003). 
Criterion validity is not straight forward as the researcher must ensure that the 
validity criterion to be used is itself valid (Blumberg et al., 2005) especially if 
we consider that aconstruct validation is an ever-extending process of 
investigation and development" (Cronbach, 1971 cited in Peter, 1981, p. 135) 
and that major aspects of construct validity such as dimensionality and 
internal consistency could change according to the research context. For this 
reason, care was taken when measures employed were borrowed from 
previous studied. 
Construct validity is one of the most complex, but most important forms of 
validity, which necessitates theoretical awareness of factors underlying the 
concept(s) under investigation (Mitchell, 1996). The term 'construct validity', 
which "lies at the very heart of the scientific process" (Churchill, 1979, p. 70), is 
used "to refer to the vertical correspondence between a construct which is at 
an unobservable, conceptual level and a purported measure of it which is at 
an operational level... The term means that a measure assesses the 
magnitude and direction of (1) all of the characteristics and (2) only the 
characteristics of the construct it is purported to assess' (Peter, 1981, p. 134). 
Convergent validity refers to the convergence of multiple indicators or 
measures of the same construct (Neuman, 2003). It is based on "the 
correlation between responses obtained by maximally different methods of 
measuring the same construct" (Campbell and Fiske, 1959 cited in Peter, 
1981, p. 136). Convergent validity in this research was tested using principle 
component factor analysis and looking at the extent of factor loadings (see for 
example Ang and Straub, 1998). 
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Discriminant or divergent validity refers to "low correlations between the 
measure of interest and other measures that are supposedly not measuring 
the same variable or concept" (Heeler and Ray, 1972, p. 362); which also 
reflects uni-dimensionality of the set of items measuring the concept in 
question. It could be determined by revealing that a measure does not 
correlate very highly with other measures from which it is supposed to be 
different (Campbell, 1960, cited in Peter, 1981, p. 137). Once again, statistical 
tools such as factor analysis could be employed in assessing the discriminant 
validity of a construct (Emanuel and Bramble, 1989), by examining for 
example the item loadings across constructs in a rotated principle component 
factor analysis making sure that no item loaded high on another construct that 
it did not intend to measure (Ashill and Jobber, 2005); a method which is 
employed in this research. In addition, discriminant validity is further tested in 
this research through the use of Pearson correlation. These statistical 
assessments will be reported in the following chapter. 
By addressing both convergent and discriminant validity, this research 
managed obviously to fulfil Malhotra and Grover's (1998) ISA-9 quality 
attribute. The suitability of the collected data for the running of factor analysis 
and the full procedure of carrying it out including a discussion in relation to the 
fulfilment of the item to subject ratio (ISA17) will all be presented in the next 
chapter (see section 5.9.1). Statistical tests in relation to both non-response 
and common method bias will also be presented in the next chapter, hence 
fulfilling ISA 15 quality attribute (see section 5.3,5.4, and 5.10). 
4.6.5.3 Practicality 
In assessing and validating the measures employed in this study, the author 
has also taken into account practical issues which can introduce some kind of 
trade-off between the ideal research project and the resource constraints. 
Indeed, as highlighted by Blumberg et al. (2005), factors including budget, 
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time constraints, degree of expertise, and convenience would ultimately play 
an important role in dictating the choice of validity checks to be used 
(Blumberg et aL, 2005). 
4.7 Research ethics 
This research project has received clearance by Oxford Brookes University's 
Research Ethics Committee (see appendix 4.3). The author considered the 
recommendations put forward by the committee in their letter of approval. The 
questionnaire included both a cover letter and an additional tear-off 
information sheet since cover letters could easily get separated from the 
actual questionnaire particularly in the case when the questionnaire is passed 
from one colleague to another for completion. Such instance of separation has 
already been noted during the pilot-testing process (see appendix 4.2). 
4.8 Conducting the main survey 
In line with Artz (1999) and Wang (2002), the author designed the research to 
aim at respondents who are highly knowledgeable of their firms' outsourcing 
activities. Since HR activities are generally ranked as top activities being 
outsourced8 (see, Gurchiek, 2005; and Wahrenburg et aL, 2006), HR directors 
were believed to be key informants in relation to outsourcing. In addition, the 
nature of industries targeted (service-related) entails lower likelihood for our 
survey to reach companies with traditionally outsourced activities such as 
logistics (which would be more prominent among manufacturing companies 
for example), leading the author to believe that it would be more likely for the 
targeted companies to outsource HR related-activities. Pre-survey phone 
conversations, with a randomly selected number of firms from our sample, 
confirmed that, in majority of cases, HR directors were, indeed, informative 
about the outsourcing activities within their respective companies. However, if 
8 "A 1996 Hewitt Associates survey of large employers found that 93% of respondents outsourced some 
of their HR functions. Similarly, an American Management Association survey found that 77% of firms 
surveyed in 1996 outsourced some of their HR activities, up from 60% in 1994" (Greer et at, 1999). In 
addition, a 2004 survey carried out on 120 companies in North America and Europe showed that 80% 
of companies that outsource HR functions would do so again (Conference Board, 15th April, 2004). 
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lacking the required information, HR directors were asked, in the cover letter, 
to pass the survey to a more knowledgeable person within the company. 
A pre-paid self-addressed envelope was enclosed with the questionnaire to be 
used for returning the completed questionnaire. There is a general agreement 
in the research methods literature over the positive effect of such practice as it 
implies the actual importance of returning the questionnaire completed 
(Dillman, 2000; Edwards et al., 2002). To add a personal touch and to 
increase the likelihood of the envelope reaching the intended recipient, most 
envelopes were personally addressed to the name of HR directors of the 
targeted company (except in a few occasions where the name of the HR 
director could not be identified). It was believed that respondents would be 
more encouraged to open an envelope which was specifically addressed to 
them (Webb, 1992). 
Three weeks after the initial mailing, a second mailing, which included a copy 
of the questionnaire and a prepaid return envelope, was addressed to a 
random sample of 1000 non-respondents. This follow-up process is widely 
believed to be an effective mechanism to increase the response rate (see 
among others Jobber and O'Reilly, 1996; Dillman, 2000; Edwards et al., 2002) 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
Given the nature of this research and taking into account the resource 
constraints, a mail survey was chosen as to be the most appropriate method 
for enabling the collection of quantitative data through which research 
hypotheses could be tested. This chapter reported the process of the research 
design, sampling, questionnaire design and administration, as well as scale 
development and all related reliability and validity issues. The methodology 
employed in the course of this research tried to reach an important degree of 
rigour by augmenting the widely known Churchill's (1979) traditional paradigm 
for instrument development through the consideration of Malhotra and 
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Grover's (1998) Ideal Survey Attributes (ISAs). As can be seen from Table 
4.14, all but four of Malhotra and Grover's (1998) 17 ISAs were applied in this 
research methodology suggesting a more than adequate level of rigour in 
developing a valid and reliable measurement of key constructs (e. g. asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance). 
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Table 4.14: A summary of the methodological actions carried out in the 
development and validation of the research instrument 
Phase Churchill's Action taken in the course of this research ISAs 
Four Phases covered 
1 Construct " Extensive review of studies touching upon asset 
domain specificity (AS) and outsourcing performance. ISA-1 
specification " Categorisation of various (AS) and outsourcing 
performance definitions. 
2 Item generation Implementation of Dillman's (1978) total design 
& questionnaire method in developing the questionnaire instrument 
design Incorporation of both positive & negative statements 
(to avoid the response-set problem) ISA-2 
" Double-barrelled questions & use of jargon were both ISA-5 
avoided (Tourangeau et al., 2000) 
" Measure-comparison effort through an extensive 
review of studies touching upon the operationalisation 
of AS & outsourcing performance. 
3 Measure " face and content validity (pre-testing and pliot-testing 
purification of the questionnaire) ISA-6 
" Pre-testing through the consultation of experts in the ISA-7 
field. ISA-10 
" Pilot-testing through the administration of the 
questionnaire to a sample of 50 companies. 
4 Data collection & " Use of stratified sampling method. 
post-data Justification of sample frame. 
collection " Random selection from each stratum of the sample ISA-3 
analysis frame. ISA-12 
" Suitability of the application of the factor analysis ISA-13 
(item-subject ratio) ISA-17 
" Convergent & discriminant validity (factor loading ISA-9 
through principle componenent factor analysis, 
Pearson correlation) 
ISA-8 
" Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) 
ISA-15 
" Non-response bias (Chi-square test & ANOVA test 
on early & late respondents) 
" Common method bias (Harman's one factor analysis 
augmented by Podsakoffs et a/. (2003) framework. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the exploratory data analysis of the research. After 
reporting the response rate, the results of the tests for non-response bias, and 
the ways in which outliers were handled, descriptive statistics regarding the 
general profile of respondents and research key variables are presented. The 
measurement scales used are, thereafter, purified using exploratory factor 
analysis. The chapter ends with an extended note over the reliability and validity 
of the extracted factors. 
5.2 Response rate 
As highlighted in section 4.5.4 (in the previous chapter), a stratified random 
sampling of 2400 companies (600 from each of the four industries) was employed 
for data collection. The initial survey was followed by a follow-up mail survey 
consisting of a sample of 1000 non-respondents. Out of the 2400 questionnaires, 
2286 reached the intended recipients, and a total of 286 were returned, yielding a 
12.5% overall response rate or rate of return (see Lever, 1997; and Widener and 
Selto, 1999). Among the 286 respondents, 20 refused to take part in the survey. 
The main reasons expressed were lack of time and companies' policy (see Table 
5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Reasons for not taking part in the questionnaire as highlighted by respondents 
Reasons for non-participation Frequency Percentage 
I 'do not have time to complete 166 questionnaire 10 50% 
It is the company, policy not to take part in questionnaires 30% 
I am not aware of any activities being outsourced 1 5% 
The company is still in its preparatory stage of outsourcing 1 5% 
The company is in transition period (change in management) 1 5% 
The company is not operating on a proper basis 1 5% 
TOTAL 20 100% 
In addition, 118 respondents of the remaining 266 reported that they had not 
been engaged in any outsourcing projects. Out of the 148 firms with outsourcing 
experience, 11 had to be dropped since they were either unreliable (as they failed 
the validity check test) or had particularly poor entries (counting more than 10 
missing values), leaving us with 137 usable responses (6.3% usable response 
rate) (see Table 5.2). 
Even though the above usable response rate could be regarded as relatively low, 
according to Babble (1973) "demonstrating a lack of response bias is more 
important than a high response rate" (Babble, 1973, cited in Wang, 2002, p. 168). 
In addition, as noted by Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 175), within postal self- 
administered questionnaires, "response rates of 10 per cent or less are not 
uncommon". Such relatively low response rate is not unusual among studies 
targeting a large sample (eg. Gonzalez et al. 2005). Besides, although at first 
sight it might be perceived that our usable final sample may be on the low side to 
ensure reliable inferences, it is worth noting that it is not uncommon for factor 
analysis to be reliably and validly applied using a sample that is even less than 
120 (see of example Widener and Selto, 1999; Wang, 2002; and Templeton of 
' This has been calculated applying Saunders et al's (2000, p. 157) suggested method: total usable 
responses / total number in sample - (ineligible + unreachable). 
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a/., 2002). Moreover, 137 usable responses fall well within the range that was 
recommended by Spector (1992). Furthermore, as highlighted by Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2001) smaller sample size could be sufficient when there are several 
variables with high loadings (e. g., >. 80). 
Table 5.2: Distribution of questionnaires' return 
Numbers 
Sent 2400 Percentage 
Undelivered 117 
Reached 2283 100% 
Returned 286 12.5% 
Of which 
Refused to 20 7% 
participate 
Not usable 11 4% 
Ineligible 118 41% 
Usable 137 48% 
5.3 Non-response bias 
Generalisation of results from this research requires the final sample to be 
representative of the sample frame. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
initial sample, to which the questionnaires were sent, was drawn using the 
stratified sampling method that increases the likelihood of achieving 
representativeness of the sample (Saunders et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the non- 
response issue that is associated with surveys does not only mean a reduction in 
the final sample size but can also lead to the creation of bias. Consequently, 
adequate attention should be directed to the issue of 'non-response bias'. 
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Non-response bias occurs when the final sample responding to the survey is not 
representative of the initial sample to which the questionnaire was sent. This 
could be due to systematic differences in both groups which could be reflected in 
their responses thus leading to potential bias in the final results (Dillman, 2000; 
De Vaus, 2002). 
To check for non-response bias, both the Chi-square test and the analysis of 
variance test were performed so as to confirm or refute the existence of bias. 
Respondents were divided into two groups: the respondents to the first mailing 
and the respondents to the follow up (see Table 5.3). In line with the extrapolation 
method over successive waves, it was assumed that respondents to the follow up 
were "less readily" to take part in the survey and, consequently, were considered 
most similar to non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). 
Table 5.3: Early and late respondents 
Receipt Frequency Percentage (%) Cumulative 
Early (before reminder) 5 weeks 105 76.6 76.6 
Late (following reminder) 6 weeks 32 23.4 100.0 
Total 111 weeks 137 100.0 
As can be seen from the above table, most of the usable questionnaires (76.6%) 
were returned before any follow-up. The reminders (that were randomly sent to 
40% of the non-respondents) captured the remaining 23.4% of the usable 
sample. The Chi-square test was considered appropriate for examining 
differences between the two groups (early and late respondents) in terms of 
categorical background variables that are important in this research, namely firm 
size and industry type (Greer and Ireland, 1992; Pallant, 2001). An additional 
one-way ANOVA test was used to explore differences between each set of 
groups with regards to key continuous research variables (Wang and Ahmed, 
2004). 
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5.3.1 Chi-Square test regarding firm size 
The Chi-square test was used to explore differences between each set of groups 
regarding firm size. The latter is divided into three sub-groups depending on the 
number of employees2. Using the European Union classification of firm size the 
following cut-offs were used: i) Small firms: 1-49 employees; ii) medium firms: 50- 
249 employees; iii) large firms: over 249 employees (Brown et at, 2001). Table 
5.4 shows the distribution of the groups of early and late respondents across firm 
size categories. 
Table 5.4: Cross-tabulation - early & late respondents v. type of respondents 
FIRM SIZE Total 
small medium large 
Respondents Early 43 39 23 105 
Late 15 8 9 32 
Total 58 47 32 137 
As can be seen from Table 5.5, the Chi-square test revealed a statistically 
insignificant difference between the two groups of respondents in relation to firm 
size (=1.664; df= 2; p= 0.435). 
Table 5.5: Chi-Square Tests regarding firm size 
Value df 
Asymptotic Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi- 1.664(a) 2 . 435 Square 
Likelihood Ratio 1.720 2 . 423 
Linear-by-Linear 000 1 985 Association . . 
N of Valid Cases 
137 
Note: 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.47. 
2A high correlation was detected between the firms' number of employees and their respective turnover. 
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5.3.2 Chi-square test regarding industry type 
A chi-square test was also employed to compare the two groups with reference to 
the industry type. The distribution of the two groups across industries is shown in 
the following table. 
Table 5.6: Cross-tabulation - early and late respondents across industries 
BANKING 
IT TEL HOTEL & 
FINANCE 
Count 29 25 26 25 
% within 27.6% 23.8% 24.8% 23.8% 
Early Respondents early resp 
% of total 21.2% 18.2% 19% 18.2% 
Count 11 4 6 11 
% within Late Respondents 34.4% 12.5% 18.8% 34.4% 
late resp 
% of total 8% 2.9% 4.4% 8% 
Count 40 29 32 36 
Total 
% of total 29.2% 21.2% 23.4% 26.3% 
As can be seen from Table 5.7, the asymptotic significance value for the Chi- 
square test is 0.349 (=3.287; df =3; p= 0.349) indicating no statistically 
significant difference between early and late respondents across the distribution 
of firm size. It is also worth noting that all cells have expected frequencies of 5 or 
more, which indicates a non-violation of the assumption in relation to the 
`minimum expected cell frequency' (Pallant, 2001). 
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Table 5.7: Chi-Square Test regarding industry type 
Value df Asymptotic Significance. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi- 3.287(a) 3 . 349 Square 
Likelihood Ratio 3.413 3 . 360 
Linear-by-Linear 125 1 912 Association . . 
N of Valid Cases 137 
Note: 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.77 
Although the results of the chi-square tests showed no significant differences 
both in terms of firm size and industry type, a further ANOVA test with reference 
to the remaining key research variables was carried out. Indeed, as highlighted 
by Van Goor and Van Goor (2007, p. 221) anon-response bias in substantive 
variables is generally larger and of more consequence than non-response bias in 
background variables". 
5.3.3 One-way ANOVA test for key variables 
Using the one-way (between groups) ANOVA test, the two groups were 
compared on all continuous variables. The results revealed that there was no 
significant difference (at the 5 per cent significance level) between the two groups 
on all continuous items (the lowest p= . 051, with 98% of 
items reporting no 
significant difference at 10 per cent level), indicating the absence of significant 
response bias (see appendix 5.1). 
An additional Mann-Whitney U test was conducted for comparing early and late 
respondents. The results showed high Mann-Whitney Test values and probability 
values (p) higher than . 05, confirming the non-existence of response bias (see 
appendix 5.2). 
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While the total non-response bias that stems from a total failure to reply has 
traditionally attracted adequate attention, the item non-response issue seems to 
have been either largely neglected (Riphahn and Serfling, 2005; Winkler and 
McCarthy, 2005; Roth, 1994) or inappropriately addressed. Indeed, Dillman et al. 
(2002) raise concerns over the fact that most current survey missing-data 
adjustments are carried out while taking the random missingness assumption for 
granted. Nevertheless, if such missing data are due to unobservable 
determinants, and if this is ignored in the analysis, then the accuracy of the 
results could seriously be affected, potentially introducing bias (Van Den Berg et 
a/., 2006; Batista and Monard, 2003). This view has been echoed by Olinsky et 
a/. (2003) who pointed out that missing data resulting from the non-response of 
particular survey questions does raise issues of bias that cannot be ignored. 
Therefore, in order to give missing values the attention they deserve, the 
following section will try to firstly assess the randomness of the missing data so 
as to accordingly employ the right strategy in dealing with the item-non response 
issue. 
5.4 Item non-response bias 
Item non-response refers to the failure to answer one or more of the questions 
that should be answered, resulting in missing data (Hoinville et al., 1978). These 
exclude any empty data for which a blank can itself imply an answer or also any 
other data that is not required due, for example, to a filter question (Saunders et 
a/., 2000; Winkler and McCarthy, 2005). Reasons for item non-response could 
include: (i) inability to respond due to either difficulty in understanding the 
question or to a lack of knowledge (Shoemaker et al., 2002); (ii) refusal to answer 
a particular question (Batista and Monard, 2003; Shoemaker et al., 2002); and 
(iii) unintentional skipping of items (Helms, 1999). 
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5.4.1 Extent and randomness of missing values 
Although, as explained in section 5.2, five replies had to be dropped since they 
contained more than ten missing values, among the retained 137 replies, 48 
cases still contained less than four missing values. The author was able to 
retrieve from the database some of the missing values that were related to the 
general profile questions (eg. number of employees, industry of belonging, date 
of incorporation) which brought the number of cases containing missing data to 
39. Although the ratio of the number of missing values over the number of total 
values was below 0.5%, a deeper exploration aiming at identifying the missing 
rate of each item was carried out (see Table 5.8). 
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Table 5.8: Frequency and rate of missing data 
Questions' Questions / items Missing frequency Missing 
category rate 
Number of employees 0 (4 initially missing 
values were retrieved 0% 
from the database 
2.9%) 
Industry of belonging 0 (5 initially missing 
values were retrieved 0% 
General from the database 
profile 3.6%) 
questions Date of incorporation 0 (6 initially missing 
values were retrieved 
FO% 
from the database 
Turnover 16 (18 of which ? were 11.7%0 
retrieved from the 
database 
Job title 3 2.1'; 
Number of outsourcing projects 13 9.5`: 
Informative 
questions 
Your supplier could easily re-sell extra output or 
make use of additional capacity in other 
applications outside the outsourcing relationship 3 2.1% 
with your company. 
Any underperformance from the supplier will 
result in a highly negative effect on your 2 1.5% 
company's reputation. 
Your company assists this supplier in relation to 
Questions lowering production costs and improving 1 0.7% 
measuring delivery. 
research By outsourcing the activity, your company has 
constructs benefited from greater scale economies 1 0.7 % 
achievable by your supplier. 
By outsourcing the activity, your company has 
removed the need to invest in certain equipment 
(now under the governance of your supplier) 1 0.7% 
and hence reduced the risk of technological 
obsolescence. 
Your company has not achieved the target level 
of cost savings expected by outsourcing this 1 0.7% 
activity. 
As can be seen from the above table, only two questions had more than 9% 
missing rates. The first is a general profile question that asks about the annual 
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turnover of the company (11.7% missing rate). The second could be classified as 
an informative question that draws upon the number of outsourcing projects that 
were undertaken during the past five years (9.5% missing rate). Regarding the 
turnover question, the missing data could most probably be attributed to a refusal 
to answer due to the sensitivity of question which requires financial data to be 
revealed. As for the question on the number of outsourcing projects, lack of 
knowledge could have affected the respondents' capacity to answer this 
particular question. 
In order to implement the right strategy for dealing with the two missing values 
identified (turnover and number of outsourcing projects), an assessment of the 
randomness of the missing data was carried out. Indeed, according to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 63) "although the temptation to assume that data 
are missing randomly is nearly overwhelming, the safest thing to do is to test it". 
To this end, a dummy variable with two groups, cases with missing and non- 
missing values on turnover, was constructed and a test of mean differences 
between the two groups performed on all continuous items using the 
independent-samples t-test (see appendix 5.3). The t-test revealed no significant 
difference between the two groups on more than 94% of all continuous items 
(with only 3 out of the 52 continuous items showing a significant difference). 
A further Mann-Whitney U test on all continuous items showed no significant 
difference on more than 94% of items (see appendix 5.4). The only three items 
(out of 52) in which the two groups showed a significant difference are reported in 
the following table: 
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Table 5.9: Presentation of the Mann-Whitney U Test results 
-Items Asymptotic 
Significance (2- 
tailed 
For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your company has 
made additional investments that would result in excess capacity in 0.018 
the event of contract termination. 
The product or service provided by your supplier requires timely 0.017 
delivery. 
In the relationship with your supplier, precise scheduling is very 0.041 
important. 
Although the above two items showed a statistically significant difference 
between the two groups, refusal to answer the turnover question is not logically 
related to the above items. Given this fact, and taking into account the small 
sample size of the group with missing values (16), this result could be interpreted 
as reflecting no significant difference between the two groups on all continuous 
items. 
As for the missing data on the number of outsourcing projects, another dummy 
variable with two groups (cases with missing and non-missing values) was 
constructed and a test of mean differences between the two groups was 
performed on all continuous items using the independent-samples t-test (see 
appendix 5.5). The test revealed no significant difference between the two groups 
on 50 (out of 52) continuous variables. 
Moreover, a further Little's MCAR test (see Tabachnick and Fideli, 2007, p. 63) 
carried out on all continuous items using the Missing Values Analysis (MVA) 
shows a statistically insignificant result (Chi-Square =267.714, df =262, 
Sig=. 391), which indicates that the probability that the pattern of missing values 
diverges from randomness is greater than . 05. This confirms the randomness of 
our missing data which could be classified as MCAR (Missing Completely At 
Random) (see Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The latter "occurs when the 
probability of an instance (case) having a missing value for an attribute does not 
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depend on either the known values or the missing data" (Batista and Monard, 
2003, p. 520). 
5.4.2 Handling missing data 
Following the seminal work of Rubin (1987), a number of techniques have been 
developed and proposed for dealing with the issue of missing values (see 
methods as summarised in Roth, 1994; and Little and Rubin, 2002). These 
include variable and case deletion, mean substitution, and multiple imputations. 
Table 5.10 provides a summary of the main techniques. 
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Table 5.10: Main methods for handling missing values 
Method Advantage Disadvantage Use 
Deleting variables Easy to employ Could affect the research Most appropriate when 
analysis if the variable to be missing values are MCAR 
dropped is critical and are concentrated in a 
few variables that are not 
critical 
Listwise deletion Easy to employ and it is Sacrifices a large amount of Most appropriate when 
the default option in most data & reduce the power of missing data is MCAR and 
programmes of the SPSS dataset when very few cases are 
package missing not in a scattered 
way 
Pairwise deletion Easy to employ using Could lead to Most appropriate when 
packages and preserves mathematically inconsistent missing data is MCAR and 
more information than correlations and difficulty in when very few cases are 
Listwise deletion interpretation missing but in a scattered 
way 
Mean substitution It preserves data and easy Reduction in the variance of Most appropriate when the 
to employ the variable data is missing at random 
and the amount of missing 
data is very low (less than 
5%) 
Imputation by Greater objectivity Reduced variance and Most appropriate when data 
regression Variability and covariance necessity of having good are missing in non-random 
are better preserved IVs in the dataset. pattern (MNAR) and when 
more than 20% of the data is 
missing. 
Expectation More accurate estimates Algorithm could take long Most suitable for 
maximisation than pairwise deletion time to converge, carry a statisticians or extremely 
degree of complexity adept quantitative 
researchers 
Multiple imputation Can be applied to Involves several steps in the Could be used regardless of 
longitudinal data; makes estimation of missing data the randomness of the 
no assumption about the missing data. 
randomness of missing 
data. 
Hot-deck Increased accuracy Requires specialised Most appropriate when data 
software; Difficulty in is missing randomly within 
estimating the standard subgroups. 
error; difficulty to manage 
the number of classification 
variables 
Source: Adapted from Roth (1994); Helms (1999); Little and Rubin (2002); Olinsky et a/. 
(2003); Batista and Monard (2003); Winkler and McCarthy (2005); and Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007). 
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Since the majority of the missing values are concentrated on the turnover and 
the number of outsourcing projects variables which are not so critical to our 
analysis, and given the established randomness of these missing values, both 
items will be dropped (variable deletion method). 
As for the other missing values (other than turnover and number of 
outsourcing projects), they have a very low missing rate (less than 2.5%) and 
are missing in a random pattern which could be attributed to unintentional 
skipping. For this kind of missing values, one could employ any of the 
handling techniques. Indeed, according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 63) 
"if only a few data points, say, 5% or less, are missing in a random pattern..., 
the problems are less serious and almost any procedure for handling missing 
values yields similar results": Nevertheless, while the general profile item (job 
title) could be dropped as it is not so critical to the analysis, the other missing 
values on the construct-related items cannot be dropped as they are 
particularly important to the analysis. Moreover, since these missing values 
are scattered throughout cases, a listwise deletion should also be avoided 
since this would reduce the size of the sample by 6.5% and thus significantly 
reduce valuable degrees of freedom and hence the power of the database. 
Alternatively, given the low missing rates and the randomness of the missing 
data, this research could adopt the mean substitution (MS) method in handling 
the missing values in question. In this method, "the mean value of the variable 
for all existing values of that variable are calculated and substituted for all 
cases with a missing value for that variable" (Olinsky et al., 2003, p. 56). The 
actual methods employed for the relevant items are reported in Table 5.11. 
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Table 5.11: Methods employed for handling missing values in this research 
Questions / items Missing Method employed 
rate 
Number of employees 2.9% 
Industry of belonging 3.6% Retrieval from the 
database 
Date of incorporation 4.3% 
Turnover 11.5% 
Number of outsourcing projects 9.5% Variable deletion method 
Job title 2.1% 
Your supplier could easily re-sell extra 
output or make use of additional capacity in 
other applications outside the outsourcing 2.1% 
relationship with your company. 
Any underperformance from the supplier will 
result in a highly negative effect on your 1.5% 
company's reputation. 
By outsourcing the activity, your company Mean Substitution 
has benefited from greater scale economies 0.7 % 
achievable by your supplier. 
By outsourcing the activity, your company 
has removed the need to invest in certain 
equipment (now under the governance of 0.7% 
your supplier) and hence reduced the risk of 
technological obsolescence. 
Your company has not achieved the target 
level of cost savings expected by outsourcing 0.7% 
this activity. 
5.5 Data screening 
Once the S. P. S. S file was created, all the variables were labelled and defined, 
data were entered, and a screening process checking for and detecting of 
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errors was carried out. The first step was to check for scores that were 
entered by mistake and which fell outside the possible range leading to a 
possible distortion of the analyses. Such out-of-range values were checked 
through the examination of the minimum and maximum values so as to make 
sure that they all were within the range of possible scores (Pallant, 2001; 
Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). Following this preliminary screening, outliers were 
identified and attempts were made so as to reduce their deleterious. Indeed, 
as emphasised by Dancey and Reidy (2004, p. 57) "we need to be aware of 
whether or not data contain such extreme scores if we are to draw the 
appropriate conclusions from the statistical analyses". 
5.5.1 Checking for outliers 
An outlier could be defined as "a case with such an extreme value on one 
variable (a univariate outlier) or such a strange combination of scores on two 
or more variables" (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 72). Using the histogram 
and the stem and leaf plot, and calculating the 5% trimmed mean, it was found 
that the open question related to the number of employees together with 33% 
(22 out of 68) of continuous items (that were measured using a7 point-Likert 
scale) contained a number of outliers. 
5.5.2 Dealing with outliers 
As highlighted by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the first step in dealing with 
outliers is to firstly check the data for each case containing outliers so as to 
make sure that the information was correctly entered in the SPSS file and, 
secondly, to verify whether one or few variables are responsible for most of 
the outliers (in which case the elimination of the variables in question could 
become an option to be considered). As far as our case is concerned, it was 
found that all the data were accurately entered and outliers were relatively 
evenly spread across the 22 items (variables); a finding which precludes us 
from using the variable-deletion option. It should be noted, however, that items 
in relation to physical asset specificity contained more outliers than items that 
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were measuring other dimensions; a fact which will be taken into account at a 
later stage of the analysis. 
Having decided to keep the variables, following the suggestion by Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007), a further exploration of the cases containing outliers was 
conducted so as to check whether there were any particular cases that 
contained most of the extreme values. Such process revealed the existence of 
three cases containing more than three instances of outliers each. While one 
of the cases contained high extreme values in most of the physical and site 
specificity variables, the outliers in the other two cases showed particularly low 
extreme values in both collaborative ties and performance-related items. 
Since according to the review of the literature site asset specificity entails 
relocation of parts or the whole of production facilities and hence may be 
viewed as sharing similarities with physical investments, and since 
outsourcing performance is expected to be positively correlated to 
collaborative ties (as highlighted in section 2.4.2 in chapter two), the author 
chose not to drop the three cases. Besides, the fact that respondents' 
answers were constrained to a 7-point Likert scale, raises legitimate doubts as 
to whether the cases in question could be classified as real outliers. As far as 
the open question on the number of employees is concerned, the descriptive 
statistics showed a highly extreme value of '104400 employees', which could 
have a big effect on the statistical mean of the variable 'number of employees' 
(see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the number of employs scores across the sample 
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Indeed, comparing the number of employees statistical mean with and without 
the extreme value in question, we can see a huge difference (1302 as 
compared to 544) (see Table 5.12). 
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Table 5.12: Descriptive statistics in relation to the number of employee item 
Question 
Min 
1 
Max 
Number of employees 104400 
Mean 
1302 
Mean excluding the 
extreme case 544 
In such circumstances, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend either the 
transformation of variable or the adjustment of scores. While the former is not 
universally recommended as it can make variables harder to interpret, the 
latter is often described as an attractive alternative enabling the reduction of 
the impact of a univariate outlier. Given the big differences between the 1St 
and 2"d extreme values (104400 compared to 9800), in line with Tabachnick 
and Fidell's (2007) suggestion and after verifying that the company in question 
does not differ in nature from the overall sample, it was decided to assign the 
1st extreme value a raw score that is one unit larger than the next extreme 
score in the distribution, hence replacing the 104400 value with the score of 
9801. 
5.6 General profile of respondents 
Towards the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked about the 
general profile of their companies. These questions focused upon the number 
of employees, the industry in which the company operates, and the year in 
which the company was established. 
5.6.1 Firm age 
Using an open question, respondents were asked to provide information about 
their firm's year of incorporation. Firm age was calculated as of year 2006. 
The average firm age was 23.4 years. As can be seen from the following 
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table, the majority of companies which were included in our usable sample 
were less than 10 years old (41.6%). 23.4 % of respondents reported a firm 
age between 11 and 20 years, while 35% of firms were incorporated more 
than 20 years ago. 
Table 5.13: Distribution of respondents by firm age 
Firm Age Frequency Percentage 
Less than 10 years old 57 41.6 
Between 11 and 20 years old 32 23.4 
More than 20 years old 48 35 
Total 137 100 
5.6.2 Firm size 
Respondents were asked to provide information regarding the number of 
employees they have in their companies. The reported number of employees 
ranged from 1 to 9801, averaging 611. As shown in Table 5.14, the majority of 
respondents could be classified as small firms reporting a number of 
employees that is between 1 and 49 (42.4%), followed by medium sized firms 
(34.3%), and large firms (23.3%). It is not surprising that the least number of 
respondents comes from large firms as directors in such companies may tend 
to be less willing to respond due to time constraint (see also Pervan, 1998). 
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Table 5.14: Distribution of respondents by firm size 
Firm Size Frequency Percentage 'Vo 
Small 
1-49 employees 58 42.4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Medium 
50-249 employees 47 34.3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Large 
Over 249 employees 32 23.3 
Total 137 100 
5.6.3 Industry type 
The responses were spread across the four targeted industries with each 
industry counting more than 20% of responses. As shown in Figure 5.2,30% 
of respondents operate in the IT industry, 26% in the banking and finance 
industry, 23 % in the hotel industry, and 21% in the telecommunication 
industry. Such a relatively even representation of industry sector among the 
usable responses further confirms the lack of non-response bias (as 
demonstrated in section 5.3.2). 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of respondents by industry type 
Banking & Finance 
26% 
Hotel Telecornnunication 
24",, 21% 
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Nevertheless, in order to obtain an accurate overall picture in the subsequent 
analyses by industry type, these relatively small differences in response rates 
across industries (strata) should be taken into account by calculating and 
applying the weighting cases3 (Saunders et al., 2000) (see Table 5.15). 
Table 5.15: The weighting cases for different industries strata 
Industries 
Business & 
IT Tel Hotel 
Finance 
Weight 40/40 =1 40/29 = 1.38 40/32 = 1.25 40/36 = 1.1 
5.6.4 Distribution in relation to the type of activities being outsourced 
Given the fact that a priori we did not have a precise idea about the type of 
activities that were outsourced by targeted firms, respondents were asked at 
the beginning of the questionnaire to identify the most significant one that is 
being outsourced at the time of questionnaire. Upon the receipt of the 
questionnaire, the identified activities were classified into four categories (HR- 
related activities, IT maintenance and development activities, housekeeping 
activities, and other activities). Although most of the outsourced activities 
highlighted by respondents were spread across a wide variety of activities 
(assembled under 'others'), the author was able to identify three categories 
under which the rest of outsourced activities were classified. 18.2% of 
outsourced activities were related to IT maintenance and development, 14.6 
% were HR-related, and 11% were to do with housekeeping (including 
catering and laundry) (see Table 5.16). 
3 This could be calculated by dividing the highest proportion of population responding in any stratum 
(in our case IT industry) by the proportion of population responding in stratum for which we are 
calculating the weight (Saunder et al., 2000, p. 336). 
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Table 5.16: Distribution of respondents by type of activity being 
outsourced 
Percentage 
Categories Sub-categories Frequency U/ 
U 
Payroll 12 
Training & development 5 
HR-related activities 
Recruitment 3 
Total 20 14.6% 
ti 31 Liuslgn Jn _ 
5 
development 
IT maintenance and Database maintenance 15 
development IT hosting and support 
5 
(including web-design) 
Total 25 18.2% 
C, itu. [ illy 
Laundry 7 
Housekeeping Cleaning-related 5 
activities 
I Iý . .r IR ý 
11% 
Includes all other 77 
Others diverse activities 
56.2% 
5.7 Descriptive statistics: Outsourcing motives 
Respondents were asked to provide information about the firm's motives 
behind outsourcing the activity that they identified as the most significant one 
being outsourced. As shown in Figure 5.3, the majority of respondents 
reported engaging in outsourcing in an attempt to either achieve cost savings 
(60% of preferences) or to free time so as focus on their core competence 
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(56.2% of preferences). The quality enhancement motive was the third 
compelling reason for engaging in outsourcing with a 42.3% preference rate. 
This was followed respectively by access to skilled personnel (36.5%) and 
access to technology (22%). Overall, other motives mentioned, only 
accounted for 5.8%. 
Figure 5.3: Outsourcing motives as highlighted by respondents 
Motives 
Other motives 
Focusing on core competence 
Access to new technology 
Access to skilled J)Lrsonnrl 
Achieving Cost saving 
Ensuring better quality 
Percentage of respondents 
Table 5.17 presents a cross-tabulation between industry type and outsourcing 
motives. The table reveals that while the quality enhancement motive was, to 
a certain extent, evenly present in all four industries, the cost cutting rationale 
was more pronounced among hotel and telecommunication industries. The 
access to new technology motive was particularly less pronounced in the 
banking and finance industry. Freeing time to focus on core competences was 
particularly important in the banking and finance industry. The latter 
observation is supported empirically by the Chi-Square test, which shows 
significant association between the type of industry and the outsourcing 
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motive of focusing on core competences (Chi-square = 8.886; df=3; sig = 
0.031). 
Table 5.17: Cross-tabulation - Industry type vs. outsourcing motives 
Banking 
IT Tel Hotel & Total 
Finance 
Count 18 12 14 14 58 
Ensuring better quality 
Adjusted count by 18 16.5 17.5 17.5 69.5 
weis, ht 
%ofadjusted .,, x26% 24% 25% 25% 100% Count 18 20 23 21 82 
Achieving cost saving 
Adjusted count b- 18 27.6 28.7 2 97.6 
weight 
% of adjusted 18.4% 28.3% 29.4% 23.9% 100% 
Count 15 I0 1O 15 5O 
Access to skilled Adjusted count by 15 13.8 12.5 16.7 58 
personnel weight 
% of adjusted 25.9% 23.8% 21.5% 28.8% 100% 
Count 9 8 10 3 30 
Access to new Adjusted count by 1I I5 5 36 
technology ciýýht 
% of adjusted 25% 30.5% 34.5% 10% 100% 
Cuunt 16 22 18 21 77 
Focusing on core Adjusted count by 16 30 3 22 5 23.3 92.1 
competence weight . . 
of adjusted 25%' 23'. 4% 22.2% 29.4% 100% 
Count 5 0 I 2 8 
Other motives 
ndJusted count by 5 O 14 2.2 8.6 
An additional cross-tabulation between firm size and outsourcing motives (see 
Table 5.18) reveals that the access to skilled personnel motive was 
particularly pronounced among small firms. Cost savings and freeing time to 
focus on core competences were the highest motives among all firms across 
all sizes. 
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Table 5.18: Cross-tabulation - Firm size vs. outsourcing motives 
Small Medium Large Total 
Count 28 16 14 58 
Ensuring better Adjusted 
count by 28 20 25 73 quality weight 
% of adjusted 38% 28% 34% 100% 
Count 33 30 19 82 
Achieving cost 
Adjusted 
count by 33 37 34 104 saving 
% of adjusted 32% 35% 33% 100% 
Count 29 14 7 50 
Access to Adjusted 
skilled count by 29 17 13 59 
personnel ýýeight 
% of adjusted 49% 29% 22% 100% 
Count 11 10 9 30 
Access to new 
Adjusted 
count by 11 12 16 39 technology 
weight 
% of adjusted 28% 31 % 41 % 100% 
Count 35 24 18 77 
Focusing on Adjusted 
core count by 35 30 33 98 
competence 
% of adjusted 36% 31 % 33% 100% 
(until ? 5 I 8 
Adjusted 
Other motives count by 2 6 2 10 
weight 
%ofadjusted 20% 60% 20% 100% 
5.8 Descriptive statistics in relation to key variables 
This section presents a number of descriptive statistics in relation to the key 
variables of this study, namely: (i) Buyers' (outsourcing users) asset 
specificity; (ii) Suppliers' (outsourcing providers) asset specificity; (iii) 
outsourcing performance; and iv) collaborative ties (relational exchange 
between outsourcing buyers and suppliers). In so doing, descriptive statistics 
the mean value, the skewness, and kurtosis in relation to every item 
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measuring any of the variables will be discussed. The results from the 
investigation of these statistics will be examined in an attempt to extract some 
useful implications. Although, few relationships will be explored, these will rely 
on simple comparisons of the mean scores. A more rigorous analysis will be 
carried out in the following chapter (chapter six). 
5.8.1 Buyers' asset specificity 
Buyers' asset specificity was measured using six dimensions. These include 
human asset specificity, physical asset specificity, dedicated asset specificity, 
temporal asset specificity, procedural asset specificity, and brand capital. All 
dimensions were assessed using a seven-point Likert scale. 
5.8.1.1 Buyers' human asset specificity 
Buyers' human asset specificity was measured by three items. Respondents 
provided relatively low scores in all items (mean scores ranged from 1.817 to 
2.576), suggesting low human asset specificity in the buyers side. As for the 
normality of distribution, while the 2"d and 3Id items are relatively normally 
distributed, the 1st item seems to be positively skewed and relatively peaked 
(see Table 5.19). 
Table 5.19: Responses on buyers' human asset specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
hrl b: Your company has recruited additional staff for the 1.817 2.004 2.835 
sole purpose of managing the outsourcing relationship. 
hr2b: Your company has acquired new knowledge in order 2.576 . 795 -. 589 
to adapt to the specific technological norms of your supplier. 
hr3b: Your company has invested considerably in the 2.394 1.039 -. 180 
training of personnel for the purpose of the relationship with 
your supplier. 
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Looking at the mean of the total buyers' human asset specificity across, both, 
industries and firm size, we can note no significant difference, with all the 
scores being less than 3 (see Table 5.20). The ANOVA test confirms the non- 
existence of any significant differences with the asymptotic significance in 
relation to firm size and industry type being respectively 0.158 and 0.522. 
Table 5.20: Total buyers' human asset specificity 
Indust Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 1.94 2.46 2.28 2.29 2.21 2.04 2.67 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.522 0.158 
5.8.1.2 Buyers' physical asset specificity 
Buyers' physical asset specificity was measured by two items. Respondents 
provided very low scores in both items (1.372 and 1.598), suggesting very low 
physical asset specificity in the buyers side. As for the normality of distribution, 
both items were positively skewed and too peaked (see Table 5.21). 
Table 5.21: Responses on buyers' physical asset specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Phlb: Your company has invested in highly specialised 1.598 2.424 5.747 
equipment for the sole purpose of dealing with this supplier 
ph2b: A significant amount of your company's equipment 1.372 3.607 13.700 
would need to be scrapped should your outsourcing 
relationship with this supplier cease. 
Looking at the mean of the total buyer's physical asset specificity across, both, 
industries and firm size, we can note no significant difference with all the 
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scores being less than 2 (see Table 5.22). The ANOVA test confirmed the 
non-existence of any significant differences (the statistical significance in 
relation to firm size and industry type was respectively . 204 and . 089). 
The low 
scores in physical asset specificity could be explained by the fact that all 
targeted industries are service-related and, by their nature, they are unlikely to 
require investment in physical assets at least at the outsourcing level. It 
should be noted, however, that the skewness and kurtosis in relation to the 
second item (ph2b) are on the high side. The significant difference by industry 
(p = 0.089) perhaps indicate the fact that typical outsourcing relationships in 
some industries (e. g. hotels and IT) could be more associated with higher 
physical asset specific investments than in other industries (e. g. Banking and 
telecommunication). 
Table 5.22: Total buyers' physical asset specificity 
Indust Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 1.50 1.80 1.22 1.36 1.30 1.61 1.62 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.089 0.204 
5.8.1.3 Buyers' dedicated asset specificity 
Buyers' dedicated asset specificity was measured by three items. 
Respondents provided relatively low scores in all items (mean scores ranged 
from 1.744 to 2.102), suggesting low dedicated asset specificity in the buyers 
side. As for the normality of distribution, the three items were reasonably 
normally distributed (see Table 5.23). 
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Table 5.23: Responses on buyers' dedicated asset specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
dedi 1 b: For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your 
company has made additional investments that would result 1.744 1.653 1.686 
in excess capacity in the event of contract termination. 
dedi2b: For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your 
company has made additional investments in quality control 1.883 1.570 1.404 
facilities which are likely to result in excess capacity in the 
event of contract termination. 
dedi3b: In order to cope with the ̀ weight' of the relationship 
with this supplier, your company has made additional 2.102 1.249 . 311 
investments in communication facilities that are likely to 
result in excess capacity in the event of contract termination. 
Looking at the mean of the total buyers' dedicated asset specificity across, 
both, industries and firm size, we can note no significant difference in relation 
to industry type with scores ranging from 1.71 to 2.08 and the ANOVA 
statistical significance being 0.617. Although there seems to be some 
difference across firm size, the spread of scores was not high (from 1.67 to 
2.38) (see Table 5.24). 
Table 5.24: Total buyers' dedicated asset specificity 
Indu st Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 1.92 2.08 1.71 1.89 1.67 1.87 2.38 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.617 0.025 
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5.8.1.4 Buyers' procedural asset specificity 
Buyers' procedural asset specificity was measured by four items. 
Respondents provided low to neutral level of scores (mean scores ranged 
from 2.715 to 4.299), suggesting low to neutral level of procedural asset 
specificity in the buyers side. As for the normality of distribution, the four items 
were reasonably normally distributed (see Table 5.25). 
Table 5.25: Responses on buyers' procedural asset specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
ProcdIb: Your company has established procedures and 
routines tailored to the relationship with your supplier 3.832 -. 167 -1.295 
Procd2b: The outsourcing relationship has entailed no 
changes for your employees. 4.299 -. 201 -1.427 
Procd3b: The outsourcing relationship has entailed 
significant changes for the overall operations of your 3.175 . 103 -1.244 
company 
Procd4b: The outsourcing relationship has entailed 
significant restructuring and downsizing (e. g. redundancies) 2.715 . 596 -1.004 
in your company. 
Looking at the mean of the total buyers' procedural asset specificity across, 
both, industries and firm size, we can note no significant difference with all the 
scores being around 3.5 (see Table 5.26). The ANOVA test confirmed the 
non-existence of any significant differences (the statistical significance in 
relation to firm size and industry type was, respectively, . 922 and . 686). 
Table 5.26: Total buyers' procedural asset specificity 
Indu st Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 3.60 3.68 3.38 3.31 3.49 3.56 3.43 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
--Significance 
0.686 0.922 
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5.8.1.5 Buyers' temporal asset specificity 
Buyers' temporal asset specificity was measured by four items. Respondents 
provided relatively high level scores in most items, suggesting the general 
existence of high temporal asset specificity among the outsourcing 
relationships referred to by the majority of respondents. Both the skewness 
and kurtosis values indicated, generally, normal distribution in all items (see 
Table 5.27). 
Table 5.27: Responses on buyers' temporal asset specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Temp Ib: The product or service provided by your supplier 5.394 -. 989 -. 211 
requires timely delivery. 
Temp2b: In the relationship with your supplier, precise 5.233 -. 918 -. 094 
scheduling is very important. 
Temp3b: Punctual delivery from your supplier is crucial; 
hence any delay will result in a significant cost to your 4.773 -. 528 -. 991 
company (e. g. loss of clients). 
Temp4b: In the event of delay from your supplier, your 
company can easily get the same product / service from 4.927 -. 537 -. 988 
another supplier. 
Examining the mean of the total buyers' temporal asset specificity across, 
both, industries and firm size, we can note no significant difference (see Table 
5.28). The ANOVA test confirmed the non-existence of any significant 
differences (the statistical significance in relation to firm size and industry type 
was, respectively, 0.756 and 0.803). 
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Table 5.28: Total buyers' temporal asset specificity 
Indu st Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 4.914 5.198 5.208 4.956 4.97 5.20 5.10 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.803 0.756 
5.8.1.6 Buyers' brand name capital 
Buyers' brand name capital was measured by three items. Respondents 
provided relatively high scores (mean scores ranged from 4.912 to 5.642), 
suggesting medium to high level reputation investment from buyers. Scores 
on the three items were quiet normally distributed (see Table 5.29). 
Table 5.29: Responses on buyer's brand capital 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Brand 1 b: In the industry, in which your company operates, 
you cannot afford receiving a low quality product or service 5.642 -1.294 . 541 
from your supplier since this will negatively affect your own 
reputation. 
Brand2b: Given the importance of your company in the 
market, your supplier must do its utmost to maintain the 4.912 -. 455 -6.91 
quality of service provided to your company. 
Brand3b: Any underperformance from your supplier will 
result in a highly negative effect on your company's 5.140 -. 795 -. 657 
reputation. 
Looking at the mean of the total buyers' brand asset specificity, we can see no 
significant difference across firm sizes and slight differences in relation to 
industry type with the hotel industry counting a particularly high mean score 
(see Table 5.30). The ANOVA test confirmed the non-existence of any 
197 
significant differences with regard to firm size (the asymptotic significance 
being 0.534). 
Table 5.30: Total buyers' brand capital 
Indust Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 5.87 4.99 4.99 5.14 5.08 5.41 5.21 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.047 0.534 
5.8.1.7 Distilled comments concerning buyers' asset specificity 
Generally, scores in relation to all dimensions were normally distributed with 
the exception of those related to physical asset specificity, which showed poor 
normality. While both temporal asset specificity and brand capital contained 
neutral to high mean scores, human, physical, and dedicated asset specificity 
were predominantly less pronounced. A particular low mean score in relation 
to the physical asset specificity dimension together with relatively high level of 
skewness and kurtosis were noted. On the other hand, an almost neutral 
position in relation to procedural asset specificity was expressed by the 
majority of respondents. 
5.8.2 Suppliers' asset specificity 
Suppliers' asset specificity was measured using four dimensions. These 
include human asset specificity, physical asset specificity, dedicated asset 
specificity and site specificity. All dimensions were assessed using a seven- 
point Likert scale. 
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5.8.2.1 Suppliers' human asset specificity 
Suppliers' human asset specificity was measured using four variables. 
Respondents provided almost neutral scores in all items (means scores 
ranging from 3.948 to 4.284), suggesting a rather neutral level of intangible 
investment made by the majority of suppliers in the outsourcing relationship. 
Given the skewness and kurtosis values, as shown in Table 5.31, the 
distribution of scores could be described as reasonably normal. 
Table 5.31: Responses on suppliers' human asset specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Hrls: Your supplier has customized its own workflows and 
routines to the peculiarities of your company. 4.080 -. 411 -. 980 
Hr2s: Your supplier faced initial difficulties in learning and 
adapting to your company's way of doing things. 3.948 -. 184 -1.113 
Hr3s: Your supplier has made a high degree of adaptation 
(e. g. via training) in order to provide the customized service 3.985 -. 118 -1.350 
required by your company. 
Hr4s: If you were to change your supplier, it would take a 
long time for a new supplier to serve as well as the current 4.284 -. 237 -1.120 
one. 
Although the ANOVA test showed no significant difference in mean scores 
across industry types and firm sizes, a further examination of the means 
reveals a slightly higher mean score in the baking and finance industry as 
compared to the other three industries (see Table 5.32). 
Table 5.32: Total suppliers' human asset specificity 
Indust Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 3.781 3.968 4.50 4.017 4.137 4.005 4.062 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.216 0.901 
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5.8.2.2 Suppliers' physical asset specificity 
Suppliers' physical asset specificity was measured using two variables. 
Respondents provided low scores in all items (means scores ranging from 
1.897 to 2.175), suggesting a rather low level of tangible investment made by 
the majority of suppliers in the outsourcing relationship. While the scores 
could, in general, be considered normally distributed, the 2nd item was 
positively skewed and relatively peaked (see Table 5.33). 
Table 5.33: Responses on suppliers' physical asset specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
phis: Your supplier has invested in highly specialized 
equipment and facilities that were required for the purpose 2.175 1.356 . 755 
of the relationship with your company. 
ph2s: Your supplier has invested in highly specialized 
equipment and facilities that cannot easily be used in other 1.897 1.878 2.541 
applications outside the relationship with your company. 
A further exploration of the means in relation to total tangible investment made 
by suppliers across industries and firm size, reveals relatively significant 
differences evidenced by a fairly higher score among large firms in general 
and those operating in the hotel industry in particular (see Table 5.34) 
Table 5.34: Total suppliers' physical asset specificity 
Indust Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 2.5 1.987 1.736 1.965 1.698 2.085 2.578 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.022 0.007 
5.8.2.3 Suppliers' site specificity 
Suppliers' site specificity was measured using four items. Respondents 
provided generally low scores (mean scores ranging from 1.773 to 2.175), 
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suggesting a rather low level of site specificity involving relocation of assets 
among suppliers (see Table 5.35). 
Table 5.35: Responses on suppliers' site specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Sitels: Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its 
operations for the purpose of being nearer to your company 2.175 1.356 . 755 
since close proximity is important to the outsourcing 
relationship 
Site2s: Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its 
operations for the sole purpose of the outsourcing 1.897 1.878 2.541 
relationship with your company and, hence, this relocation 
has little value outside this relationship. 
Site3s: Your supplier has relocated some of its operations or 
assets in order to improve its services towards your 1.781 2.235 3.663 
company. 
Site4s: The outsourcing relationship requires your supplier 
to be located near your company. 1.7737 2.247 3.601 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the distribution of the mean in relation to the 
total suppliers' site specificity across industry types reveals a particularly 
higher mean value among hotels compared to other industries (a ratio higher 
than 1.7: 14) (see Table 5.36). This result seems to echo Lamminmaki's (2005) 
findings which showed site specificity as a dimension particularly pertinent 
among firms operating in the hotel industry. In addition, a higher level of mean 
could also be noted among large firms compared to smaller ones. Such 
differences among means across firm size and industry types could explain 
the relatively high values of skewness and kurtosis and, hence, elucidate on 
the reason behind such low level of normality. 
4 This figure is obtained by dividing the hotel industry mean by the second largest mean among the 
other three industries (3.21/1.843 =1.741) 
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Table 5.36: Total suppliers' site specificity 
Indust Firm size 
Botel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 3.210 1.843 1.430 1.344 1.517 2.122 2.476 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.000 0.002 
5.8.2.4 Suppliers' dedicated asset specificity 
Suppliers' dedicated asset specificity was measured using five items. 
Respondents generally provided relatively low to neutral scores (mean scores 
ranging from 2.642 to 3.619). suggesting a low to medium level of investments 
in dedicated assets (see Table 5.37). 
Table 5.37: Responses on suppliers' dedicated asset specificity 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Dedi 1 s: Your supplier has made extra investments in order 
to expand its production capacity and to be able to meet 2.664 . 722 -. 766 
your needs. 
Dedi2s: Your supplier has expanded its production capacity 
in the hope of a long-term relationship with your company. 2.729 . 699 -1.018 
Dedi3s: Your supplier's sales to your company represent an 
important share of your supplier's total sales. 3.036 . 553 -. 725 
Dedi4s: Your supplier could easily re-sell extra output or 
make use of additional capacity in other applications outside 3.619 . 348 -. 696 
the outsourcing relationship with your company. 
Dedi5s: Should your outsourcing relationship cease, your 
supplier would be left with substrantial unsold output or 2.642 . 797 -. 820 
excess capacity (e. g. extra staff). 
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However, a closer look at the distribution of means across firm sizes in 
relation to the suppliers' total asset specificity reveals a particularly higher 
score among large firms as compared to smaller ones (see Table 5.38). The 
skewness and kurtosis values indicate that all the scores in all items are 
broadly normally distributed. 
Table 5.38: Total suppliers' dedicated asset specificity 
Mean 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
Indust Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
3.235 3.010 2.842 2.631 2.309 3.096 3.847 
0.381 0.000 
5.8.2.4 Distilled comments concerning suppliers' asset specificity 
Generally, all scores in relation to all dimensions were normally distributed 
with the exception of those related to physical and site asset specificity, which 
were relatively peaked among respondents operating in the hotel industry. 
The association of the site asset specificity dimension with hotel industries 
was already noted in previous empirical studies (see for example 
Lamminmaki, 2005). While both dedicated and human asset specificity 
dimensions contained medium mean scores, physical and site asset 
specificity were notably less pronounced, displaying rather low mean scores. 
5.8.3 Outsourcing performance 
As outlined in the methodology chapter (see section 4.6.2.2), outsourcing 
performance was measured using two dimensions, namely: (i) the overall 
satisfaction of buyers (outsourcing users); and (ii) the extent of realisation of 
outsourcing objectives. The two dimensions were assessed using a seven- 
point Liked scale. 
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5.8.3.1 The overall satisfaction of buyers 
The overall satisfaction of buyers was measured using four items. 
Respondents provided relatively high scores (mean scores ranging from 4.277 
to 5.335), projecting, in general, a fairly high overall satisfaction. The scores 
were, in the main, normally distributed (see Table 5.39). 
Table 5.39: Responses on the overall satisfaction of buyers dimension 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Satis 1 b: Your company is very satisfied with the overall 
benefits obtained from outsourcing this activity. 5.503 -1.141 1.190 
Satis2b: Your company is very satisfied with the quality of 
the service received in terms of consistency, timeliness and 5.335 -1.277 1.340 
accuracy. 
Satis3b: Your company is very satisfied with this supplier's 
responsiveness to problems or queries. 5.335 -1.002 . 884 
Satis4b: The service level received from this supplier has 
exceeded your company's expectations. 4.277 -. 508 -. 165 
Table 5.40: Total buyers' overall satisfaction 
Indust Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 5.343 4.962 5.041 5.155 5.181 5.079 5.039 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.564 0.838 
Looking at the means of the total buyers' overall satisfaction across industry 
types and firm sizes, we can note no statistically significant differences with all 
scores being around 5 (the asymptotic significance value for industry type and 
firm size was respectively 0.564 and 0.838) (see Table 5.40). 
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In addition, looking at the Pearson correlation matrix in relation to the four 
items measuring the overall satisfaction of outsourcing buyers (see appendix 
5.6), it can be noted that all items were significantly correlated at the 0.01 
level, suggesting convergence among the items in question. 
5.8.3.2 Realisation of outsourcing objectives 
The extent of realisation of outsourcing performance was measured by seven 
items. Respondents generally indicated a neutral to high extent of realisation 
of outsourcing objectives (mean scores ranging from 4.044 to 5.554). Scores 
were reasonably distributed (see Table 5.41). 
Table 5.41: Responses on the realisation of outsourcing objectives 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Objec1b: Outsourcing the activity of reference has allowed 
your company to concentrate own resources on (e. g. staff) 5.554 -1.552 2.543 
on core activities. 
Objec2b: By outsourcing the activity, your company has 
benefited from higher quality. 4.948 -. 864 1.169 
Objec3b: By outsourcing the activity, your company - via 
your supplier - has benefited from better access to skilled 5.043 -. 891 . 414 
personnel. 
Objec4b: By outsourcing the activity, your company has 
benefited from greater scale economies achievable by your 5.000 -1.041 . 752 
supplier. 
Objec5b: By outsourcing the activity, your company has 
removed the need to invest in certain equipment (now under 4.044 . 048 -. 960 
the governance of your supplier) and reduced the risk of 
technological obsolescence. 
Object6b: Your company has NOT achieved the target level 
of cost savings expected by outsourcing this activity. 5.117 -. 721 -. 110 
Object7b: Overall, the objectives set by your company in 
relation to the outsourcing project have been met. 5.510 -. 949 . 823 
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Table 5.42: Total buyers' realisation of outsourcing objectives 
Industry Firm size 
Hotel IT B&F Tele Small Medium Large 
Mean 5.200 4.926 4.984 5.049 5.022 4.963 5.147 
ANOVA 
Asymptotic 
significance 
0.641 0.683 
Looking at the means of the total buyers' overall satisfaction across industry 
types and firm sizes, we can note no significant differences with all scores 
being around 5 (The asymptotic significance value for industry type and firm 
size was respectively 0.641 and 0.683) (see Table 5.42). 
Nevertheless, looking at the Pearson correlation matrix in relation to the seven 
items measuring buyers' realisation of outsourcing objectives (appendix 5.7), it 
can be noted that although most items were significantly positively correlated 
at the 0.01 level, both 'Objec4' and 'Objec5' items were either poorly 
correlated or even negatively correlated vis-ä-vis all other items. Statistically, 
the poor convergence of these two items (object4 & objec5) vis-ä-vis the rest 
of items could be an indication that they are not measuring the same 
dimension. Consequently, both 'Objec4' and 'Objec5' might have a negative 
effect on the convergent validity of the realisation of objective construct. 
Further attention should, hence, be directed towards these two items during 
the factor analysis stage. 
5.8.4 Collaborative ties between buyers and suppliers 
As outlined in chapter four (see section 4.6.2.2), the collaborative ties 
construct was measured using seven items. Respondents provided relatively 
high scores in all items (mean scores ranged from 4.781 to 6.014), suggesting 
generally high collaborative ties between buyers and suppliers. All items were 
reasonably normally distributed (see Table 5.43). 
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Table 5.43: Responses across items in relation to the collaborative ties 
variable 
Items Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
collabl: Your company and the supplier have an 5.328 -. 812 . 837 extremely collaborative relationship. 
collab2: Your company and the supplier share both 4.861 -. 620 . 115 short- and long-term goals. 
collab3: No major disputes have so far taken place 
5.146 -. 785 -. 543 between your company and this supplier. 
collab4: When your company has queries in relation 
to the service or product provided, the supplier's 5.328 -. 884 1.048 employees promptly respond with accurate 
information. 
collab5R: Your company and the supplier do NOT 
6.014 -1.461 2.493 generally keep each other's promises. 
collab6: Your supplier is always willing to provide 5.459 -1.061 1.221 assistance to your company. 
collab7R: Your company would be inclined to switch 
to an alternative supplier if the latter could provide a 4.781 -. 505 -. 890 service comparable to the one offered by the current 
supplier at a slightly lower price. 
5.9 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis is employed in this research in order to extract a valid reduced 
number of factors. This process will enable the author to develop a reliable 
measurement instrument through which the research results can be assessed. 
Indeed, as highlighted by Hair et al. (1998, p. 90), factor analysis "derives 
underlying dimensions that, when interpreted and understood, describe the 
data in a much smaller number of concepts than the original items" The 
literature distinguishes between two different types of factor analysis, 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. While the former is often 
employed in the early-stage of research to explore the inter-relationships 
among a set of variables, the latter is normally used to confirm theories in 
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relation to the structure underlying a set of variables (Pallant, 2001). Although 
the two are not mutually exclusive, for this research, the exploratory factor 
analysis was judged to be sufficient and appropriate due to the fact that this 
research counts among the very rare empirical works trying to measure asset 
specificity from the side of both buyers and suppliers. The novelty of the 
research led to the choice of exploratory methods so as to fulfil the need to 
derive factors from the data. 
5.9.1 Suitability of the data for factor analysis 
The appropriateness of employing factor analysis on any set of data depends 
generally on two criteria, these being the sample size and the strength of the 
relationship between variables (Pallant, 2001). 
As far as the sample size is concerned, while it is commonly agreed that 
sample sizes should be quite large so that correlations are reliably estimated, 
this does not eliminate the possibility of carrying out factor analysis with 
relatively small samples (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Indeed, as more 
research has been done on the topic, the sample size requirements 
suggested by researchers have been dropping over the years (Stevens, 
1996). Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) argue that it is not necessary to have 
large sample sizes as long as solutions contain several high loading marker 
variables. Stretching this argument further, some authors (for example Sapnas 
and Zeller, 2002) even conclude that under certain circumstances, 100 or 
even 50 cases could be sufficient. Therefore, armed with a sample size of 137 
cases, this research could be considered a good candidate for suitably 
carrying out factor analysis. This could further be substantiated by the fact that 
our ratio of subjects to cases even exceeds what is recommended by authors 
such as Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) and Hinkin (1998) both consider a6 to 
I ratio as an adequate figure for achieving stable factor solutions5. 
s The expected number of factors in this research is 13 (4 suppliers' asset specificity +6 buyers' asset 
specificity +2 outsourcing performance +1 collaborative ties). 13* 6= 78 < 137. 
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Nevertheless, since 137 cases could be regarded as relatively low as 
compared to what is generally recommended by some authors (e. g. Comrey 
and Lee, 1992), this research will follow a conservative and strict approach in 
the extraction of factors by setting a high minimum level of loading so as to 
protect the reliability of our correlations. 
As for the strength of the relationship criteria, Hair et al. (1998) suggest 
assessing the 'factorability of the data using the Bartlett's test of sphericity 
and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. 
Table 5.44: Assessing the strength of the relationship 
KMO Bartlett sphericity test 
Buyers' asset specificity . 765 (F=1358.75, df=172, p=0.000) 
Suppliers' asset specificity . 773 (F=1071.258, df=78, p=0.000) 
Outsourcing Performance . 901 (F=973.966, df=78, p=0.000) 
Collaborative ties . 847 (F=386.550, df= 21, p=0.000) 
As can be seen from the above table, the KMO tests exceeded the required 
0.70 (some authors such as Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend even 
0.60 as the minimum KMO index value for a good factor analysis)6 while the 
Bartlett sphericity tests were significant at the 0.001 level. Hence, the item 
pool from the response data was amenable to factor analysis. 
5.9.2 Extracting factors 
Exploratory principle components factor analysis in relation to buyers' asset 
specificity, suppliers' asset specificity, outsourcing performance, and 
collaborative ties was carried out so as to extract factors with eigenvalues of 
one or greater (Nunnally, 1978; Straub, 1989). Catell's Scree test was, 
thereafter, used to further verify the number of factors to be included in the 
final solution (Catell, 1966). Once the number of factors had been determined, 
6 Other authors (e. g. George and Mallery, 1995) suggest that even a KMO index as low as 0.50 could 
be adequate. 
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factor rotation was conducted. Generally, there are two main types of rotation 
methods, namely: (i) orthogonal rotation; and (ii) oblique rotation. The former 
has been chosen to be used in this research for its ease of interpretation and 
usage compared to the latter (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Besides, as 
highlighted by Hair et al. (1998, p. 109), compared to orthogonal rotations, 
oblique rotation methods "are not as well developed and are still subject to 
considerable controversy". Among the different orthogonal rotations, the 
Varimax technique was specifically selected as it is the most commonly used 
orthogonal approach (Pallant, 2001). The rotated factor solutions were judged 
on simplicity (Kim and Mueller, 1978, p. 29), interpretability in relation to the 
literature (Kachigan, 1982), and the extent of factor loading (Hair et al., 1998). 
5.9.2.1 Buyers' asset specificity 
As can be seen from the total variance table (Table 5.45), the first six 
components had eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining together a total of 
73.5% of the variance. 
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Table 5.45: The total variance table in relation to buyers' asset specificity 
construct 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.219 27.467 27.467 5.219 27.467 27.467 
2 3.286 17.297 44.764 3.286 17.297 44.764 
3 1.682 8.855 53.619 1.682 8.855 53.619 
4 1.478 7.777 61.396 1.478 7.777 61.396 
5 1.272 6.695 68.091 1.272 6.695 68.091 
6 1.028 5.409 73.501 1.028 5.409 73.501 
7 
. 737 3.877 77.378 8 
. 696 3.662 81.039 9 
. 612 3.220 84.259 10 
. 556 2.928 87.188 11 
. 511 2.687 89.875 12 
. 399 2.102 91.977 13 
. 326 1.716 93.693 14 
. 304 1.598 95.291 15 
. 233 1.226 96.517 16 
. 225 1.182 97.698 17 
. 195 1.025 98.723 18 
. 161 . 846 99.570 19 
. 082 . 430 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Figure 5.4: Scree plot in relation to buyers' asset specificity construct 
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As demonstrated in Figure 5.4, the Catell's test shows a clear break between 
the third and fourth factor and an additional second little break after the fifth 
component. In making the decision to either retain 5 or 6 factors, the author 
considered the fact that physical asset specificity was responsible for the 
majority of outliers (as discussed in section 5.5.2), showed poor normal 
distribution, and had particularly low mean scores (see section 5.8.1.2); which 
could lead to the conclusion that this dimension might not be a good candidate 
especially if we take into account the fact that all the targeted industries were 
service-related (entailing little involvement of physical assets). Hence, the 
decision was taken to retain five instead of six factors. 
Having conducted the Varimax rotation on the original 19 items, factors were 
statistically formed on the basis of item factor loadings (see Table 5.46). 
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Table 5.46: Buyers' Rotated Component Matrix(a) using Varimax technique 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
templb: The product or service provided by your supplier requires timely 925 delivery. . 
temp2b: In the relationship with your supplier, precise scheduling is very 
important. 907 
temp3b: Punctual delivery from your supplier is crucial; hence any delay will 
result in a significant cost to your company (e. g. loss of clients). . 828 
brandlb: In the industry in which your company operates, you cannot afford 
receiving a low quality product or service from your supplier since this will . 636 . 
210 . 564 negatively affect your own reputation. 
brand2b: Given the importance of your company in the market, your supplier 
must do its utmost to maintain the quality of service provided to your . 539 . 
340 
company. 
temp4bR: In the event of delay from your supplier, your company can easily 420 -. 205 . 203 get the same product / service from another supplier. . 
dedi2b: For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your company has 
made additional investments in quality control facilities which are likely to . 850 . 227 result in excess capacity in the event of contract termination. 
dedi3b: ln order to cope with the'weight of the relationship with this supplier, 
your company has made additional investments in communication facilities 
that are likely to result in excess capacity in the event of contract termination. . 818 
dedil b: For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your company has 
made additional investments that would result in excess capacity in the event . 803 of contract termination. 
hr2b: Your company has acquired new knowledge in order to adapt to the 
specific technological norms of your supplier. . 844 
hr3b: Your company has invested considerably in the training of personnel 
for the purpose of the relationship with your supplier. . 837 
hrl b: Your company has recruited additional staff for the sole purpose of 
managing the outsourcing relationship. . 800 
procd3b: The outsourcing relationship has entailed significant changes for the 835 overall operations of your company. . 
procd2bR: The outsourcing relationship has entailed NO changes for your 263 237 755 employees. . . . 
procd4b: The outsourcing relationship has entailed significant restructuring 
_ 203 207 681 and downsizing (e. g. redundancies) in your company. . . 
procd1 b: Your company has established procedures and routines tailored to 414 227 633 the relationship with your supplier. . . . 
brand3b: Any underperformance from your supplier will result in a highly 716 
negative effect on your company's reputation. . 390 . 
phi b: Your company has invested in highly specialised equipment for the 253 361 432 -. 536 sole purpose of dealing with your supplier. . . . 
ph2b: A significant amount of your company's equipment would need to be 517 
scrapped should your outsourcing relationship with this supplier cease. . 487 -. 
Note: txtraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
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Having examined in detail the rotated component matrix, four items were 
deleted. Both items measuring physical asset specificity (Ph1b and ph2b) 
were, as expected, poorly loaded and had to be dropped. In addition, while 
item "temp4bR" did not load significantly (. 42), item "procd1b" loaded on more 
than one factor. These two items, therefore, were also dropped. The 
remaining 15 items constitute 5 stable factors representing buyers' asset 
specificity (see Table 5.47). These are labelled buyers' human asset 
specificity, buyers' temporal asset specificity, buyers' procedural asset 
specificity, buyers' dedicated asset specificity, and buyers' brand capital. Each 
item loaded significantly in their theoretically correct underlying factor. 
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Table 5.47: Factors representing buyers' asset specificity 
Rotated Component Matril 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
tempi b: The product or service provided by your supplier require 923 . 240 timely delivery. 
temp2b: ln the relationship with your supplier, precise scheduling 899 280 very important. 
temp3b: Punctual delivery from your supplier is crucial; hence any 
delay will result in a significant cost to your company (e. g. loss of . 832 . 
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clients). 
hr3b: Your company has invested considerably in the training of 
personnel for the purpose of the relationship with your supplier. 
857 
hr2b: Your company has acquired new knowledge in order to ada 
to the specific technological norms of your supplier. 
848 
hrl b: Your company has recruited additional staff for the sole 821 
purpose of managing the outsourcing relationship. 
dedi2b: For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your 
company has made additional investments in quality control 246 880 facilities which are likely to result in excess capacity in the event . . 
contract termination. 
dedi3b: ln order to cope with the 'weight' of the relationship with th 
supplier, your company has made additional investments in 829 
communication facilities that are likely to result in excess capaci 
in the event of contract termination. 
dedil b: For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your 
company has made additional investments that would result in . 813 
excess capacity in the event of contract termination. 
brand3b: Any underperformance from your supplier will result in 873 highly negative effect on your company's reputation. 
brandlb: ln the industry in which your company operates, you 
cannot afford receiving a low quality product or service from your . 392 . 813 
supplier since this will negatively affect your own reputation. 
brand2b: Given the importance of your company in the market, yo 
supplier must do its utmost to maintain the quality of service . 321 . 640 
provided to your company. 
procd3b: The outsourcing relationship has entailed significant 
. 813 changes for the overall operations of your company. 
procd4b: The outsourcing relationship has entailed significant 
. 746 restructuring and downsizing (e. g. redundancies) in your compan 
procd2bR: The outsourcing relationship has entailed NO changes 243 . 251 . 732 for your employees. 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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5.9.2.2 Suppliers' asset specificity 
As can be seen from the total variance table (Table 5.48) and as theoretically 
expected, four components had eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining 
together a total of 70.5% of the variance. This was confirmed by the Catell's 
test (Scree plot as shown in Figure 5.5) which indicated a clear cut following 
the fourth component, leading to the decision to retain 4 factors (site, 
dedicated, human, and physical). 
Table 5.48: Total variance in relation to suppliers' asset specificity 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Ei envalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
% of % of % of 
Comp Varianc Cumul Varianc Cumul Varianc Cumul 
onent Total e ative % Total e ative % Total e ative % 
1 4.779 31.861 31.861 4.779 31.861 31.861 3.317 22.113 22.113 
2 2.708 18.056 49.917 2.708 18.056 49.917 3.124 20.829 42.941 
3 1.954 13.024 62.940 1.954 13.024 62.940 2.476 16.506 59.447 
4 1.147 7.650 70.590 1.147 7.650 70.590 1.671 11.143 70.590 
5 
. 919 6.125 76.716 6 
. 839 5.591 82.307 
7 
. 590 3.932 86.239 8 
. 432 2.880 89.119 
9 
. 347 2.311 91.430 
10 
. 327 2.183 93.613 
11 
. 290 1.935 95.547 
12 
. 255 1.702 97.249 13 
. 213 1.419 98.668 14 
. 136 . 905 99.573 15 
. 064 . 427 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Figure 5.5: Scree plot in relation to suppliers' asset specificity construct 
Scree Plot 
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Components 
Having conducted the Varimax rotation on the original 15 items, factors were 
statistically formed on the basis of item factor loadings (see Table 5.49). 
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Table 5.49: Suppliers' rotated component Matrix(a) using Varimax Technique 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
site 1s: Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its operations 
for the purpose of being nearer to your company since close proximity . 933 is important to the outsourcing relationship. 
site2s: Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its operations 
for the sole purpose of the outsourcing relationship with your 908 company and, hence, this relocation has little value outside this 
relationship. 
site3sYour supplier has relocated some of its operations or assets in 850 order to improve its services towards your company. . 
site4s: The outsourcing relationship requires your supplier to be 836 located near your company. . 
dedi2s: Your supplier has expanded its production capacity in the 902 hope of a long-term relationship with your company. 
dedi 1 s: Your supplier has made extra investments in order to expand 885 its production capacity and to be able to meet your needs. 
dedi5s: Should your outsourcing relationship cease, your supplier 
would be left with substantial unsold output or excess capacity (e. g. . 851 extra staff). 
dedi3s: Your supplier's sales to your company represent an important 750 252 share of your supplier's total sales. . . 
hr4s: If you were to change your supplier, it would take a long time for 820 a new supplier to serve you as well as the current one. 
hrl s: Your supplier has customised its own workflows and routines to 799 the peculiarities of your company. 
hr3s: Your supplier has made a high degree of adaptation (e. g. via 
training) in order to provide the customised service required by your . 746 company. 
hr2s: Your supplier faced initial difficulties in learning and adapting to 699 your company's way of doing things. 
dedi4sR: Your supplier could easily re-sell extra output or make use of 
additional capacity in other applications outside the outsourcing . 218 . 238 relationship with your company. 
ph2s: Your supplier has invested in highly specialised equipment and 
facilities that cannot easily be used in other applications outside the . 894 relationship with your company. 
phIs: Your supplier has invested in highly specialised equipment and 
facilities that were required for the purpose of the relationship with . 318 . 817 your company. 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
As can be seen from Table 5.49, item 'dedi4s' displayed poor loading (highest 
loading being . 238), did not discriminate between factor 1 and factor 3 and 
failed to load where it was theoretically supposed to (factor 2). This led to the 
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decision to drop the item in question. In addition, item 'ph2s' poorly 
discriminated between factor 4 and 2 (by also loading quite highly on factor 2 
in addition to factor 4) and had to be dropped, leaving only a single item 
(phis) measuring the suppliers' physical asset specificity dimension. Taking 
into account that a single item is usually regarded as inadequately reliable to 
measure a given dimension or factor (De Vaus, 2002)7 and given the fact that 
physical asset specificity had particularly low mean scores (see section 
5.8.2.2) and that the targeted industries were service-related (entailing little 
involvement of physical assets), it was decided to drop item 'ph1s' in addition 
to item 'ph2s' (lowering the number of factors to be retained to 3 factors). 
Having dropped item 'dedi4s', 'phis', and 'ph2s', the remaining 12 items 
constitute 3 factors representing suppliers' asset specificity (see Table 5.50). 
These are labeled suppliers' site specificity, suppliers' dedicated asset 
specificity, and suppliers' human asset specificity. Although some items may 
seem to be loading in more than one factor, the extent of their loadings in the 
non principle factors was quite low (less than .3 in all cases). All 
items loaded 
significantly in their expected underlying factor. 
As such and given the dimensions obtained in relation to buyers' asset 
specificity, the main effect model that would be used in assessing the effect of 
asset specificity should incorporate eight different dimensions (five dimensions 
for buyers' asset specificity and three dimensions for suppliers' asset 
specificity). 
7 Single-item measures as opposed to multi-item measures are known to have almost certainly a strong 
yes-saying bias. Moreover, as argued by De Vaus (2002), multi-item indicators are the best way to 
create reliability. 
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Table 5.50: Factors representing supplier's asset specificity 
Rotated Component Matrif 
Component 
1 2 3 
sitels: Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its operations 
for the purpose of being nearer to your company since close proximity . 948 is important to the outsourcing relationship. 
site2s: Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its operations 
for the sole purpose of the outsourcing relationship with your company . 926 and, hence, this relocation has little value outside this relationship. 
site3sYour supplier has relocated some of its operations or assets in 845 . 121 order to improve its services towards your company. . 
site4s: The outsourcing relationship requires your supplier to be 838 145 located near your company. . 
dedi2s: Your supplier has expanded its production capacity in the hope 159 898 of a long-term relationship with your company. . . 
dedil s: Your supplier has made extra investments in order to expand 153 883 its production capacity and to be able to meet your needs. . . 
dedi5s: Should your outsourcing relationship cease, your supplier 
would be left with substantial unsold output or excess capacity (e. g. . 125 . 
870 
extra staff). 
dedi3s: Your supplier's sales to your company represent an important 789 167 share of your supplier's total sales. 
hr4s: If you were to change your supplier, it would take a long time for 824 
a new supplier to serve you as well as the current one. 
hrl s: Your supplier has customised its own workflows and routines to 101 208 802 the peculiarities of your company. . . . 
hr3s: Your supplier has made a high degree of adaptation (e. g. via 
training) in order to provide the customised service required by your . 744 company. 
hr2s: Your supplier faced initial difficulties in learning and adapting to 
' 704 your company s way of doing things. 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
5.9.2.3 Outsourcing performance 
As can be seen from the total variance table (Table 5.51) and as theoretically 
expected, two components had eigenvalues greater than unity, explaining 
together a total of 66.45% of the variance. This was confirmed by the Catell's 
test (Scree plot as shown in Figure 5.6) which indicated a clear cut following 
the second component, leading to the decision to retain 2 factors (overall 
satisfaction of buyers and realization of buyers' outsourcing objectives). 
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Table 5.51: Total variance table in relation to outsourcing performance 
construct 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Ei envalues 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loa inqs 
% of % of 
Comp Varianc Cumula - Varianc Cumula 
onent Total e tive % Total e tive % 
1 6.059 55.077 55.077 6.059 55.077 55.077 
2 1.252 11.380 66.457 1.252 11.380 66.457 
3 
. 938 8.531 74.988 4 
. 729 6.624 81.612 
5 
. 640 5.815 87.427 6 
. 405 3.684 91.111 7 
. 322 2.925 94.036 8 
. 236 2.143 96.179 9 
. 215 1.954 98.133 10 
. 109 . 995 99.128 11 100.00 
. 096 . 872 0 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Figure 5.6: Scree plot in relation to outsourcing performance construct 
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Having conducted the Varimax rotation on the original 11 items, factors were 
statistically formed on the basis of item factor loadings (see Table 5.52). 
Table 5.52: Outsourcing performance Varimax Rotated Component Matrix(a) 
Component Matrixe 
Component 
1 2 
Satis2: You company is very satisfied with the quality of the service 
received in terms of consistency, timeliness and accuracy. . 904 
Satis3: Your company is very satisfied with this supplier's responsiveness 
to problems or queries. 895 
Satisl: Your company is very satisfied with the overall benefits obtained 
from outsourcing this activity. 886 
Objec7: Overall, the objectives set by your company in relation to the 
outsourcing project have been met. 
857 
Satis4: The service level received from this supplier has exceeded your 
company's expectations. . 847 -. 
111 
Objec3: By outsourcing the activity your company - via your supplier - has benefited from better access to skilled personnel. 782 181 
Objec2: By outsourcing the activity your company has benefited from higher 
quality. 771 
Objecl : Outsourcing the activity of reference has allowed your company to 
concentrate own resources (e. g. staf) on core activities. 
731 222 
Objec6R: Your company has NOT achieved the target level of cost savings 
expected by outsourcing this activity. . 660 -. 112 
Objec4: By outsourcing the activity, your company has benefited from 
greater scale economies achievable by your supplier. . 846 
Objec5: By outsourcing the activity, your company has removed the need to 
invest in certain equipment (now under the governance of your supplier) -. 150 . 643 and reduced the risk of technological obsolescence. 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
Although initially effort was made to measure outsourcing performance using 
two dimensions (overall satisfaction and extent of realisation of outsourcing 
objectives), the varimax rotation (as shown in Table 5.52) revealed the loading 
of all items (except 2 items: objec4 and objec5) on a single factor (single 
dimension). This is confirmed by the Pearson correlation coefficient in relation 
to the averaged items of both the satisfaction and the realisation of objectives 
dimensions, which was significant at the 0.01 level (see Table 5.53). 
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Table 5.53: Correlation between the average of items measuring outsourcing 
satisfaction and those measuring realisation of outsourcing objectives. 
Correlations 
Aver. Satis Aver. Objec 
Aver. Satis Pearson Correlation 1 . 668* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 
N 137 137 
Aver. Objec Pearson Correlation . 668* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 
N 137 137 
". Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
This result can be explained by the fact that outsourcing buyers' satisfaction 
can itself be linked to the extent of realisation of outsourcing objectives. 
However, a closer look at the correlation matrix among all items (in relation to 
both satisfaction and realisation of objectives) reveals that although most 
items measuring realisation of objectives were significantly correlated (at 0.01 
level) with items measuring buyers' satisfaction, both 'objec4' and 'objec5' 
were poorly correlated with the rest of items (see appendix 5.8); which 
explains their isolated loading vis-ä-vis other items (see Table 5.52). A priori, 
this result was somewhat expected especially given the fact that both items in 
question have not shown convergence even among other items measuring the 
realisation of objective dimension (see section 5.8.3.2). Hence, decision was 
taken to drop both of these items, leaving a unique factor representing 
outsourcing performance (see Table 5.54). 
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Table 5.54: Component matrix 
Component Matrixe 
Component 
1 
Satis2: You company is very satisfied with the quality of the service 906 
received in terms of consistency, timeliness and accuracy. . 
Satis3: Your company is very satisfied with this supplier's 896 responsiveness to problems or queries. . 
Satisl: Your company is very satisfied with the overall benefits 888 
obtained from outsourcing this activity. 
Objec7: Overall, the objectives set by your company in relation to the 856 outsourcing project have been met. . 
Satis4: The service level received from this supplier has exceeded 848 your company's expectations. 
Objec3: By outsourcing the activity your company - via your supplier - 782 has benefited from better access to skilled personnel. 
Objec2: By outsourcing the activity your company has benefited from 772 higher quality. 
Objecl: Outsourcing the activity of reference has allowed your 728 company to concentrate own resources (e. g. staff) on core activities. 
Objec6R: Your company has NOT achieved the target level of cost 660 savings expected by outsourcing this activity. . 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
The fact that the last two items 'objec4' and 'objec5' did not load on the same 
factor as the other items (see Table 5.52), perhaps echoes an emerging shift 
in outsourcing motives, similar to the one highlighted by Quinn and Hilmer 
(1995), and which is characterised by a more strategic-oriented motives that 
links satisfaction mainly to more strategic factors such as access to skilled 
personnel, greater focus on core activities, and obtaining higher quality 
(successively represented by 'objec3', 'objec1', and 'objec2'). 
In addition, outsourcing objectives such as the one articulated by 'objec4' 
(achieving greater economies of scale) are generally more sought by 
outsourcing suppliers rather than buyers. Indeed, as far as buyers are 
concerned, once outsourced, the cost of the activity in question will be guided 
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by the contract and, hence, the objective of achieving greater scale 
economies will be passed towards the supplier. This could also explain the 
divergence of 'objec4' vis-ä-vis the rest of items. 
5.9.2.4 Collaborative ties 
As can be seen from the total variance table (Table 5.55) and, as theoretically 
expected, only the first component recorded an eigenvalue above 1 explaining 
53.78% of the variance. 
Table 5.55: Total variance table in relation to collaborative ties 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3,765 53,786 53,786 3,765 53,786 53,786 
2 
, 904 12,916 66,703 3 
, 774 11,063 77,765 
4 
, 514 7,336 85,101 
5 
, 408 5,825 90,926 
6 
, 364 5,203 96,129 7 
, 271 3,871 100,000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Looking at the varimax rotation table (Table 5.56), all items showed a 
significant loading except item 'collab 7' which had a relatively low loading 
(. 532). 
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Table 5.56: Varimax rotated component Matrix(a) in relation to collaborative ties 
Component Matrix3 
Compone 
nt 
1 
collab6: Your supplier is always willing to provide assistance to your 826 company. 
collab4: When your company has queries in relation to the service or 
product provided, the supplier's employees promptly respond with , 793 accurate information. 
collabl: Your company and the supplier have an extremely 772 collaborative relationship. , 
collab3: No major disputes have so far taken place between your 740 company and this supplier. 
collab2: Your company and the supplier share both short- and 731 long-term goals. , 
collab5R: Your company and the supplier do NOT generally keep each 
' 701 other s promises. 
collab7R: Your company would be inclined to switch to an alternative 
supplier if the latter could provide a service comparable to the one , 532 offered by the current supplier at a slightly lower price. 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
Indeed, as can be seen from the correlation matrix (Table 5.57), the item in 
question showed particularly low correlation coefficients (less than . 35 in all 
cases) vis-ä-vis the other items, which explains its poor loading. For these 
reasons, the author decided to drop the 'collab7' item, leaving a total of six 
items measuring the collaborative ties construct and the loading of which 
ranges from . 712 to . 733 (see Table 5.58). 
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Table 5.57: Correlation matrix in relation to the various original items 
measuring collaborative ties 
Correlation Matrix 
collab 
1 
collab 
2 
collab 
3 
collab 
4 
collab5 
R 
collab 
6 
collab 
7 
Correlation collabl: Your company and the 
supplier have an extremely 1,000 , 649 , 460 0487 , 
334 , 625 , 
347 
collaborative relationship. 
collab2: Your company and the 
supplier share both short- and , 649 1,000 , 408 , 452 , 
324 , 543 , 
344 
long-term goals. 
collab3: No major disputes have so 
far taken place between your , 460 , 408 1,000 , 561 . 
550 , 456 , 
348 
company and this supplier. 
collab4: When your company has 
queries in relation to the service or 
product provided, the supplier's , 487 , 452 , 561 1,000 , 
570 , 638 , 
274 
employees promptly respond with 
accurate information. 
collab5R: Your company and the 
supplier do NOT generally keep , 334 , 324 , 550 , 570 
1,000 , 535 , 
272 
each other's promises. 
collab6: Your supplier is always 
willing to provide assistance to . 625 , 543 , 456 , 638 , 535 
1,000 , 347 
your company. 
collab7R: Your company would be 
inclined to switch to an alternative 
supplier if the latter could provide a 347 344 348 274 , 272 , 
347 1,000 
service comparable to the one . , , , 
offered by the current supplier at a 
slightly lower price. 
Table 5.58: Retained items measuring the collaborative ties construct 
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Component Matrix' 
Compone 
nt 
I 
collab6: Your supplier is always willing to provide assistance to your company. , 833 
collab4: When your company has queries in relation to the service or product provided, 811 the supplier's employees promptly respond with accurate information. ' 
collabl: Your company and the supplier have an extremely collaborative relationship. , 775 
collab3: No major disputes have so far taken place between your company and this 741 
supplier. 
collab2: Your company and the supplier share both short- and long-term goals. , 730 
collab5R: Your company and the supplier do NOT generally keep each other's promises. , 712 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
5.10 Reliability and validity of the extracted factors 
In addition to face and content validities, which were checked at an earlier 
stage prior to the collection of the data (see section 4.6.4, chapter 4), both 
construct validity and reliability should also be verified. While the former is 
determined through (i) the examination of the percentage of variance 
accounted for, and (ii) the distribution and magnitude of the obtained factor 
loadings, the latter, which represents a further requirement for construct 
validity, is assessed by calculating the Cronbach's Alpha statistic for each of 
the factors. As discussed in the previous chapter (see section 4.6.5.1), while 
there is a general agreement in the research methodology literature over the 
acceptable level of the alpha coefficient (0.70 as recommended by Nunnally, 
1978)8, there seems to be little consensus as to what constitutes (i) a 'high' or 
'low' factor loading; and (ii) a reasonable percentage of variance accounted for 
in a factor analysis. This research adopts (70%) as the minimum acceptable 
percentage of variance accounted for (well above Meranda's, 1997 rule of 
thumb which regards 50% as the minimum acceptable percentage) and 
applies 0.60 (in absolute terms) as the 'cutoff value' when determining 
a Although some authors (e. g. Price and Mueller, 1986, p. 6) have noted 0.60 as the minimum 
acceptance level. 
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whether a given factor loading is salient (well above Hair et al. 's, 1998, p. 111 
cutoff value of 0.50). 
In addition to the above, discriminant validity among all the main constructs 
(buyers' and suppliers' asset specificity and their sub-dimensions, outsourcing 
performance, and collaborative ties) is further assessed through the 
examination of the 95% confidence intervals around all correlations between 
construct factors (Anderson, 1987, p. 531). 
Finally, in order to address the potential concerns of common method bias, 
Harman's (1976) one-factor (or single-factor) test and Podsakoffs et al. (2003) 
framework in relation to controlling for common variance method will also be 
carried out. 
5.10.1 Buyers' asset specificity 
As can be seen from Table 5.59, the exploratory factor analysis procedure in 
relation to buyers' asset specificity resulted in the establishment of 5 stable 
dimensions showing reasonably high loadings and explaining 75.4% of the 
overall covariance. Buyers' temporal asset specificity factor accounted for 
18.4% of the overall covariance and contained three items the loadings of 
which ranged from 0.83 to 0.92. Buyers' human asset specificity factor 
accounted for 15.5% of the overall covariance and contained three items the 
loadings of which ranged from 0.82 to 0.85. Buyers' dedicated asset specificity 
factor accounted for 15% of the overall covariance and contained three items 
the loadings of which ranged from 0.81 to 0.88. Buyers' brand capital factor 
accounted for 13.9% of the overall covariance and contained three items, the 
loadings of which ranged from 0.64 to 0.87. Buyers' procedural asset 
specificity was the last factor accounting for 12.6% of the overall covariance 
and containing also three items, the loadings of which ranged from 0.73 to 
0.81. Such results provide adequate evidence to confirm convergent validity 
due to the magnitude of factor loadings offered by items of each factor (the 
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weakest factor loading being 0.64 well above 0.6). The fact that all items 
consistently discriminated between the extracted five factors' (see Table 5.47) 
is a good indication suggesting unidimensionality of each of the asset 
specificity dimensions and confirming discriminant validity. 
As for the reliability of the measurements of buyers' asset specificity 
dimensions, the minimum Cronbach alpha value in relation to the five 
extracted factors was 0.7, and the overall alpha value was 0.82. The internal 
consistency of buyers' asset specificity is confirmed (see Table 5.59). 
9 Items of each factor did not count any significant loadings on other factors. 
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5.10.2 Suppliers' asset specificity 
As can be seen from Table 5.60, the exploratory factor analysis procedure in 
relation to suppliers' asset specificity resulted in the establishment of three 
stable dimensions showing reasonably high loadings and explaining 72.8% of 
the overall covariance. Suppliers' site asset specificity factor accounted for 
27.1% of the overall covariance and contained four items the loadings of 
which ranged from 0.83 to 0.94. Suppliers' dedicated asset specificity factor 
accounted for 25.6% of the overall covariance and contained four items the 
loadings of which ranged from 0.78 to 0.89. Suppliers' human asset specificity 
factor accounted for 20.1 % of the overall covariance and contained four items 
the loadings of which ranged from 0.7 to 0.82. Such results provide adequate 
evidence to confirm convergent validity due to the magnitude of factor 
loadings offered by items of each factor (the weakest factor loading being 0.7 
well above 0.6). The fact that all items consistently discriminated between the 
extracted three factors (see Table 5.50) is a good indication suggesting 
unidimensionality of each of the asset specificity dimensions and confirming 
discriminant validity. 
As for the reliability of suppliers' asset specificity measurements, all Cronbach 
alpha values in relation to the three extracted factors were well above 0.7 and 
the overall alpha value was 0.80, thus confirming the internal consistency of 
the measures employed (see Table 5.60). 
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5.10.3 Outsourcing performance 
As can be seen from Table 5.56, the exploratory factor analysis procedure in 
relation to outsourcing performance resulted in the establishment of a single 
dimension the item of which showing reasonably high loadings and explaining 
67% of the overall covariance. Such results provide adequate evidence to 
confirm convergent validity due to the magnitude of factor loadings offered by 
all items (the weakest factor loading being 0.66 well above 0.6). Uni- 
dimensionality could be confirmed by the fact that initially all items 
(representing outsourcing performance) showed high loading uniquely on one 
factor (see Table 5.53). 
As for the reliability of outsourcing performance measurements, the Cronbach 
alpha value was well above 0.7, thus confirming the internal consistency of the 
measures employed (see Table 5.61). 
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5.10.4. Collaborative ties 
As can be seen from Table 5.56, the exploratory factor analysis procedure in 
relation to collaborative ties resulted in the establishment of a single 
dimension the item of which showing relatively high loadings and explaining 
almost 60% of the overall covariance. Such results provide adequate evidence 
to confirm convergent validity due to the magnitude of factor loadings offered 
by all items (the weakest factor loading being 0.71 well above the threshold 
0.6). Internal consistency of measures and realiability could be confirmed by 
the Cronbach alpha value which was reasonably high (. 85) (see Table 5.62). 
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5.10.5 An additional test in relation to discriminant validity 
One way to test for discriminant validity among the various constructs is to 
constrain the estimated correlation parameter between each pair of the 
various constructs to 1.0 and then perform a chi-square difference test on the 
values for the constrained and unconstrained models (for each pair) 
(Joreskog, 1971; Bagozzi and Philips, 1982). "A significantly lower Chi-square 
for the model in which the trait correlations are not constrained to unity would 
indicate that the traits are not perfectly correlated and that discriminant validity 
is achieved" (Bagozzi and Philips, 1982, p. 476). However, commenting on the 
above-mentioned method, Anderson (1987, p. 531) questioned the practical 
significance of the difference in chi-square using this method and suggested 
determining "whether the confidence interval around the correlation between 
the construct factors include 1.0" 
Adopting Anderson's (1987) proposed method, discriminant validity of the 
main constructs (buyers' and suppliers' asset specificity and their sub- 
dimensions, outsourcing performance, and collaborative ties)1° was assessed 
by examining the 95% confidence intervals around all factor correlations so as 
to determine whether they encompass 1.0. As can be seen from Table 5.63, 
the factor correlations differ significantly in value. The highest correlation 
coefficient was 0.556 between temporal and brand buyers' asset specificity. 
The lowest correlation coefficient was -0.010 between buyers' human asset 
specificity and collaborative ties. None of the correlation coefficients at the 
95% confident interval encompassed 1.0, suggesting discriminant validity 
among the various main constructs (including their sub-dimensions). 
10 Taking into account all the sub-dimensions in relation to the asset specificity construct, there will be, 
in total, (10x9) /2= 45 pairwise factor correlations. 
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5.10.6 Controlling for common method bias 
In this research, the author collected most of the data using a single survey 
instrument, which might raise potential concerns in relation to common 
method bias. One widely cited statistical technique that addresses such issue 
is Harman's (1976) one-factor (or single factor) test. The latter consists of 
loading all the variables in an exploratory factor analysis and examining the 
unrotated factor solution so as to identify whether a single or major factor 
would emerge. If, for example, a substantial amount of common method bias 
exists, a single or general factor accounting for the majority of the variance will 
emerge from the factor analysis. 
An unrotated principal components factor analysis on all continuous variables 
measured using the survey instrument revealed four factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1.0, which together accounted for almost 66.3 per cent of the 
total variance; also, the first (largest) factor did not account for a majority of 
the variance (26.93 per cent) (see Table 5.64). 
Table 5.64: Unrotated principal components factor analysis for all 
variables 
Initial Eigen values 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative 
1 2,694 26,936 20,620 
2 1,600 16,000 42,936 
3 1,286 12,860 55,796 
4 1,051 10,507 66,303 
However, it should be noted that although it is widely employed, Harman's one 
factor test contains a number of limitations, the most important of which is its 
actual failure to control for method effects (Podsakoff et al., 2003). A more 
comprehensive framework for dealing with common method bias is the one 
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developed by Podsakoff et al. (2003) in which he presents a number of 
scenarios depending on the context of the research (see Figure 5.7). 
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Since in this research the predictor (outsourcing performance) and the 
criterion variables (asset specificity) could not have been obtained from 
different sources and cannot be measured in contexts outside the actual 
outsourcing relationship, and given the fact that that the source of the method 
bias cannot, a priori, be identified; this study seems to fit Podsakoffs et al. 
(2003) 'situation 7'. In this case, Podsakoff et a/. (2003) recommends three 
steps: i) using all procedural remedies in relation to questionnaire design; ii) 
separating measurement of predictor and criterion variables psychologically 
while guaranteeing response anonymity; iii) employing a single-common 
method approach. 
As highlighted in Figure 5.8, the first step was implemented through the 
application of most of Malhotra and Grover's (1998) Ideal Survey Attributes 
(ISAs) (see Chapter 4, Table 4.3 and Table 4.14). The second step was 
achieved through the separation of scale item technique (Parkhe, 1993) (As 
can be seen from appendix 4.1, both asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance items were placed apart from each other). Finally, the third step 
was applied using the statistical technique of Harman's (1976) single factor 
test, which has not shown any single emerging factor (as shown above). 
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Figure 5.8: An application of Podsakoff's et al. (2003) framework in 
relation to common method bias 
Can the predictor and criterion variables be obtained from different sources? 
1 
No: due to resource constraints, the author was not able to administer the survey to both buyers and suppliers 
Can the predictor and criterion variables be measured in different context? 
No: due to the fact that both asset specificity and outsourcing performance must be measured in the same outsourcing context. 
Can the source(s) of the method bias be identified? 
No 
Situation 7 Implementation 
"Remedies" 
1) Use all procedural remedies related to Application of most Malhotra & Grovers's (1998) 
questionnaire design Ideal Survey Attributes (ISAs). 
2) Separate measurement of predictor and Asset specificity & outsourcing performance scale 
criterion variables psychologically & items were placed apart, which according to Parkhe 
guarantee response anonymity (1993) would reduce the likelihood of respondents 
guessing the relationship between the predictor & 
criterion variables. 
3) Single-common-method factor approach Harman's one factor test revealed the non-existence of 
a single emerging factor. 
244 
CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Chapter overview 
Using the purified measurement scales obtained in the previous chapter 
and employing the hierarchical regression analysis procedure, this chapter 
reports and discusses the empirical results in relation to the research 
model that was formulated in chapter three and which consists of a number 
of hypotheses to be tested. 
The chapter begins by testing the base model of the relationship between 
buyers-suppliers asset specificity dimensions and outsourcing performance 
whilst controlling for the potential effect of firm size, industry type, and type 
of activity being outsourced. The impact of reciprocal investments as an 
additional independent variable to the base model is, thereafter, examined. 
The chapter continues with an investigation of the moderating effect of 
collaborative ties on the relationship between asset specificity and 
outsourcing performance. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 
research findings which includes a comparison with previous findings from 
related empirical work. 
6.2 Assessing the base model 
This thesis employs a multiple regression technique to establish the 
magnitude and significance of the impact of buyers-suppliers asset 
specificity dimensions on outsourcing performance. The statistical literature 
generally refers to two major applications in which regression analysis is 
employed, namely: (i) prediction, and (ii) causal analysis. Multiple 
regressions are used in this thesis to investigate the causal relationship 
between asset specificity and outsourcing performance. As specified in the 
previous chapter (see section 5.9.2.2), the base model (or the main effect 
model) to be tested is as follows: 
Y= bO+blXl +b2X2+b3X3+b4X4+b5X5+b6X6+b7X7+ 
b8X8. 
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Where 
Y= outsourcing performance (Outperf) 
bO = the constant (including the error term) 
X1 = Buyers' human asset specificity (Humb) 
X2 = Buyers' dedicated asset specificity (DediB) 
X3 = Buyers' temporal asset specificity (TempB) 
X4 = Buyers' brand asset specificity (BrandB) 
X5 = Buyers' procedural asset specificity (ProcdB) 
X6 = Suppliers' human asset specificity (HumS) 
X7 = Suppliers' dedicated asset specificity (DediS) 
X8 = Suppliers' site asset specificity (SiteS) 
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6.1. As can be seen from the 
table, the independent variables that had a relatively high mean include 
buyers' brand and temporal asset specificity, and suppliers' human asset 
specificity. This could be related to the nature of the four industries under 
investigation which are all service-related. Such industries are usually 
characterised by the simultaneous purchase-consumption character that 
requires timely response and could have a direct effect on the company's 
brand. It is also interesting to note that outsourcing performance had the 
highest 'Min' figure (2.80) reflecting perhaps the reluctance of respondents 
to report mediocre results in relation to the performance of their 
outsourcing activities. 
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TABLE 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Outperf 137 5.08 1.12 2.80 6.90 
Independent Variables 
(Asset specificity 
dimensions) 
Buyers Asset specificity 
HumB 137 2.26 1.46 1.00 7.00 
DediB 137 1.90 1.20 1.00 5.70 
TempB 137 5.13 1.74 1.00 7.00 
BrandB 137 5.22 1.50 1.00 7.00 
ProcdB 137 3.39 1.47 1.00 6.30 
Suppliers Asset 
Specificity 
HumS 137 4.07 1.48 1.00 6.75 
DediS 137 2.76 1.61 1.00 7.00 
SiteS 137 1.94 1.65 1.00 7.00 
6.2.2 Checking multiple regression assumptions 
A number of methodological issues / assumptions require checking and 
subsequently addressing before Multiple Regression Analysis (MNA) 
results can be relied on with confidence. These include the issue of sample 
size, outliers, multicollinearity, linearity, and normality. 
6.2.2.1 Sample size 
In multiple regression analysis, sample size is very important for 
`generalisability' purpose (Pallant, 2001). It could also have a significant 
effect on tests of statistical significance such as t tests and F tests both of 
which are approximations that tend to deteriorate significantly when the 
sample is relatively small (Allison, 1999). Different authors tend to provide 
different guidelines in relation to the minimum sample required for multiple 
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regression. For example, while Stevens (1996, p. 72) contends that "15 
subjects per predictor are needed for a reliable equation", Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007) suggest that the sample should be bigger than (50 + 8m) 
(where m= number of independent variables). The usable sample size that 
is employed in the course of this research meets both Steven (1996) and 
Tabachnick and Fidell's (2007) suggested criteria. Indeed since the 
number of independent variables (predictors) that constitutes our base 
model is 8, the number of observations required is 120 (15 *8= 120 
applying Steven's rule of thumb) and 114 (50 + 8*8 = 114) applying 
Tabachnick and Fidell's suggested formula. 
6.2.2.2 Outliers 
Multiple regression is generally highly sensitive to extreme cases (Pallant, 
2001). As such, outliers could have a large negative impact on the 
regression solution that can affect the precision of estimation in relation to 
the regression weights (Fox, 1991). According to Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007), the presence of multivariate outliers can be detected using either 
statistical methods (e. g. Mahalanobis distance) or using graphical methods 
such as the residual scatter plot. This thesis screens for outliers using both 
methods. 
As can be seen from Table 6.2, using p< . 001 criterion for Mahalanobis 
distance with reference to the critical values of Chi Square, only two cases 
(90 and 51) were found to be exceeding the critical value of 26.125 
(corresponding to 8 independent variables according to the critical values 
of Chi-Square table that is presented by Pearson and Hartley, 1958 and 
which was cited in Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 949). 
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Table 6.2: The Mahalanobis distance test 
Case 
Number 
Mahalanobis 
Test Value 
Critical 
Value at p< 
. 001* 
Mahalanobis Highest 1 90 26.125 
Distance 
2 51 
3 46 25.17911 
4 91 24.77537 
5 107 24.41384 
Lowest 1 6 1.79941 
2 76 1.86893 
3 79 1.95428 
4 39 1.95948 
5 13 2.19646 
*Value corresponding to a number of independent variables that is equal to 8 and obtained from the 
Biometrika tables for statistics (1958) that was reproduced by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 949). 
However, in order to ensure whether these two cases are extreme enough 
to cause problems, the graphical residual scatter plot method is employed. 
As can be seen from Figure 6.1, the standardised residual values are 
within the acceptable range (-3.3 to 3.3) that is suggested by Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007, p. 128), which indicates the absence of outliers. 
Given the outcome of the residual scatter plot and taking into account the 
fact that an initial data screening process (checking for outliers) has 
already been employed (see section 5.5.1), no action will be taken towards 
the two extreme cases that were identified using the Mahalanobis test 
(case 90 and 51). Indeed, as highlighted by Pallant (2001, p. 144) "with 
large samples, it is not uncommon to find a number of outlying residuals. If 
you only find a few, it may be not necessary to take any action". 
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Figure 6.1: Residual Scatterplot Plot 
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6.2.2.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to the relationship among the independent variables. 
"lt is a question of degree and not of kind. The meaningful distinction is 
[hence] not between the presence and the absence of multicollinearity, but 
between its various degrees" (Gujarati, 1988, p. 298). As such, the degree 
of multicollinearity should be determined by the degree of strength of the 
relationship among the independent variables. According to Allison (1999), 
while a perfectly related linear function among independent variables 
indicates the presence of `extreme multicollinearity, a strong but not 
perfect linear relationship could be a sign of `near-extreme 
multicollinearity'. The correlation coefficients for pairs of variables in 
relation to our model are provided in Table 6.3. Based on Tabachnich and 
Fidell's (2007) suggested cut-off line (. 7), there seems to be no pairs of 
independent variables that are correlated highly enough to cause concern 
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with multicollinearity (the highest correlation was between brand and 
temporal asset specificity, r=0.556). It is also interesting to note that 
buyers' temporal, brand, and procedural asset specificity show correlation 
with outsourcing performance that is significant at p<0.005. 
TABLE 6.3 
Variable Correlations 
Outperf HumB DediB TempB BrandB ProcdB HumS dedis SiteS 
Outperf 1.00 
HumB -0.156 1.00 
DediB -0.158 0.348* 1.00 
TempB -0.483" 0.95 0.052 1.00 
BrandB -0.430* 0.108 0.178 0.556" 1 _on 
ProcdB -0.281* 0.338* 0.223** 0.212 0.300* 1.00 
HumS 0.350* 0.281* 0.229** 0.161 0.220** 0.422* 1.00 
DediS 0.322 0.257** 0.362* 0.113 0.150 0.296* 0.226** 1.00 
SiteS -0.143 0.014 0.135 -0.107 0.061 0.065 0.030 0.254** 1.00 
* Statistically significant at p<0.001 
* Statistically significant at p<0.005 
Nevertheless, to further check for the potential problem of multicollinearity, 
both the tolerance level (1 - R2) and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are 
examined. According to Allison (1999), any tolerance level below . 40 and 
any VIF value over 2.50 could indicate the existence of a multicollinearity 
problem. As can be seen from Table 6.4, all our tolerance levels and VIF 
values clearly meet Allison's (1999) rule of thumb, suggesting a low degree 
of multicollinearity (the largest VIF was 1.584 and the lowest tolerance 
level was . 63 1). 
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Table 6.4: Collinearity diagnostics 
Collinearity Statistics 
Independent Variables Tolerance VIF 
Buyers' Human Asset Specificity (HumB) . 784 1.275 
Suppliers' Human asset specificity (HumS) . 779 
1.283 
Suppliers' Site specificity (SiteS) . 898 
1.113 
Buyers' Dedicated Asset Specificity (DediB) . 774 1.291 
Suppliers' Dedicated Asset specificity (DediS) . 764 1.308 
Buyers' Temporal Asset specificity (TempB) . 661 1.513 
Buyers' Brand Capital (BrandB) . 631 
1.584 
Buyers' Procedural Asset Specificity (procdB) . 707 1.414 
6.2.2.4 Normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity 
One of the ways that normality, linearity and homoscedasticity could be 
checked for, is by examining the residual scatter plot (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). As can be gathered from Figure 6.1, all three assumptions 
seem to be met. As far as homoscedasticity is concerned, we can note that 
the standard deviations of errors of prediction are approximately equal for 
all predicted dependent variable scores. The assumption of both linearity 
and normality seems also to be met as the scatter plot of the standardised 
residuals displays an overall rectangular shape with most of the scores 
concentrated in the centre. In order to further check for normality, the 
Normal Probability Plot was also inspected. As shown in Figure 6.2, all 
points form a reasonably straight diagonal line from bottom left to top right, 
suggesting no major deviation from normality (Pallant, 2001). 
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TABLE 6.5 
Results of standard regression analysis: The influence of control variables 
on outsourcing performance 
ndependent Variables V SE Beta T-Value p-Value 
Intercept 
Control variables 
5.476 0.426 12.850 . 000 
Firm size -0.083 0.123 -0.059 -0.677 . 499 
Industry type -0.014 0.083 -0.014 -0.162 . 871 
Type of activity being -. 0.051* 0.071 -0.063- -0.728 . 468 
outsourced 
R2 . 007 
Adjusted R2 -. 015 
F 
. 329 
N 137 
aUnstandardised regression coefficient bStandardised regression coefficient 
6.2.3.2 Relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance 
Table 6.6 presents the regression results regarding the base model. The 
results show that, after controlling for firm size, industry type, and type of 
activity being outsourced, buyers' and suppliers' asset specificity variables 
are significant predictors of outsourcing performance [F (11,125) = 8.768, 
p<. 001]. The R2 of . 436 value indicates that 42.9 per cent (43.6 per cent - 
0.7 per cent) of the variability in outsourcing performance is predicted by 
the five buyers' and three suppliers' asset specificity variables. In line with 
H1a that was distilled from the traditional view of TCT and in contradiction 
with H5a as generated from the 3`d stream of SBT, all buyers' asset 
specificity variables were found to decrease outsourcing performance (both 
b and Beta in relation to all buyers' asset specificity dimensions showed a 
negative figure). However, while support for Ma was found in all five 
buyers' asset specificity dimensions (human asset specificity, dedicated 
asset specificity, temporal asset specificity, brand asset specificity, and 
procedural asset specificity), results in relation to the suppliers' asset 
specificity variables were generally supportive for H5b, revealing a positive 
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Figure 6.2: Normal Probability Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
Dependent Variable: Degree of outsourcing performance (Outperf) 
0.8- 
E 0. s 
ai 0.4 
0.2- 
0.0--f 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Observed Cum Prob 
6.2.3 Regression results in relation to the base model 
In order to control for the potential effect of firm size, industry type and type 
of activity being outsourced, a standard regression analysis is firstly used 
so as to assess the significance of variance in outsourcing performance 
that might be explained by these variables. 
6.2.3.1 Controlling for firm size, industry type and type of activity 
being outsourced 
As can be seen from Table 6.5, all coefficients in relation to the control 
variables are insignificant. Taken together, the three control variables (firm 
size, industry type, and type of the activity being outsourced) do not exert a 
combined significant impact upon outsourcing performance [F (3,133) = 
. 329, p=. 805], explaining together only 0.7 per cent of its overall variance 
(R2 = . 007). 
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TABLE 6.6 
Results of regression analysis: The impact of buyers' and suppliers' asset 
specificity on outsourcing performance 
Independent Variables W SE Beta T-Value p-Value 
Control variables 
Firm size -0.040 . 110 -0.028 -0.362 . 718 
Industry type -0.051 . 067 -0.053 -0.768 . 
444 
Type of activity being 0.054 0.058 0.066 0.927 . 356 
outsourced 
Buyers' Asset Specificity 
HumB -0.078 0.058 -. 102 -1.336 . 184 
DediB -0.131t 0.072 -. 140t -1.813 . 072 
TempB -0.261*** 0.054 -. 405*** -4.853 . 000 
BrandB -0.142* 0.066 -. 190* -2.158 . 033 
ProcdB -0.195** 0.061 -. 257** -3.181 . 003 
Suppliers' Asset 
Specificity 
HumS 0.200** 0.059 . 264** 3.370 . 001 
DediS 0.187** 0.049 . 269** 3.255 . 001 
SiteS -0.145** 0.057 -. 214** -2.967 . 004 
Constant 7.195*** 0.438 16.436 . 000 
R2 
. 436 
Adjusted R2 . 386 
F 8.768- 
F change 11.852- 
N 137 
alnstandardised regression coefficient bStandardised regression coefficient 
t p<. 10; 
*p<. 05; 
**P<. 01; 
*** p <. 001 
As such, the main effect model would be: 
Outsourcing performance = 7.195 - (0.078 HumB) - (0.131 DediB) - (0.261 
TempB) - (0.142 BrandB) - (0.195 ProcdB) + (0.200 HumS) + (0.187 DediS) - 
(0.145 SiteS). 
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relationship with outsourcing performance in all suppliers' asset specificity 
variables with the exception of site specificity which is found to be having a 
negative effect upon outsourcing performance. 
In order to compare the magnitude of each predictor of outsourcing 
performance among buyers and suppliers' asset specificity, "it is essential 
to have a clear understanding of the units of measurement for the 
dependent [outsourcing performance] and independent variables [asset 
specificity variables]" (Allison, 1999, p. 28). The standardised coefficients 
(as opposed to the unstandardised ones) seem to solve the issue by 
assembling all coefficients into a common metric being the standard 
deviation units. As such, the Beta values presented in table 6.5 indicate 
how many standard deviations outsourcing performance changes with an 
increase of one standard deviation in the asset specificity variables. 
Comparing these values across all independent variables, we find that 
while temporal (Beta = -. 405, p< . 001) and procedural asset specificity 
(Beta = -. 257, p< . 005) are the best predictor of outsourcing performance 
among buyers' asset specificity, all suppliers' asset specificity variables are 
equally important reporting Beta values that are very close to each other in 
absolute terms. Among all the independent variables, buyers' human asset 
specificity (HumB) seems to be the only insignificant variable. Buyers' 
dedicated asset specificity has not also shown great significance (Beta 
. 137, p< . 10). 
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In order to find out whether buyers' or suppliers' asset specificity variables 
explain most of the variance in outsourcing performance, a hierarchical 
regression analysis method is used. In addition to the ability to estimate the 
statistical significance of the coefficients corresponding to our set of 
hypotheses, this method enables us to assess changes in the proportion of 
variance explained (R2) and the statistical significance of the changes 
taking place with the introduction of each block of variables. 
As can be seen from Table 6.7, while buyers' asset specificity accounts for 
29.9% of the variance in outsourcing performance, suppliers' asset 
specificity explains only 13.7% of the variance (R2 change = . 137). The 
contribution of the suppliers' asset specificity towards outsourcing 
performance should not, however, be underestimated as it remains highly 
significant (R2 change = . 130, p< . 001). 
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TABLE 6.7 
Results of regression analysis: The influence of buyers' and suppliers' 
asset specificity on outsourcing performance 
Independent Variables b SE b SE 
Control variables 
Firm size -0.004 0.109 -0.040 0.110 
Industry type -0.024 0.072 -0.051 0.067 
Type of activity being 0.014 0.063 0.054 0.058 
outsourced 
Block I 
Buyers' Asset Specificity 
Human -0.029 0.063 -0.078 0.058 
Dedicated -0.063 0.077 -0.131f 0.072 
Temporal -0.224*** 0.058 -0.261*** 0.054 
Brand -0.139t 0.063 -0.142* 0.066 
Procedural -0.096 0.072 -0.195** 0.061 
Block 2 
Suppliers' Asset 
Specificity 
Human 0.200** 0.059 
Dedicated 0.187** 0.057 
Site -0.145** 0.049 
R 
. 299 . 436 
AR 2 
. 137 F change 9.671*" 
aunstandardised regression coefficient 
t p<. 10; *p<. 05; **P<. 01; ***p<. 001 
6.3 The effect of reciprocal specific investments on outsourcing 
performance 
As outlined in chapter four (section 4.6.2.2), reciprocal investments was 
assessed using the interaction technique. Nevertheless, in an attempt to 
tackle the multicolinearity issue that is likely to occur by the employment of 
such a technique (interaction) and as recommended by the literature (see 
for example Aiken and West, 1991), the mean-centered scores were 
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employed so as to reduce multicollinearity among the predictor variables 
and the interaction terms. 
Based on the notion of reciprocal exposure, Hypothesis 6 stated that 
reciprocal investments of high asset specificity (made by exchange parties) 
in a transactional relationship will have a positive effect on outsourcing 
performance. All 15 interaction terms among buyers and suppliers' asset 
specificity dimensions were computed, and the results from the regression 
analysis were highly corroborative in three interaction instances. Indeed, 
as can be seen from Table 6.8, suppliers' site asset specificity (which was 
found in section 6.2.3 to be having a negative relationship with outsourcing 
performance) positively interacted with buyers' temporal asset specificity in 
affecting outsourcing performance (p<0.001). Similarly, a positive and 
significant interaction was also found between suppliers' human asset 
specificity and buyers' dedicated asset specificity (p<0.01), and between 
suppliers' dedicated asset specificity and buyers' temporal asset specificity 
(p <0.01). In addition, the incremental variance in outsourcing performance 
accounted for by the above mentioned three interactions was found to be 
significant (R2 change = . 141, p <0.001). Overall, the addition of the three 
interaction variables improved R2 significantly, from . 436 to . 577, adding, 
hence, 14.1% of the variance in outsourcing performance. 
1 To conserve space in table 6.8, the author reported only the three significant interactions 
regarding reciprocal investments. All other interactions are reported in appendix 6.1 
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TABLE 6.8 
Results of hierarchical regression analysis: The effect of reciprocal specific 
investments (leading to reciprocal exposure) on outsourcing performance 
Model incorporating interaction 
Base Model between Buyers' & suppliers' 
Asset specificity 
Independent 
Variables 
b Beta SE b Beta SE 
Control Variables 
Firm size -0.040 -0.028 0.110 -0.036 -0.025 0.097 
Industry type -0.051 -0.053 0.067 -0.046 -0.047 0.059 
Type of activity 0.054 0.066 0.058 0.082 0.101 0.051 
being outsourced 
Buyers' AS 
HumB -0.078 -0.102 0.058 -0.053 -0.069 0.051 
DediB -0.131t -0.140t 0.072 -0.134* -0.143* 0.066 
TempB -0.261*** -0.405*** 0.054 -0.297*** -0.461*** 0.049 
BrandB -0.142* -0.190* 0.066 -0.162* -0.271* 0.059 
ProcdB -0.195** -0.257** 0.061 -0.105t . 0.137t 0.056 
Suppliers' AS 
HumS 0.200** . 264** 0.059 0.139* 0.183* 0.055 
DediS 0.187** . 269** 0.057 0.197*** 0.283*** 0.051 
SiteS -0.145** -. 214** 0.049 -0.074t -0.110t 0.044 
Reciprocal 
investment 
DediB x HumS 0.116++ 
TempB x SiteS 0.083+"+ 
TempB x DediS 0.074** 
Constant 7.195*** 16.436 
R2 
. 436 . 577 
Ajusted R2 
. 386 . 491 Q R2 
. 141 F change 13.631*** 
aUnstandardised regression coefficient bStandardised regression coefficient 
t p<. 10; *p<. 05; **P<. 01; ***p<. 001 
To visually inspect the effect of reciprocal specific investments, the 
significant interaction terms were plotted against the outsourcing 
performance values expected on the basis of their unstandardised 
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regression coefficients (Figure 6.3,6.4 and 6.5). The high level asset 
specificity lines indicate values ranging from 5 to 7 in the Likert scale 
employed in the survey, the medium level asset specificity lines refer to 
values ranging from 3 to 5, and the low level asset specificity plots indicate 
values ranging from 1 to 3. Figure 6.3,6.4 and 6.5 display patterns 
consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 6. 
Figure 6.3: Interaction: Buyers' temporal specificity, suppliers' site 
specificity, and outsourcing performance 
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Figure 6.4: Interaction: Buyers' dedicated AS, suppliers' human AS, and 
outsourcing performance 
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Figure 6.5: Interaction: Buyers' temporal specificity, suppliers' dedicated 
AS, and outsourcing performance. 
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6.4 The moderating effect of collaborative ties 
Hypothesis 4 stated that collaborative ties among outsourcing buyers and 
suppliers can positively moderate the relationship between asset specificity 
and outsourcing performance. In line with the recommendation of Jaccard 
et al. (1990), the moderating effect was investigated using the interaction 
technique that was performed on the mean-centered scores so as to avoid 
the occurrence of multicollinearity. The results from the regression analysis 
did not support the hypothesised moderation effect. Indeed, as can be 
seen from Table 6.8, all the interaction terms of collaborative ties with each 
of the buyers and suppliers' asset specificity dimensions were not 
significant. 
However, while collaborative ties does not seem to have any significant 
moderation effect on the relationship between asset specificity and 
outsourcing performance (see Table 6.9), the construct was found to be 
positively related to outsourcing performance (Beta = . 228, p <. 01). 
Overall, the addition of the collaborative ties variable to the base model 
improved R2 significantly, from . 436 to . 476 (R2 change = . 041, p <. 01), 
hence explaining a further 4.1 % of the variance in outsourcing performance 
(see Table 6.10). 
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TABLE 6.9 
Results of hierarchical regression analysis: The Moderation effect of collaborative ties 
on the relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing 
Moderating model incorporating 
Base Model Interaction between 
collaborative ties and buyers- 
suppliers AS dimensions 
Independent b Beta SE b Beta SE 
Variables 
Control Variables 
Firm size -0.040 -0.028 0.110 -0.012 -0.016 0.114 
Industry type -0.051 -0.053 0.067 -0.036 -0.044 0.083 
Type of activity being 0.054 0.066 0.058 0.045 0.022 0.060 
outsourced 
Buyers' AS 
HumB 
-0.078 -0.102 0.058 -0.087 -0.113 0.058 
DediB -0.131t -0.1401 0.072 -0.104 -0.112 0.077 
TempB -0.261*** -0.405*** 0.054 -0.236*** -0.365*** 0.059 
BrandB -0.142* -0.190* 0.066 -0.224** -0.299** 0.072 
ProcdB -0.195** -0.257** 0.061 -0.145* -0.190* 0.063 
Suppliers' AS 
HumS 0.200** . 264** 
DediS 0.187** . 269** 
SiteS -0.145** -. 214** 
Collaborative Ties 
Moderating effect of 
collaboration 
Collab X TempB 
Collab X BrandB 
Collab X DediB 
Collab X ProcdB 
Collab X HumB 
Collab X HumS 
Collab X DediS 
Collab X SiteS 
Constant 7.195*** 
R2 
. 436 
Ajusted R2 . 386 Q R2 
0.059 0.174** 0.229** 0.061 
0.049 0.173** 0.249** 0.051 
0.057 -0.107* -0.158* 0.057 
0.206* 0.189* 0.088 
0.075 0.137 0.048 
-0.068 -0.103 0.057 
0.109 0.140 0.067 
0.010 0.014 0.057 
0.009 0.013 0.055 
0.031 0.042 0.057 
-0.034 -0.051 0.053 
0.035 0.058 0.051 
5.074*** 
499 
. 413 
. 063 
Note: tp<. 10; *p<. 05; **p<. 01; ***p<. 001 
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TABLE 6.10 
Results of hierarchical regression analysis: The impact of collaborative ties on 
outsourcing 
Incorporation 
Base Model of collaborative ties 
Independent b Beta T-Value b Beta T-Value 
Variables 
Control Variables 
Firm size -0.040 -0.028 -0.362 -0.023 -0.016 -0.212 
Industry type -0.051 -0.053 -0.768 -0.043 -0.044 -0.661 
Type of activity 0.054 0.066 0.927 0.018 0.022 0.314 
being outsourced 
Buyers' AS 
HumB -0.078 -0.102 -1.336 -0.084 -0.110 -1.491 
DediB -0.131t -0.1401 -1.813 -0.097 -0.104 -1.375 
TempB 
-0.261*** -0.405*** -4.853 -0.208*** -0.323*** -3.809 
BrandB -0.142* -0.190* -2.158 -0.211** -0.282** -3.132 
ProcdB -0.195** -0.257** -3.181 -0.171** -0.225** -2.853 
Suppliers' AS 
HumS 0.200** . 264** 3.370 0.178** 0.235** 3.079 
DediS 0.187** . 269** 3.255 0.175** 0.252** 3.147 
SiteS -0.145** -. 214** -2.967 -0.124* -0.183* -2.598 
Collaborative 
. 248** . 228** 3.103 
Ties 
Constant 7.195*** 5.997*** 
R2 
. 436 .. 476 
Ajusted R2 . 386 . 425 AR 2 
. 041 F Change 9.626** 
alnstandardised regression coefficient bStandardised regression coefficient 
t P<. 10; 
*p<. 05; 
** P <. 01; 
***p<. 001 
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6.5 Summary of the results 
Table 6.11 provides a summary of the results of regression analysis. 
Model 1 includes the control variables (firm size; industry type; and type of 
activity being outsourced). Model 2 adds asset specificity dimensions from 
both the buyer and supplier's side. Model 3 introduces the collaborative 
ties construct. Model 4 adds the various interactions of collaborative ties 
with the asset specificity variables, and Model 5 tests for the effect of 
reciprocal investments by adding the interaction terms of buyers' asset 
specificity dimensions with those of suppliers. 
In sharp contradiction to Hypothesis 5a, Hypothesis 1a states that an 
increase in buyers' asset specificity (across dimensions) will negatively 
affect outsourcing performance. As shown in the base model (model 2 in 
Table 6.11), all buyers' asset specificity dimensions (with the exception of 
human asset specificity, the effect of which was insignificant) were 
consistently negatively signed and were found, therefore, to decrease 
outsourcing performance. Buyers' temporal asset specificity (p < 0.001), 
buyers' procedural asset specificity (p < 0.01), buyers' dedicated asset 
specificity (p < 0.10), and buyers' brand capital (p < 0.05) were all 
negatively related to outsourcing performance. This result displays general 
support for Hypothesis la and, therefore, leads to the rejection of 
Hypothesis 5a. Whilst general support for Hypothesis la was found, 
results in relation to suppliers' asset specificity dimensions (Hypothesis 1b 
and Hypothesis 5b) portrayed a more mixed picture. As predicted by the 
traditional view of transaction cost theory, site specificity (p <0.01) was 
found to have a significant negative impact on outsourcing performance, 
however, results in relation to both suppliers' human asset specificity (p < 
0.01) and suppliers' dedicated asset specificity (p < 0.01) appear to be in 
line with Hypothesis 5b displaying a rather positive relationship with 
outsourcing performance. 
Hypothesis 4 states that collaborative ties positively moderates the 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance. To 
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test this hypothesis we first had to include collaborative ties as an 
additional independent variable (Model 3 in Table 6.11) and then test for 
moderating interactions (Model 4). As can be seen from Model 4, all the 
interaction terms of collaborative ties with each of the buyers and 
suppliers' asset specificity dimensions were not significant. Hence, we did 
not find empirical support for Hypothesis 4. While collaborative ties was 
positively related to outsourcing performance (R2 change = 0.41, p<0.01, 
in Model 3), it did not appear to have any significant moderating effect on 
the relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance. 
Based on the notion of reciprocal exposure, Hypothesis 6 postulates that 
reciprocal investments with high asset specificity content will positively 
affect outsourcing performance. As shown in Model 5, the results 
corroborated this proposition in three interaction instances: (i) Buyers' 
temporal asset specificity by suppliers' site (p < 0.001); (ii) Buyers' 
dedicated asset specificity by suppliers' human asset specificity (p < 0.01); 
and (iii) Buyers' temporal asset specificity by suppliers' dedicated AS (p < 
0.01). In addition, the incremental variance in outsourcing performance 
that was accounted for by the three above-mentioned interactions was 
found to be significant (R2 change = . 141, p <. 001). 
According to Jaccard et al. (1990), in the presence of significant interaction 
terms, the main effect becomes conditional. Since significant interaction 
terms were found between two dimensions of buyers and suppliers' asset 
specificity, the main effect of buyers' asset specificity (highlighted in Model 
2) should be interpreted as simply the effect of buyers' asset specificity on 
outsourcing performance when suppliers' specificity dimensions are 
absent, and vice versa. 
Table 6.12 depicts the results in relation to the various hypotheses framed 
in the research model that was developed in chapter three (see section 
3.4). 
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Table 6.12: Results in relation to the research hypotheses2 
Theoretical 
Hypotheses Results 
perspective 
Hla: An increase in buyers' asset specificity across Supported different dimensions of non re-deployable investments, in a 
given transactional outsourcing relationship, will negatively 
affect outsourcing performance. 
Partially H1b: An increase in suppliers' asset specificity across 
different dimensions of non re-deployable investments, in a supported (site 
TCT given transactional outsourcing relationship, will negatively dimension) 
affect outsourcing performance. 
Partially 
H6: Reciprocal non re-deployable investments in a given supported transactional outsourcing relationship will have a positive 
impact on outsourcing performance. (supported in 3 
interaction instances) 
H4: Collaborative ties in the buyer-supplier relationship will 
positively moderate the relationship between asset Rejected 
specificity [non-re-deployable investments] and outsourcing 
performance. 
H5a: An increase in buyers' asset specificity across 
Strategy- different dimensions of non re-deployable investments, in a Rejected 
given transactional outsourcing relationship, will positively 
related affect outsourcing performance. 
literature 
H5b: An increase in suppliers' asset specificity across 
Partially 
different dimensions of non re-deployable investments, in a supported (human 
given transactional outsourcing relationship, will positively and dedicated 
affect outsourcing performance. dimensions) 
An additional and potentially interesting result that was highlighted in the 
previous section is that, compared to suppliers' asset specificity, buyers' 
asset specificity accounted for more than double of the variance in 
outsourcing performance. Also interestingly, all the control variables (firm 
size, industry type, and type of activity being outsourced) were 
insignificant. 
2 As explained in section 3.4, hypothesis 2 and 3 were not tested as they fall outside the scope of 
this study. 
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6.6 Discussion 
With reference to previous empirical work which touched upon areas that 
can be linked to the focus of this study, this section tries to discuss the 
findings of this research and offer logical explanations in relation to the 
obtained results. Discussions will be grouped into categories according to 
areas covered by hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that since no 
other work has attempted to look at the relationship between asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance using a fine-tuned measurement 
disaggregated by buyers-suppliers asset specificity dimensions in a single 
study, comparison with previous empirical results could prove to be 
somewhat difficult. 
6.6.1 Impact of buyers' asset specificity dimensions on outsourcing 
performance (Hypothesis la and Hypothesis 5a) 
In sharp contrast to the third stream of SBT (H5a) and in accordance to the 
TCT prediction, our results found support for the hypothesised negative 
relationship between buyers' asset specificity and outsourcing performance 
(H1a). Indeed, with the exception of human asset specificity which was 
insignificant, all buyers' asset specificity dimensions that were tested were 
found to have a negative effect upon outsourcing performance. Our 
empirical backing of the detrimental effect of buyers' asset specificity on 
outsourcing performance, is consistent with the results obtained by Heide 
and Stump (1995), Poppo and Zenger (1998) and Artz (1999), who found a 
negative relationship between buyer's investment in specific assets and 
buyer-supplier transaction performance. 
Unlike our research, however, the measurements employed in Heide and 
Stump (1995) and Artz (1999) were based on the aggregate effect of 
buyer's asset specificity with no attempt being made to evaluate the 
specific impact of individual asset specificity dimensions. In addition, the 
two above-mentioned studies were not constrained in their focus on 
outsourcing projects, having looked, instead, at the general performance of 
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a pure buyer-supplier transaction within manufacturing-related as opposed 
to service-related industries. 
Whereas, in line with our study, Poppo and Zenger (1998) focused 
exclusively on outsourcing performance, their research failed to measure 
levels of asset specificity from both side of the dyad and, in addition, their 
empirical findings were not disaggregated by asset specificity dimensions. 
While, we can confidently exclude the possibility of multicollinearity 
problems in our data (see section 6.2.2.3 in this chapter) or the existence 
of any lack of discriminant validity (see section 4.6.5.2 in chapter four), one 
possible explanation of the insignificant effect of human asset specificity 
could be the fact that this construct might have been captured by the 
procedural asset specificity dimension which seems to share 
characteristics pertaining to human asset specificity (organisational 
routines and workflows could be seen as latent components, see section 
4.6.2.2 in chapter four). 
6.6.2 Impact of suppliers' asset specificity dimensions on 
outsourcing performance (Hypothesis lb and Hypothesis 5b) 
Unquestionably, the most important finding stemming from this study is the 
mixed results to Hypotheses lb and 5b. While in accordance with TCT 
predictions (H1b), suppliers' site specific investments were found to have a 
negative effect on outsourcing performance (though only significantly so at 
the 10% level in Model 5), both suppliers' human and dedicated asset 
specificity dimensions consistently displayed positive and significant 
coefficients, partially supporting hypothesis 5b. In previous literature, Wang 
(2002) is alone in having found a positive relationship between asset 
specificity and the success of (software) outsourcing. Yet, in his study, he 
aggregated human and dedicated asset specificity into a single five-item 
construct, and, therefore, he did not examine the effect of each dimension 
of asset specificity. Besides, Wang (2002) made no distinction between 
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buyers and suppliers' asset specificity, and, hence, was unable to count for 
the potential effect of reciprocal investments made. 
This mixed result in relation to the effect of suppliers' asset specificity upon 
outsourcing performance opens up the suggestion that there may exist an 
`optimum' level of asset specificity that attracts / invites effective and 
efficient relationship between outsourcing buyers and suppliers, but 
beyond which, exposure becomes so pronounced that temptation to 
renege on outsourcing contract could prove to be too high to resist. Figure 
6.6 provides a visual schematisation of the above suggestion. 
Figure 6.6: Relationship between suppliers' asset specificity and 
outsourcing performance 
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As can be seen from Figure 6.6, this intuitive explanation seems to be able 
to accommodate the different emphases placed by TCT and strategy- 
related literature in relation to the effect of asset specificity upon 
outsourcing performance. Indeed, while the strategy perspective seems to 
have captured the part of the relationship between asset specificity and 
outsourcing performance as placed prior to the asset specificity optimum 
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level, the TCT explanation is corroborated by the dynamics that follow that 
optimum level. 
Given the above, one could question the reason why suppliers' site asset 
specificity, in particular, displayed a negative impact upon outsourcing 
performance while at the same time all other suppliers' asset specificity 
dimensions (precisely suppliers' human and dedicated asset specificity) 
were found to have a positive effect. 
One possible explanation to the above phenomenon as rooted in the 
findings of this research could be that although all suppliers' asset specific 
investments are, by their very nature, dedicated to the particular 
requirements of the relationship, the 'optimum level' after which they begin 
to trigger opportunistic behaviour (temptation to renege on outsourcing 
contracts) to the detriment of outsourcing performance may vary across 
asset specificity dimensions due to the 'value' (cost) and 'non re- 
deployability' content embedded in them. Given their intrinsically limited 
'value' and/or 'transfer cost' vis-ä-vis other asset specificity dimensions 
(e. g. site specificity), relatively low levels of suppliers' human and 
dedicated asset specificity may represent levels of 'insufficient exposure'to 
trigger opportunistic behaviour leading, instead, to a positive impact upon 
outsourcing performance. Only ample investments in such assets would, 
by taking asset specificity beyond the optimum level, invert the sign of the 
relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing performance as the 
buyer's individual gain from opportunistic behaviour would be perceived to 
outweigh the shared benefits from an improved outsourcing relationship. 
As such, given their intrinsically high 'value' and 'non re-deployability' 
content, the optimum level after which suppliers' site specific investments 
lead to opportunistic behaviour to the detriment of outsourcing performance 
is likely to be lower than the one associated with suppliers' dedicated and 
human specific investments. Hence, even very low levels of suppliers' site 
specificity may be expected to take the relationship beyond the optimum 
level of required specific investment, resulting in a more immediate 
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negative effect on outsourcing performance. This idea is diagrammatically 
illustrated in Figure 6.7 which tries to offer a visual conceptualization of the 
hypothesised functional form of the relationship in question. 
Figure 6.7: A hypothesised 'Optimum Level' of suppliers' asset specificity 
across dimensions 
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This 'optimum level' rationalisation of the research findings not only implies 
that the relationship between each dimension of asset specificity and 
outsourcing performance may be a non-constant function that takes the 
shape of an inverted U curve, it also suggests that the point at which 
opportunistic behaviour is activated varies according to the particular type 
of investment across both buyers and suppliers' asset specificity 
dimensions. Particularly, site specificity investment seems to imply a 
greater degree of hostage than the one inherited by human and dedicated 
asset specificity. 
Finally, the fact that buyers' asset specificity accounted for more than twice 
the variance in outsourcing performance as compared to suppliers' asset 
specificity may also open the suggestion that the 'optimum level' in relation 
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to buyers' asset specificity dimensions are generally lower than those of 
suppliers. In other words, even extremely low level of non-redeployable 
investment made by the buyer side, could quickly take the relationship 
beyond the optimum point, with a more immediate negative effect on 
outsourcing performance, quicker than the effect that would be exerted by 
the same level of non-redeployable investment as made by suppliers. Such 
idea, however, awaits more data. If confirmed, this could serve as an 
explanation for the higher proportion of variance in outsourcing 
performance that was found to be caused by buyers as compared to the 
one caused by suppliers' asset specificity. 
6.6.3 The moderating effect of collaborative ties on the relationship 
between asset specificity and outsourcing performance (Hypotheses 4) 
The hypothesised moderating effect of collaborative ties on the relationship 
between asset specificity and outsourcing performance (H4) was not 
supported by our data. The finding of an insignificant moderating effect of 
collaborative ties across all dimensions of the relationship between asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance could be rationalised by 
postulating that asset specificity itself explains variance in crafting stronger 
relationships, as empirically found by Heide and John (1990), Anderson 
and Weitz (1992) and Heide and Stump (1995). 
To probe this explanation using our data, we run a separate regression 
with collaborative ties as a dependent construct and buyers' and suppliers' 
asset specificity dimensions as independent variables (see Table 6.13). 
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TABLE 6.13 
Results of standard regression analysis: The influence of buyers and 
suppliers' asset specificity on collaborative ties 
Independent Variables b SE Beta T-Value p-Value 
Intercept 5.110 0.375 13.622 . 000 
Buyers' asset specificity 
HumB 0.023 0.064 0.033 0.362 . 
718 
DediB -0.138 0.078 -0.161 -1.772 . 079 
TempB -0.224 0.059 -0.378 -3.834 . 000 
BrandB 0.319 0.069 0.464 4.601 . 000 
ProcdB -0.084 0.067 -0.084 -1.261 . 210 
Suppliers' asset specificity 
HumS 0.070 0.063 0.101 1.111 . 269 
DediS 0.033 0.059 0.052 . 562 . 
575 
SiteS -0.78 0.053 -. 124 -1.470 . 
144 
R2*a 3#ýýýý ý. 177 " 
Adjusted R2 
. 
126 
N 137 
The results show that asset specificity does actually explain a significant 
variance in collaborative ties (17.7%) with both buyer's temporal asset 
specificity and brand capital significantly affecting collaborative ties. 
However, while temporal asset specificity negatively affected collaboration, 
brand capital was found to be positively related to collaborative ties. The 
latter could be explained by the fact that reputation, which is at the heart of 
brand capital, could actually be reciprocal in nature as any 
underperformance of the subcontractor could result in its own reputation 
being affected (Lamminmaki, 2005), leading to a greater degree of 
collaboration. 
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6.6.4 The effect of reciprocal investments on outsourcing 
performance (Hypothesis 6) 
Hypothesis 6 was partially supported, as we found that in three (out of 15) 
cases tested, reciprocal investments had a significant positive effect on 
outsourcing performance (with the remaining interaction instances being 
found to be statistically insignificant). This result partially corroborates 
Williamson's (1983) suggestion that such offsetting investments should 
lead to increased interdependency between buyers and suppliers, which 
could in turn be at the origin of creating a safeguard mechanism (against 
potential opportunistic behaviour) in the form of mutual hostages. These 
results complement those obtained by Artz (1999), who used data from the 
manufacturing sector; though our disaggregated framework is more 
informative by additionally revealing which specific asset specificity 
dimensions display significant interactions. The fact that not all interaction 
instances had a significant impact on outsourcing performance perhaps 
reiterates the author's intuitive explanation regarding the existence of an 
optimum level of asset specificity beyond which opportunistic behaviour 
could be trigged unless specific investments by one party are reciprocated 
to the same extent by the other exchanging party. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter begins by providing a summary of the research findings, 
structured by research objectives. Following a synopsis of the contribution 
to knowledge of this research, the implications of the findings are explicitly 
highlighted from both the academic and the pragmatic perspectives. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations of this study and of 
profitable avenues for future work. 
7.2 Summary of main findings 
The initial mapping of the outsourcing literature revealed the scarcity of 
empirical studies that characterises the outcome oriented literature in 
general and the relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance in particular. The additional critical review that focused 
particularly on this area (chapter three) allowed the author to distil a 
number of theory-based hypotheses on the relationship between asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance. The extensive review and 
analysis of the past conceptualisations and measurements of the asset 
specificity construct assisted the author to accomplish the difficult task of 
developing a comprehensive modelling framework by which the construct 
could be operationalised and tested across a number of dimensions so as 
to meet the research objectives. 
The first research objective was to assess the effect of the various buyers' 
asset specificity dimensions on outsourcing performance. The regression 
results revealed that buyers' investments account for almost 30% of 
variance in outsourcing performance. The finding of consistently negative 
coefficient of all the buyers' asset specificity dimensions provides empirical 
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backing to the TCT predictions in relation to the negative relationship 
between buyers' asset specificity and outsourcing performance. 
The second objective of the thesis was to assess the impact of various 
suppliers' asset specificity dimensions on outsourcing performance. The 
results showed that the sign of the suppliers' asset specificity coefficient 
varies according to the type of specificity dimension examined. Whilst site 
specificity was found to negatively to affect outsourcing performance, both 
human and dedicated asset specificity dimensions were shown to exert a 
positive impact upon outsourcing performance. As such, while empirically 
backing the TCT predictive implications at the buyers' level of asset 
specificity, the research findings in relation to the suppliers asset specificity 
paved the way for the suggestion that the relationship between asset 
specificity and outsourcing performance may be of a form best represented 
by an inverted U-shaped curve, where there exists an 'optimum level' of 
asset specificity up to which outsourcing performance is positively affected 
and, beyond which, the relationship assumes negative connotations. The 
results may also imply that this 'optimum level' of specificity varies 
according to the particular type of investment across both buyers and 
suppliers' asset specificity dimensions. 
The third objective was to add an empirical edge to the notion of reciprocal 
exposure by empirically examining the effect of reciprocal asset soecilic, 
non-redeployable investments on the outsourcing performance. In line with 
Artz (1999), the results of this study confirmed, in three interaction 
instances, the positive impact which reciprocal investments exert upon 
outsourcing performance. 
The forth main objective of the thesis was to establish whether 
collaborative ties can moderate the relationship between asset specificity 
and outsourcing performance. While collaborative ties was found to exert a 
direct, positive influence outsourcing performance, the results did not 
support the hypothesis of any moderating effect on the relationship in 
question. 
278 
Another important finding of this thesis is the insignificant effect of the three 
control variables (firm size, industry type, and type of activity being 
outsourced). Although this result may well be sample dependent 
(especially given our relatively small sample), similar results (particularly in 
relation to firm size) appear to have been found in a number of related 
studies. For example, in their empirical investigation of the relationship 
between HR outsourcing and firm performance, Gilley of al. (2004) found 
no significant effect of firm size. A similar conclusion was reached by 
Gorzing and Stephan (2002) who found firm size to be of little relevance in 
explaining differences in performance among firms engaging in 
outsourcing. 
7.3 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis makes several, significant contributions to knowledge. 
First, although much work has already been done in relation to the 
determinants of outsourcing performance (for example, on the skills 
required for managing the outsourcing relationship and on the provider 
selection process), this thesis redirects attention to the crucial role which 
asset specificity plays in affecting outsourcing performance. By empirically 
demonstrating that asset specificity does indeed affect outsourcing 
performance, this research clearly shows that any future study examining 
outsourcing performance cannot afford to overlook the effect of asset 
specificity. 
Second, the disaggregated approach for operationalising the asset 
specificity construct enabled the author to go beyond any previous 
empirical (outsourcing-related) study and assess the individual impact of 
each dimension of buyers and suppliers' asset specificity on outsourcing 
performance. In so doing, the thesis made a significant contribution to our 
existing knowledge by showing that the way in which asset specificity 
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affects outsourcing performance varies across buyers-supplier asset 
specificity dimensions. As such, the thesis also managed to respond to 
earlier calls made by Lohtia et al. (1994, p. 268) for engaging in a more 
comprehensive and refined disaggregated measurement of asset 
specificity, and confirmed their suggestion that research results based on 
TCT may be dependent on the specific dimension of transaction-specific 
assets examined. 
Third, while complementing Artz's (1999) findings within the manufacturing 
sector, the disaggregated framework employed in this thesis offers more 
informative results by revealing which particular asset specificity 
dimensions interact with one another to positively affect outsourcing 
performance. In so doing, this research offered further empirical content to 
the hypothesis of reciprocal exposure by finding empirical support for its 
tenets in three interaction instances. 
Finally, by rejecting the existence of any moderating effect that could stem 
from collaborative ties, our findings suggest that collaborative ties alone is 
in fact unable to neutralise any potential opportunistic expropriation from 
one party of the dyad in relation to the specific, non redeployable, 
investment made by the other party. 
Collectively, the above-mentioned contributions significantly enrich our 
existing empirical knowledge regarding the TCT's implication for 
outsourcing performance in relationships characterised by the presence of 
transaction specific assets. 
7.4 Research implications 
To the author, it appears that the findings of this research have profound 
implications from the theoretical, methodological, and managerial 
perspectives. 
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From a theoretical perspective, although the author's intuitive explanation 
as to why some specificity dimensions appear to have a positive effect on 
outsourcing performance may be deemed as promising as other possible 
alternative explanations, the finding of different impacts of individual asset 
specificity dimensions on outsourcing performance makes in itself a 
significant contribution to our existing knowledge of the predictive power of 
TCT when applied to the question of the impact of asset specificity on 
outsourcing performance. The findings also serve as a clear illustration of 
the benefit of integrating both economic- and strategy-based theory in the 
analysis of the relationship between asset specificity and outsourcing 
performance. 
From a methodological perspective, one important implication of our study 
concerns the approach by which future empirical research should 
operationalise the asset specifcity construct. Since outsourcing 
performance has been found to respond differently to different types of 
buyers and suppliers' non re-deployable investments, our findings have 
confirmed the empirical necessity to treat asset specifcity as more than a 
mere composite construct. Indeed, even when the measurement scale of 
asset specificity is developed drawing from items relating to different asset 
specificity dimensions, estimation of a single asset specificity coefficient 
would at best mask the individual effects on outsourcing performance of 
the different types of specific, non re-deployable investments that 
characterise the buyer-supplier relationships examined. 
By shedding light on the various effects of each particular asset specificity 
dimension from both the buyer and the supplier's side of the dyad, the 
findings of this research also have implications that should be of interest to 
managers since, for example, they demonstrate that, by offsetting 
opportunistic tendencies, the presence of a mutual commitment to 
reciprocal, non re-deployable investments specifically dedicated to the 
outsourcing relationship enhances outsourcing performance. The research 
results also indicate that while not all dimensions of specific investments 
made by suppliers seem to be reciprocated by opportunistic behaviour 
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from the buyers, outsourcing providers should exercise particular caution 
when engaging in outsourcing relationships which specifically require site 
specific, non-redeployable investments since such investments seem to be 
more prone to prime opportunistic behaviour compared to other suppliers' 
asset specificity dimensions. In addition, managers should be aware that 
asset specificity does not necessarily hinder outsourcing performance. As 
the research findings suggest, this may well vary according to the level of 
the investment for each particular buyer-supplier asset specificity 
dimension within a given outsourcing relationship. Accordingly, it becomes 
paramount (though admittedly very difficult) for managers to try to estimate 
the acceptable level of opportunistic exposure beyond which opportunistic 
expropriation could be triggered. 
However, the results of this research should be viewed in the light of the 
constraints of the study, such as the focus on few service-related 
industries, the failure to question both buyers and suppliers, as well as the 
consequent reliance on buyers' perception of suppliers' asset specificity. 
7.5 Limitations and avenues for future research 
Notwithstanding the contribution of the findings uncovered by this study, 
several limitations should be acknowledged. First, our data were limited to 
outsourcing relationships in four UK service-related industries, and this 
implies caution in generalising the findings. Accordingly, replication studies 
across different countries and sectors are encouraged. 
Second, although our methodological approach allowed us to differentiate 
between specific, non-redeployable investments made by both buyers and 
suppliers, our data were solely based on the buyers' perception of the 
outsourcing relationship. While such an approach may represent a 
potential source of response bias, there is sufficient evidence in the extant 
empirical literature to suggest that buyers and suppliers hold consistent 
perceptions of the outsourcing relationship. This has become a standard 
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assumption underlying much of the empirical work in this area, an 
assumption generally seen as unproblematic (see, among others, Artz, 
1999; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Provan and Skinner, 1989; Saxton, 1997; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). This should not, however, rule out the 
benefits of obtaining data from both sides of the dyad which would provide, 
perhaps, more accurate measures of suppliers' asset specificity and would 
enable the comparison of buyer-supplier's perceptions of the same 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, practicality, time constraints and lack of 
financial resources prevented the author from questioning both buyers and 
suppliers. Indeed, such a procedure would have involved initially sending 
questionnaires to buyers asking them to disclose the name of their 
outsourcing suppliers (an information which could be seen as highly 
sensitive and confidential) and, subsequently, sending a different 
questionnaire to those suppliers that were identified. This would not only 
have meant a lengthy and challenging process, but would also have 
reduced the final usable sample as the second set of questionnaires to be 
sent to suppliers would have been limited to the number of suppliers 
disclosed by respondents to the first questionnaire. 
Third, this research relied on the perception of a single respondent from 
each company. Although the author can confidently reject any serious 
concerns in relation to single-informant bias (as demonstrated by both 
Harman's one factor test and the application of Podsakoffs et aL (2003) 
framework, see 5.10.6), the use of multiple respondents from within the 
same company would have improved the validity of organisation-level 
constructs (e. g. buyers' asset specificity) (Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982). 
However, for reasons associated with resource constraints, such a 
procedure was discarded at the research design stage. 
There are additional caveats to be borne in mind when interpreting our 
findings. First, given the purpose of this study, our interest centred 
exclusively upon the impact of asset specificity on outsourcing 
performance yet many other factors (e. g. provider selection process, 
Masten, 1993; contract management, Lacity and Willcocks, 1998; Fowler 
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and Jeffs, 1998; skills involved in managing the outsourcing relationship, 
Madhok, 2002, Quinn and Hilmer, 1995; trust and communication quality, 
Mohr and Spekman, 1994) can be hypothesised to have explanatory power 
in the determination of outsourcing performance. Whilst a number of 
diagnostic checks and a relatively high R2 value suggested an adequate 
model specification, future work should attempt to test the concomitant 
significance of other variables found in previous literature to play an 
important role in the success of outsourcing projects. Second, the 
inconsistent treatment of the relationship between asset specificity and 
outsourcing performance across various strands of the strategy literature 
coupled with "obscure and often tautological definitions of key terms" 
(Williamson, 1999, p. 1093) (e. g. core competence) forced the author to 
coin the nomenclature 'strategy-related literature' merely to distinguish it 
from the economic-based one. Despite the usefulness and necessity to 
draw attention to the distinction between the 'economic-based literature' 
(which builds upon TCT) and the 'strategy-related' one, the author does 
acknowledge that such a definitional simplification which subsumes various 
strands of the strategy-related literature under a single umbrella, could be 
seen as a misleading piece of shorthand. Third, while our results regarding 
the mixed effects of asset specificity dimensions on outsourcing 
performance have provided the author with grounds on which to speculate 
on the likely existence of an asset specificity optimum level beyond which 
opportunistic expropriation could be trigged, future work should try to 
further probe this intuitive albeit still untested rationalisation. 
Although to ensure reliability and validity all measurement scales employed 
in this study were subjected to rigorous procedural and statistical testing, a 
number of items that were originally developed by the author during the 
course of this research (and hence had not been previously tested) could 
have been subjected to further testing through the use of confirmatory 
factor analysis. Since this study is one of the very first attempts to measure 
asset specificity across all of its various dimensions, exploratory factor 
analysis should suffice. However, future studies, using different samples, 
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are encouraged to further refine and confirmatory content to the 
measurement scales developed in the course of this research. 
Furthermore, the operationalisation of outsourcing performance relied 
exclusively on perceptual qualitative measures. Since different firms may 
have different outsourcing motives, the additional inclusion of financial 
measures would have complemented the non-financial measures 
employed and would have resulted in a 'hybrid approach' that is more likely 
to capture the 'idiosyncratic' outsourcing motive which any two different 
organisations may have. Indeed, as highlighted by Parnell et al. (2006, p. 
413), "each organisation could succeed in accomplishing its [outsourcing] 
goal but may fail if evaluated on its accomplishment of the other 
organisation's [outsourcing] goal" ('outsourcing' added). Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that asking for precise outsourcing-related financial data 
could be regarded as a challenging and complicated task for respondents. 
The release of such sensitive data could also be seen as highly 
confidential, which may lead to a lower response rate. Without asking for 
such precise financial data, this research has tried, however, to count for 
the potential 'idiosyncratic' outsourcing motives of different firms through 
the inclusion of a broad range of common outsourcing motives that could 
be seen as central to outsourcing performance. 
Although it may also be deemed opportune to acknowledge potential 
concerns with a fairly low rate of return, low response rates for this kind of 
surveys are becoming increasingly common (e. g. Lepak et al., 2003; 
Perez-Nordtvedt, et al. 2008) and our usable sample size seemed to prove 
sufficiently large to draw valid asymptotic inferences. Small sample bias 
increases the probability of a Type II error but, reassuringly, our results 
also present instances in which the null hypothesis was rejected. However, 
future studies employing a larger sample can perhaps provide us with a 
better picture regarding the effect of our control variables (firm size, 
industry type, and type of activity being outsourced). Given the number of 
interaction terms included, a larger sample would also enhance the validity 
of the moderating effect in relation to collaborative ties. 
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This research relied solely on data collected by means of questionnaires. A 
more reliable empirical basis could have been achieved by triangulating 
the data collected through the incorporation of focus groups before 
finalising the research model and hypotheses, or also through the use of 
follow-up interviews with a selected number of companies in order to 
further illuminate on the quantitative analysis conducted and, 
consequently, enhance the discussion of the research findings that were 
generated from the self-administered questionnaires. Both methods would 
have enabled the author to gain deeper insights of the specific 
organisational contexts and would have provided him with the opportunity 
to acquire a greater understanding of the issues underpinning firms' 
choices concerning asset specific investments. However, these 
triangulation procedures would have required further financial resources 
and would have obliged the author to obtain a new ethical approval. Time 
constraints and resource restrictions prevented the author to employ these 
triangulation procedures. 
Finally, although the impact of asset specificity on outsourcing 
performance was estimated within a straightforward linear regression 
framework, the author is unable to exclude the possibility that the 
functional form of the relationship between asset specificity and 
outsourcing performance be of a non-linear nature, nor can he rule out the 
possibility that outsourcing performance itself may, under certain 
conditions, and over time, induce greater levels of asset specific 
investments by one or both of the parties of the outsourcing relationship. In 
these circumstances, the bias stemming from the linear approximation of 
the non-linearities of the 'true relationship' as well as reverse causality bias 
may seriously affect the reliability of estimated coefficients. To address 
these issues, a profitable avenue for future research would entail 
constructing a longitudinal dataset to test a structural inter-temporal model 
that would allow to establish both the non-linear, dynamic structure and the 
reverse causality properties of the relationship between asset specificity 
dimensions and outsourcing performance. 
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Appendix 2.3: Extracts from questionnaires in relation to asset 
specificity measurement 
Poppo & Zenger, 1998 
1) To what degree must individuals acquire company-specific or division-specific 
information to adequately perform the IS function? 
2) To what degree is your approach to this function is custom-tailored to the 
company? 
3) How costly in terms of time and resources would it be to switch to outsourcing 
this function or to switch vendors if you are already outsourcing it (Poppo & 
Zenger, 1998, p. 866) 
Wang (2002) 
Questionnaire: 
Please indicate the uniqueness of the following aspects involved in this particular 
software project: 
a) Functional l information requirements 
b) operating procedures 
c) business domain knowledge required 
d) training for the developers 
e) technical skills required 
Morill & Morill (2003) 
Questionnaire: 
Specialized knowledge of this company and its industry is necessary on the part of the 
external auditor in order to perform the following activities (1=strongly disagree; 7= 
strongly agree) 
a) Understanding the nature of our business 
b) Planning the audit 
c) Documenting and evaluating the internal control system 
d) Testing the internal control system 
e) Designing substantive tests 
f) Performing substantive tests 
g) Designing analytical review procedures 
h) Performing analytical review procedures 
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Rodriguez and Padilla (2005) 
Questionnaire: (7-point Likert-type scale) 
I. To what extent must the personnel performing the leisure activities have 
specific knowledge and information about how the hotel works? 
2. To what extent do the tasks to be performed within the leisure activities 
require a degree of adaptation to the peculiarities and particularities of the 
hotel? 
3. How costly would it be to outsource the leisure activities or to change the 
supplier if it were already outsourced? (consider the cost and time involved in 
finding outside service companies, in contract negotiation, in supervising 
contract compliance by the supplier, and in working together) 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) 
Questionnaire: 1(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) 
(i) It's difficult to learn all the ins and outs of our company that a salesperson 
needs to know to be effective 
(ii) An experienced salesperson's inside information could do us a lot of 
damage if it got out 
(iii) To be effective, the salesperson has to take a lot of time to get to know our 
accounts 
(iv) Personal relationships between our salespeople and accounts have little 
influence on sales of our product line 
(v) Amount of extra training needed in this firm by a new salesperson who has 
experience in the product class ............ Weeks (vi) Importance of key accounts: % of accounts given special attention. 
Monteverde and Teece (1982) 
Questionnaire: 
Please examine the following list of 133 automotive components and indicate which of 
the non-captive items on the list could be procured as replacement units without 
necessarily having to know the manufacturer, make, and model of the vehicle for 
which the replacement is sought. That is, which of the following categories of parts 
may be expected to be largely common across several manufacturers' vehicles. 
Murray and Kotabe (1995) 
Questionnaire: (p. 195) 
330 
In manufacturing the non-standardized components in product, the level of specific 
assets or resources (i. e.: unique assets or resources, such as configurations of work 
stations, use of special raw materials and specially trained labour, invested 
in the 
product that have little or no use for other purposes) is 
(0 = Zero, 5= Very high) 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994) 
Questionnaire: 
Business Process Asset Specificity: 
Please indicate the extent to which the following aspects of your commercial lines of 
the focal carrier are relatively similar to other carriers, or are significantly different 
from other carriers (e. g., unique or customised to suit the requirements of the focal 
carrier). Please circle the appropriate number) 
Relatively Similar Moderate significantly customised 
(a) The extent of training needed for staff 
(b) The skills level of our employees working 1 
234567 
234567 
On the focal carrier's business 
(C) The (focal carrier) workflows & routines 1 234 56 7 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994, p. 563) 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) 
Questionnaire 
(I) (Procedural asset specificity) Please indicate the extent to which the following are 
relatively similar to other carriers or are significantly different from other carriers 
(e. g., unique or customised to suit the requirements of the focal carrier) 
(a) The focal carrier's workflows and routines 
(b) The use of rating and other manuals of the focal carrier 
(c) The forms needed for the focal carrier 
(Significantly customised - Relatively similar to other carriers, 7-point scales). 
(II) (Human asset specificity) Please indicate the extent to which the following are 
relatively similar to other carriers or are significantly different from other carriers 
(e. g., unique or customised to suit the requirements of the focal carrier) 
(a) The skill levels of our employees working on the focal carrier's business 
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(b) The extent of training needed for staff 
(c) The focal carrier's unwritten norms, expectations, guidelines, etc. 
(Significantly customised - Relatively similar to other carriers, 7-point scales). 
(Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995, p. 382) 
Widener & Selto (1999) 
Questionnaire: 
" In fiscal 1996, to approximately what proportion of major activities were the 
outsourced internal audit hours devoted? 
" In fiscal 1996, how much time did the outside provider of internal audit 
services spend working with information proprietary to your company? 
" In fiscal 1996, how much time did in-house internal audit personnel spend 
working with information proprietary to your company? 
" In fiscal 1996, was the in-house internal audit department used as a training 
program for other positions? 
" How long, on average, does an employee spend in the in-house internal audit 
department before being rotated to another position within the company? 
" In fiscal 1996, what was the approximate amount of time your in-house 
internal audit department spent on the following activities? 
Widener & Selto (1999, p. 69-70) 
Heide & John (1990, p. 30) 
Likert 7-point scale: "strongly disagree / strongly agree 
Buyer's specific investment 
" We have made significant investments in tooling and equipment dedicated to 
our relationship with this supplier. 
" Our production system has been tailored to using the particular items bought 
from this supplier 
Supplier's specific investment 
" The procedures and routines developed by this supplier as part of their 
relationship with our company are tailored to our particular situation 
" Our company has some unusual technological standards and norms that have 
required extensive adaptation by the supplier. 
Brouthers & Brouthers (2003, p. 1188) 
" How do you rate the training programme in terms of preparing personnel to 
provide your service or produce your product (1= well below average, 7= well 
above average)? 
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" How do you rate your firm's potential to create new and creative products and 
services (1= well below average, 7= well above average)? 
" How many technological resources does your firm have to handle international 
expansion (1= few resources, 7= many resources). 
Ghani & Khan (2004, p. 92) 
Interview: All measures on scale of 1 "not at all to 5 "to a very great extent 
i) The level of assistance from the buyer: 
* Received technical training 
* Assistance in procuring raw materials 
* Assistance when production started 
* Assistance in improving delivery 
* Assistance in improving prouduct quality 
ii) The level of information sharing and trust: 
* Share production cost information with buyer 
* Receive cooperation in reaching fair price 
* Buyer shares future plans 
Dragonetti et al. (2003, p. 22) 
Questionnaire: Measures on 5-point Likert Scale from Low to High 
For your company, replacing your main suppliers will generate switching costs which 
are: 
Low Medium /Low Medium Medium /High Nigh 
Nb: the same article measured also the degree of learning by looking at the intensity 
of information exchange. 
Your level of information concerning your main suppliers is; 
Production Costs: Low Medium /Low 
Production Processes: Low Medium / Low 
Medium Medium / High high 
Medium Medium / Nigh Vigil 
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Maltz (1993, p. 48) 
Not at all A 
Great Deal 
For this customer, the delivery carrier must customize its servive 12 
34567 
If you replaced the delivery carrier, costs would increase during the transition 12 
34567 
How much time would it take another carrier to learn to serve the customer as 
234567 
well as the current carrier does? 
Klein et al. (1990, p. 202) 
1. It is difficult for an outsider to learn our ways of doing things. 
2. To be effective, a salesperson has to take a lot of time to get to know the 
customers 
3. It takes a long time for a salesperson to learn about this product thoroughly 
4. A salesperson's inside information on our procedures would be very helpful to 
our competitors 
5. Specialised facilities are needed to market this product 
6. A large investment in equipment and facilities is needed to market this product 
Heide & John (1992, p. 37) 
7-point Likert scale: Strongly disagree / strongly agree 
1. We have made significant investments in tooling and equipment dedicated to our 
relationship with this supplier 
2. This supplier has unusal technological norms and standards, which have required 
adaptation on our part 
3. Training and qualfying this supplier has involved substantial commitements of 
time and money 
4. Our production system has been tailored to using the particular items bought from 
the supplier 
5. Gearing up to deal with this supplier requires highly specialised tools and 
equipment 
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Masten et aL (1991, p. 14) 
10-point Likert scale: 
1. the degree to which facilities and equipments used in the production process are 
specific to this application. (PHYSICAL) 
2. The degree to which skills, knowledge or experience of workers are to specific to 
this application (HUMAN) 
3. a ranking of the importance of having the component of perfroming the task on 
schedule. (TEMPORAL) 
Brown and Potoski (2005, p. 355) 
5-point Likert scale 
Asset Specificity: Degree of specialised investments refers to whether specialised 
investments are required to produce the service. By special investments, we mean 
investments that apply to the production of one service but are very difficul to adapt 
for the production of other services. These specialised investments include: 
1) the use of a specific location that is movable only at agreat cost; 
2) the use of highly specialised human skills that cannot be put tp work for other 
purposes; 
3) the use of specialised tools or a complex system designed for a single purpose; or 
4) the requirement that the service reach the user within a relatively limited period 
of time or the quality of the srevice greatly diminishes 
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Appendix 2.4: Extracts from questionnaires used by key empirical studies 
source Example of questions 
Adapted from Communication : 
Goodman et al. When we have enquiries in relation to the service / product provided, 
(1995, p. 1323) provider's employees respond: 
With Accurate information 
With Complete set of information 
In a timely, prompt manner 
Delivery Pbs: 
During the last 12 months, have you had any problem with the activity / 
service being outsourced 
Involvement: 
Frequency of visit made to the vendor's premises 
Overall satisfaction 11-point likert scale 
How satisfied are you overall with: 1) Quality of service (consistent, 
timely, accurate) 2) meeting performance standards, 3) providing 
reasonable rate 
Intention to switch vendor? -point Liked scale 
Let's say that there is an alternative company that could deliver the 
service you are currently outsourcing, how inclined would you be to 
switch your current provider for the each of the following situations: 
a) the alternative company could provide a service comparable to 
the one offered by your current provider at a comparable price 
b) the alternative company could provide better service at a 
comparable price 
c) the alternative company could provide same service at a1% 
lower rate 
d) the alternative company could provide same service at a 10% 
lower rate 
Lee & Kim Outsourcing performance (business perspective) 
(1999, p. 59) 1. we have been able to refocus on core business 
2. we have enhanced our IT competence 
3. we have increased access to skilled personnel 
4. we have enhanced economies of scale in human resources 
5. we have enhanced economies of scale in technological 
resources 
6. we have increased control of IS expenses 
7. we have reduced the risk of technological obsolescence 
8. we have increased access to key Information technologies 
9. we are satisfied with our overall benefits from outsourcing 
Grover et al. 7 point-Likert Scale 
(1996, p. 115) Item measuring success of outsourcing 
1. we have been able to refocus on core business 
2. we have enhanced our IT competence 
3. we have increased access to skilled personnel 
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4. we have enhanced economies of scale in human resources 
5. we have enhanced economies of scale in technological 
resources 
6. we have increased control of IS expenses 
7. we have reduced the risk of technological obsolescence 
8. we have increased access to key information technologies 
9. we are satisfied with our overall benefits from outsourcing 
Items Measuring expected Tangibles and Reliability of service 
quality 
Tangibles 
Excellent service providers will have modern-looking IT facilities 
The physical IT facilities at excellent service providers should be 
visually appealing 
Employees of excellent service providers should be visually appealing 
Materials associated with the service [such as pamphlets or statement] 
will be visually appealing 
Reliability 
When excellent service providers promise to do sthg by a certain time, 
they will do so. 
When customers have a pb, excellent service providers will show a 
sincere interest in solving it 
Excellent service providers will perform the service right the first time 
Excellent service providers will provide their services at the time they 
promise to do so. 
Excellent service providers will insist on error-free records 
Wang (2002, p. 5-point Likert Scale ( using Grover's et al., 1996 nine items outsourcing 
177) success scale) 
(SUCI) focus on core business (dropped due the failure to reach the 
level of practical significance) 
(SUC2) increase IS competence 
(SUC3) access to skilled personnel 
(SUC4) cost savings on human resources 
(SUC5) cost savings on technological resources 
(SUC6) control of IS expenses 
(SUC7) avoidance of obsolescence 
(SUC8) access to key IS 
SUC9 overall successfulness 
Lever (1997) 5-point Likert Scale (1 =low 5=high) 
*I'm satisfied with the work performance of the activity 
*There are very frequent complaints about this area 
`How effective is this area? 
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Appendix 4.1 
Date: as postmark 
Dear Director, 
You are being invited to take part in a research survey on 'Managing Outsourcing 
Relationships'. Before you decide whether or not to take part, please let us highlight why 
the research is being undertaken. 
As you are aware, managing outsourcing activities previously undertaken In-house 
and now sub-contracted to external suppliers has become a common feature of the 
contemporary business landscape, with many companies resorting to outsourcing to 
increase quality, efficiency and more generally to deal with the challenges of the rapidly 
changing and increasingly competitive marketplace. This survey (which is part of a 
doctoral research project undertaken at, and funded by Oxford Brookes University) aims 
to shed light on the factors that are likely to affect outsourcing performance. 
The industry in which your company operates is one of the few that have been carefully 
selected for the purpose of this survey (2400 companies are being contacted) and, 
therefore, your voluntary participation would make a valuable contribution to the success 
of this research project. 
We would be very grateful if you could find the time to complete the attached 
questionnaire, or identify a suitable person in your company who could do so. The 
information you provide will be kept confidential and will be used for the purpose of this 
study only. No individual company names or personnel will be identified and/or divulged. 
If you wish to receive feedback on the findings of this study, please complete and return 
the tear off sheet provided at the end of the questionnaire. 
We look forward to receiving your completed questionnaire and we thank you very much 
for your kind cooperation and valuable insights. 
Best regards, 
c. ýuýý 
Arafet Tekaya 
PhD Student 
Oxford Brookes University 
Business School 
Email: atekaya@brookes. ac. uk 
Phone: 07876 277339 
Dr Glauco De Vita 
Reader in Business Economics 
Oxford Brookes University 
Business School 
Email: gde-vita@brookes. ac. uk 
Phone: 01865 485798 
Dr Catherine Wang 
Senior Lecturer In Strategy 
Oxford Brookes University 
Business School 
Email: c. wang@brookes. ac. uk 
Phone: 01865 485661 
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OXFORD 
BROOKES 
UNIVERSITY 
`Managing Outsourcing Relationships' 
A Survey Conducted by Oxford Brookes University 
The purpose of this survey is to investigate how companies manage relationships with 
their suppliers and what factors are likely to affect outsourcing performance. For this 
survey, which is part of a doctoral research project undertaken at, and funded by Oxford 
Brookes University, outsourcing is defined as activities previously undertaken In- 
house and now sub-contracted to external suppliers. Your voluntary participation will 
be highly valuable for us in order to identify critical success factors in managing 
outsourcing relationships. 
This research project has received clearance by Oxford Brookes University's Research 
Ethics Committee. In accordance with the University's policy of Academic Integrity, the 
returned questionnaires and the electronic data generated In the course of the research 
will be kept securely for a period of five years after the completion of the project. The 
questionnaire will take only about 20 minutes to complete. The information you provide 
will be used for the purpose of this study only. We assure complete confidentiality and 
anonymity of this information and of the names of the companies taking part In this 
survey. For the sole purpose of follow-up, an identifying code is used. 
Upon completion, please return the questionnaire within three weeks from receipt using 
the pre-paid envelope enclosed. If you require additional Information about the survey, 
please contact Dr Glauco De Vita (Oxford Brookes University Business School, 
Wheatley Campus, Wheatley, Oxford, OX33 1 HX, UK; Email: gde-vita@brookes. ac. uk). 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of this project, you can contact the Chair of 
the University's Ethics Committee (Email: ethicse-brookes. ac. uk). If you would like to 
keep this information sheet, please tear along the dashed line. 
If you choose not to participate in this survey, I would be very grateful If you would 
indicate the reason(s) by ticking the appropriate box(es) on page 8 of the questionnaire 
and return it using the pre-paid envelope enclosed. 
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Screening Questions 
Q1. Has your company undertaken any outsourcing projects during the past five years? 
U Yes (in this case, please specify the number of outsourcing projects and then 
go to Q2). 
Number of outsourcing projects: ................. 
U No (in this case, please tick the box and return the questionnaire in the 
enclosed pre-paid envelope). 
Q2. Please identify one of the most significant activities that is being outsourced by your 
company. 
The activity is: ....................................................... ... 
Q3. Your company's decision for outsourcing this activity was motivated by the desire 
to, 
Q Ensure a better quality product or service 
Q Achieve cost savings 
Q Gain better access to skilled personnel 
Q Gain access to specialised equipment or technology outside your core 
business 
Q Allow your company to concentrate internal resources on core business 
Q Other reason. Please specify .............................. ............ 
Q4. For how long has your company outsourced the above activity to this supplier? 
............... year(s) and .............. month(s). 
Q5. Had your company already worked with this supplier before outsourcing the activity 
of reference (i. e. the activity identified in your answer to Q2)? 
u No 
U Yes 
If yes, please specify for how long: .................. year(s) and .... .. month(s), sind the nature of this relationship: ......................................................... 
Note: From now on, please answer the questions with reference to 
the outsourcing activity identified in your answer to Q2. 
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Section A: About the context of the outsourcing relationship 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(1 = strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). 
Intangible Investments 
1. Your company has recruited additional staff for the sole 1234567 
purpose of managing the outsourcing relationship. 
2. Your company has acquired new knowledge in order to 1234567 
adapt to the specific technological norms of your supplier. 
3. Your company has invested considerably in the training of 1234567 
personnel for the purpose of the relationship with your 
supplier. 
4. Your supplier has made a high degree of adaptation (e. g. 1234567 
via training) in order to provide the customised service 
required by your company. 
5. Your supplier has customised its own workflows and 1234567 
routines to the peculiarities of your company. 
6. Your supplier faced initial difficulties in learning and 1234567 
adapting to your company's way of doing things. 
7. If you were to change your supplier, it would take a long 1234567 
time for a new supplier to serve you as well as the current 
one. 
Tangible investments 
1. Your company has invested in highly specialised equipment 1234567 
for the sole purpose of dealing with your supplier. 
2. A significant amount of your company's equipment would 1234567 
need to be scrapped should your outsourcing relationship 
with this supplier cease. 
3. Your supplier has invested in highly specialised equipment 1234567 
and facilities that were required for the purpose of the 
relationship with your company. 
4. Your supplier has invested in highly specialised equipment 1234567 
and facilities that cannot easily be used in other applications 
outside the relationship with your company. 
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Site-related investments 
1. Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its 1 234567 
operations for the purpose of being nearer to your company 
since close proximity is important to the outsourcing 
relationship. 
2. Your supplier has relocated the whole or part of its 1 234567 
operations for the sole purpose of the outsourcing 
relationship with your company and, hence, this relocation 
has little value outside this relationship. 
3. Your supplier has relocated some of its operations or assets 1 234567 
in order to improve its services towards your company. 
4. The outsourcing relationship requires your supplier to be 1 234567 
located near your company. 
Additional capacity 
1. Your supplier has made extra investments in order to 1234567 
expand its production capacity and to be able to meet your 
needs. 
2. Your supplier has expanded its production capacity in the 1234567 
hope of a long-term relationship with your company. 
3. Your supplier's sales to your company represent an 1234567 
important share of your supplier's total sales. 
4. Your supplier could easily re-sell extra output or make use 1234567 
of additional capacity in other applications outside the 
outsourcing relationship with your company. 
5. Should your outsourcing relationship cease, your supplier 1234567 
would be left with substantial unsold output or excess 
capacity (e. g. extra staff). 
6. For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your 1234567 
company has made additional investments that would result 
in excess capacity in the event of contract termination. 
7. For the purpose of the outsourcing relationship, your 1234567 
company has made additional investments in quality control 
facilities which are likely to result in excess capacity in the 
event of contract termination. 
8. In order to cope with the 'weight' of the relationship with this 1234567 
supplier, your company has made additional investments in 
communication facilities that are likely to result in excess 
capacity in the event of contract termination. 
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Punctuality 
1. The product or service provided by your supplier requires 1234567 
timely delivery. 
2. In the relationship with your supplier, precise scheduling is 1234567 
very important. 
3. Punctual delivery from your supplier is crucial; hence any 1234567 
delay will result in a significant cost to your company (e. g. 
loss of clients). 
4. In the event of delay from your supplier, your company can 1234567 
easily get the same product / service from another supplier. 
Reputation 
1. In the industry in which your company operates, you cannot 1234567 
afford receiving a low quality product or service from your 
supplier since this will negatively affect your own reputation. 
2. Given the importance of your company in the market, your 1234567 
supplier must do its utmost to maintain the quality of service 
provided to your company. 
3. Any underperformance from your supplier will result in a1234567 
highly negative effect on your company's reputation. 
Tailored business procedures 
1. Your company has established procedures and routines 1234567 
tailored to the relationship with your supplier. 
2. The outsourcing relationship has entailed NO changes for 1234567 
your employees. 
3. The outsourcing relationship has entailed significant 1234567 
changes for the overall operations of your company. 
4. The outsourcing relationship has entailed significant 1234567 
restructuring and downsizing (e. g. redundancies) In your 
company. 
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Importance of the activity being outsourced 
1. The activity being outsourced significantly contributes to the 1234567 
profitability of your company. 
2. The activity being outsourced involves direct contact 1234567 
between your supplier and your end customer. 
3. The activity being outsourced enables your company to 1234567 
differentiate itself from its competitors. 
4. The activity being outsourced is regarded by your company 1234567 
as an activity of high strategic importance. 
5. Prior to being outsourced, the activity was performed 'in-house': 
O Efficiently/ Q About Q Inefficiently/ 
highly efficiently average highly inefficiently 
Section B: About the characteristics of the outsourcing relationship 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). 
1. Your company and the supplier have an extremely 1234567 
collaborative relationship. 
2. Your company and the supplier share both short- and long- 1234567 
term goals. 
3. No major disputes have so far taken place between your 1234567 
company and this supplier. 
4. When your company has queries in relation to the service or 1234567 
product provided, the supplier's employees promptly 
respond with accurate information. 
5. Your company and the supplier do NOT generally keep 1234567 
each other's promises. 
6. Your company would be inclined to switch to an alternative 1234567 
supplier if the latter could provide a service comparable to 
the one offered by the current supplier at a slightly lower 
price. 
7. Your supplier is always willing to provide assistance to your 1234567 
company. 
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Section C: Outsourcing performance 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
(1 = strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). 
1. Your company is very satisfied with the overall benefits 1234567 
obtained from outsourcing this activity. 
2. You company is very satisfied with the quality of the 1234567 
service received in terms of consistency, timeliness and 
accuracy. 
3. Your company is very satisfied with this supplier's 1234567 
responsiveness to problems or queries. 
4. The service level received from this supplier has exceeded 1234567 
your company's expectations. 
5. Outsourcing the activity of reference has allowed your 1234567 
company to concentrate own resources (e. g. staff) on core 
activities. 
6. By outsourcing the activity your company has benefited 1234567 
from higher quality. 
7. By outsourcing the activity your company - via your 1234567 
supplier - has benefited from better access to skilled 
personnel. 
8. By outsourcing the activity, your company has benefited 1234567 
from greater scale economies achievable by your supplier. 
9. By outsourcing the activity, your company has removed 1234567 
the need to invest in certain equipment (now under the 
governance of your supplier) and reduced the risk of 
technological obsolescence. 
10. Your company has NOT achieved the target level of cost 1234567 
savings expected by outsourcing this activity. 
11. Overall, the objectives set by your company in relation to 1234567 
the outsourcing project have been met. 
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Section D: General Questions 
1. How many employees do you have in your company? 
......................................... 
2. What was the annual turnover of your company at the end of your financial year 
2005? ............................. 
3. Which industry does your company operate in? 
Q IT 
Q Telecommunication 
Q Hotel 
Q Banking & finance 
Q Other industry. Please specify: ..................................................................... 
4. In which year was your company first established? .............................. 
5. What is your job title? 
7iank, iou foryourvalua6Ce time and cooperation. 
Four insights are ejreme(y important for this research przjcct. 
If you choose not to participate in this survey, please indicate the reason(s) by ticking the 
appropriate box(es) and return the non-completed questionnaire in the pre-paid 
envelope enclosed. 
QI am not aware of any activities being outsourced by our company. 
QI do not have time to complete this questionnaire. 
QI am not the right person to fill in this questionnaire (If so, please kindly forward it to a 
suitable colleague). 
Q Other reason(s). Please specify ................................................................. 
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For participants who would like to receive a copy of the summary of findings, please tear 
along the dashed line, provide your preferred contact details below and return this sheet 
separately to the same address indicated at the beginning of the questionnaire. 
Name: ................................................................................... 
Mailing address: ...................................................................... 
E-mail: .................................................................................. 
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Appendix 4.2: Examples of adjustments made during the pilot-testing 
process 
Raised issues I Adjustment 
The questionnaire requires more than 15 In accordance with the URE(' 
minutes to fill-in (which was indicated in recommendations, '/5 mintutes' was 
the original version of the survey). This replaced by 'about 20 minutes'. 
comment has been mentioned by most 
experts who were consulted. 
Pre-testing 
through the 
consultation of 
experts 
Question 6 (in page 3) was originally as 
follows: 
"For the purpose of the outsourcing 
relationship, your company has made little 
additional investments that are likely to 
result in excess capacity in the vent of 
contract termination" 
This item was described by few experts as 
one that poorly discriminate between high 
and low scores. 
Similarly, question 2 (in the tailored 
business procedure section on page 4) was 
originally as follows: 
"the outsourcing relationship has entailed 
little changes for your employees" 
Originally, Q3 & Q4 (in the mutual 
relationship section on p. 5) made reference 
to investment without specifying what kind 
of investment both items are talking about. 
Q3: If your company switched to a 
competing supplier, it would lose the 
investment made in this particular 
outsourcing relationship. 
Q4: Compared to your supplier's 
investment in this outsourcing relationship, 
your company has invested: 
More the same less 
As a result, the word 'little' was 
omitted and the term 'are likely' was 
replaced by 'would'. 
The item became: 
For the pnpose o/ the outsourcing 
relationship, your company has mule 
additional investments that are would 
result in excess capacity in the vent of 
contract termination" 
As for question 2, the tern `little' has 
been replaced by `no' 
The item became: 
the outsourcing relationship has 
entailed no changes for your 
employees " 
As a result, the bracket (tangible / 
intangible) was added after the word 
investment to refer back to those stated 
earlier in the questionnaire (on p. 2). 
The old items became: 
Q3: : If your company switched to a 
competing supplier, it would lose the 
investment (tangible / intangible) made 
in this particular outsourcing 
relationship. 
Q4: Compared to your supplier's 
investment (tangible / intangible) in 
this outsourcing relationship, your 
company has invested: 
More the same less 
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The majority of respondents who took part 
in the full piloting process seem to have 
missed to pay attention to the negation that 
was deliberately employed to form reversed 
items (eg. Q2 in the tailored business 
procedures; Q5 section B; Q10 section Q. 
Fullpiloting 
through the 
administration of 
the questionnaire 
to S0 companies 
Some respondents missed the outsourcing 
definition which was in the cover page that 
was not passed to them by their colleagues. 
They responded to question 5 on page 5 by 
"never been performed in-house" 
The site-related investments section 
originally included five items. Q4 was 
misinterpreted by a number of respondents 
(since Q3 & Q4 were dependent). The items 
were originally as follow: 
Q3: your supplier has relocated some of its 
operations or assets to improve its services 
towards your company. 
Q4: Given their location, these assets 
cannot easily be used by your supplier for 
other purposes or applications. 
In the general questions section (section D), 
an item, asking the respondent about the 
length of the period during which he/she has 
been working with the company, was 
included. 
Q6: How long have you been working in 
this company? 
A number of respondents seemed to be 
uncomfortable with the above-mentioned 
item and suggested not to include it unless it 
is really crucial. 
Q3 & Q4 (in the tangible investment 
section, on p. 2) were originally stated as 
follows: 
Q3: your supplier has invested in 
specialized equipment required to undertake 
the activity of reference. 
Q4: your supplier can easily make use of 
this equipment in other applications outside 
the relationship with your company. 
The above two items were clearly 
dependent. 
After consulting with a few of the 
respondents concerning this issue, all 
of them mentioned that they did not 
pay attention to the negation `not' and 
suggested that it would be better to 
write the negation in capital letter so as 
to attract the attention of the 
As a result, the term outsourcing was 
defined again in the information sheet 
of the questionnaire and was 
highlighted on bold in both the cover 
letter and the information sheet. 
Consequently, Q4 was dropped and the 
old Q5 (which became Q4) was 
reformulated as follow: 
Q4: The outsourcing relationship 
requires your supplier to be located 
near your company. 
(see the note at the end of the table) 
Since the information about the lengtl 
of the period during which the 
respondent has been working within 
the company was not really crucial, it 
has been decided to drop this item. 
Consequently, the two items were 
reformulated as follows: 
Q3: Your supplier has invested in 
highly specialised equipment and 
facilities that were required for the 
purpose of the relationship with your 
company. 
Q4: Your supplier has invested in 
highly specialised equipment and 
facilities that cannot easily be used in 
other applications outside the 
relationship with your company. 
(see the following note) 
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Note: A reliability test was carried on the set of responses received during the full 
pilot testing process. The following table indicates the different values of the 
Cronbach's Alpha for each construct. These were statistically obtained using the 
S. P. S. S software. Although the literature warned against the over-reliance on 
such tests at an early stage the pilot-testing process, the Cronbach test was used 
in an attempt to gain an idea about the extent to which constructs were 
demonstrating an acceptable level of reliability. 
hr ph site dedi temp brand procd collab Perf 
Alpha 0.726 (0.223) 0.278 0.737 0.776 0.438 0.713 0.899 0.831 
As can be seen from the above table, both the tangible investment (physical 
asset specificity) and the site specificity constructs showed a particularly low 
level of reliability. Having had a deeper look at the item-total statistic table for 
both constructs, it was noticed that in both cases the main problem stemmed 
from item 4. Indeed, deletion of item 4 had a big impact on the alpha value which 
became 0.632 in the physical asset specificity construct and 0.656 in the site 
specificity construct. Consequently, actions were taken to adjust both items (see 
the adjustment made as highlighted in the first table). 
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Appendix 4.3: Ethics committee approval letter 
University Research Ethics Committee 
Wheatley Campus, Wheatley, Oxfoad OX331HX UK 
Dr Glauco De vita t. +44 (0)1865 485741 
Business School "thcsObrooke$*C Uk 
Oxford Brookes University www. 
brm*es. mukhvsearch/ethka/athicthome. htmi 
Wheatley Campus 
28 June 2006 
Dear Dr De Vita, 
UREC Registration No: 060216- Does the degree of asset specificity In outsourcing transactions 
affect outsourcing performance? An empirical analysis of outsourcing ventures by British Firms 
Thank you for submitting the application for your research student Arafet Tekaya to the University Research 
Ethics Committee. The Committee reviewed the application at its meeting on 20 June 2006, and found it to 
be a low risk study with no significant ethical problems, as it uses a questionnaire to professional people 
asking about their work. They have therefore agreed full ethics approval. 
The UREC approval period for this study is two years from the date of this letter, so until 29 June 2008. If 
you need the approval to be extended please do contact me nearer the time of expiry. The committee did 
make several suggestions, which while not conditions of approval; they would like you to consider: 
1. The participant information sheet Is in two parts -a covering letter and an Introductory page - and it 
might work better as one document; 
2. If participants wish to receive a copy of the summary of findings, it would be better to have a tear off 
or separate sheet at the and of the questionnaire that they could return. This would ensure that the 
questionnaire remained anonymous. 
3. Several members of the committee noted that the questionnaire Is being sent to HR directorates, but 
not to Finance directorates and wondered If it was worth including the latter as payroll Is frequently a 
candidate for outsourcing. 
4. The committee were unsure that the questionnaire could be completed In 15 minutes and have 
asked that you change the wording to 'less than 30 minutes'. 
I hope you find these comments helpful. If you need any further clarification, please do contact me. 
In order to monitor studies approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, we will ask you to 
provide a (very brief) report on the conduct and conclusions of the study in a year's time. It the study Is 
completed In less than a year, could you please contact me and I will send you the appropriate guidelines for 
the report 
Yours sincerely 
Teresa Smailbone 
Chair 
University Research Ethics Committee 
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Appendix 5.1: Non response Bias 
One way ANOVA test (early and late respondents) 
ANOVA 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
hrl b: Your company has Between Groups . 407 1 . 
407 . 155 . 694 
recruited additional staff for Within Groups 354.031 135 2.622 
the sole purpose of managing 
the outsourcing relationship. 
Total 354.438 136 
hr2b: Your company has Between Groups . 245 1 . 
245 . 081 . 777 
acquired new knowledge in Within Groups 409.200 135 3.031 
order to adapt to the specific Total 
technological norms of your 409.445 136 
supplier. 
hr3b: Your company has Between Groups 1.285 1 1.285 . 432 . 512 
invested considerably in the Within Groups 401.431 135 2.974 
training of personnel for the 
Total 
purpose of the relationship 402.715 136 
with your supplier. 
hr3s: Your supplier has made Between Groups . 012 1 . 
012 . 003 . 958 
a high degree of adaptation Within Groups 563.959 135 4.177 
(e. g. via training) in order to Total 
provide the customised 
service required by your 
563.971 136 
company. 
hr4s: If you were to change Between Groups 8.117 1 8.117 2.210 . 139 
your supplier, it would take a Within Groups 495.781 135 3.672 
long time for a new supplier Total 
to serve you as well as the 503.898 136 
current one. 
phi b: Your company has Between Groups 1.544 1 1.544 . 986 . 323 
invested in highly specialised Within Groups 211.376 135 1.566 
equipment for the sole Total 
purpose of dealing with your 212.920 136 
supplier. 
ph2b: A significant amount of Between Groups . 178 1 . 178 . 
152 . 697 
your company's equipment Within Groups 157.837 135 1.169 
352 
Total 158.015 136 
phIs: Your supplier has Between Groups . 865 1 . 865 . 
318 . 574 
invested in highly specialised within Groups 366.931 135 2.718 
equipment and facilities that 
Total 
were required for the purpose 
of the relationship with your 
367.796 136 
company. 
ph2s: Your supplier has Between Groups . 022 1 . 
022 . 009 . 
925 
invested in highly specialised Within Groups 328.548 135 2.434 
equipment and facilities that Total 
cannot easily be used in 
other applications outside the 328.569 136 
relationship with your 
company. 
dedils: Your supplier has Between Groups 1.126 1 1.126 . 351 . 555 
made extra investments in Within Groups 433.429 135 3.211 
order to expand its production Total 
capacity and to be able to 434.555 136 
meet your needs. 
dedi2s: Your supplier has Between Groups 1.648 1 1.648 . 422 . 517 
expanded its production Within Groups 527.359 135 3.906 
capacity in the hope of a Total 
long-term relationship with 529.007 136 
your company. 
dedi3s: Your suppliers sales Between Groups . 409 1 . 409 . 
133 . 716 
to your company represent Within Groups 416.408 135 3.085 
an important share of your Total 
supplier's total sales. 416.818 136 
dedi4sR: Your supplier could Between Groups 3.163 1 3.163 1.088 . 299 
easily re-sell extra output or Within Groups 392.428 135 2.907 
make use of additional Total 
capacity in other applications 
outside the outsourcing 395.591 136 
relationship with your 
company. 
dedi5s: Should your Between Groups 2.984 1 2.984 . 838 . 
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outsourcing relationship Within Groups 480.490 135 3.559 
cease, your supplier would be Total 
left with substantial unsold 
output or excess capacity 483.474 136 
(e. g. extra staff). 
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dedilb: For the purpose of the Between Groups . 028 1 . 028 . 01 8 . 893 
outsourcing relationship, your Within Groups 206.031 135 1.526 
company has made 
Total 
additional investments that 
would result in excess 206.058 136 
capacity in the event of 
contract termination. 
dedi2b: For the purpose of the Between Groups 4.701 1 4.701 2.373 . 126 
outsourcing relationship, your Within Groups 267.431 135 1.981 
company has made 
Total 
additional investments in 
quality control facilities which 
are likely to result in excess 272.131 136 
capacity in the event of 
contract termination. 
dedi3b: ln order to cope with Between Groups . 022 1 . 022 . 009 . 924 
the 'weight' of the relationship Within Groups 320.548 135 2.374 
with this supplier, your 
Total 
company has made 
additional investments in 
communication facilities that 320.569 136 
are likely to result in excess 
capacity in the event of 
contract termination. 
templb: The product or Between Groups . 532 1 . 532 . 154 . 695 
service provided by your Within Groups 466.183 135 3.453 
supplier requires timely 
Total 
delivery. 466.715 136 
temp2b: ln the relationship Between Groups . 009 1 . 009 . 003 . 958 
with your supplier, precise Within Groups 436.516 135 3.233 
scheduling is very important. 
Total 436.526 136 
temp3b: Punctual delivery Between Groups 3.883 1 3.883 . 971 . 326 
from your supplier is crucial; Within Groups 540.102 135 4.001 
hence any delay will result in 
Total 
a significant cost to your 543.985 136 
company (e. g. loss of clients). 
temp4bR: ln the event of Between Groups 3.061 1 3.061 . 765 . 
383 
delay from your supplier, your Within Groups 540.209 135 4.002 
company can easily get the Total 
same product / service from 543.270 136 
another supplier. 
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brandlb: ln the industry in Between Groups . 099 
1 . 099 . 
032 . 858 
which your company Within Groups 413.376 135 3.062 
operates, you cannot afford Total 
receiving a low quality 
product or service from your 
supplier since this will 
413.474 136 
negatively affect your own 
reputation. 
brand2b: Given the Between Groups 5.112 1 5.112 1.743 . 189 
importance of your company Within Groups 395.837 135 2.932 
in the market, your supplier 
Total 
must do its utmost to 
maintain the quality of service 400.949 
136 
provided to your company. 
brand3b: Any Between Groups . 268 1 . 
268 . 071 . 790 
underperformance from your Within Groups 506.097 135 3.749 
supplier will result in a highly 
Total 
negative effect on your 506.365 136 
company's reputation. 
hrl s: Your supplier has Between Groups . 851 1 . 851 . 
256 . 614 
customised its own workflows Within Groups 449.265 135 3.328 
and routines to the 
Total 
peculiarities of your company. 450.117 136 
hr2s: Your supplier faced Between Groups 8.414 1 8.414 2.426 . 122 
initial difficulties in learning Within Groups 468.229 135 3.468 
and adapting to your Total 
company's way of doing 476.642 136 
things. 
procdl b: Your company has Between Groups 2.372 1 2.372 . 625 . 431 
established procedures and Within Groups 512.766 135 3.798 
routines tailored to the Total 
relationship with your 515.139 136 
supplier. 
procd2bR: The outsourcing Between Groups 1.268 1 1.268 . 286 . 594 
relationship has entailed NO Within Groups 599.462 135 4.440 
changes for your employees. Total 600.730 136 
procd3b: The outsourcing Between Groups 11.244 1 11.244 3.886 . 051 
relationship has entailed Within Groups 390.552 135 2.893 
significant changes for the Total 
overall operations of your 401.796 136 
company. 
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procd4b: The outsourcing Between Groups 4.167 1 4.167 1.366 . 
245 
relationship has entailed Within Groups 411.731 135 3.050 
significant restructuring and Total 
downsizing (e. g. 
redundancies) in your 
415.898 136 
company. 
Objecl: Outsourcing the Between Groups . 513 1 . 
513 . 274 . 
602 
activity of reference has Within Groups 252.932 135 1.874 
allowed your company to 
Total 
concentrate own resources 253.445 136 
(e. g. staff) on core activities. 
Objec2: By outsourcing the Between Groups 1.566 1 1.566 . 914 . 341 
activity your company has Within Groups 231.383 135 1.714 
benefited from higher quality. Total 232.949 136 
Objec3: By outsourcing the Between Groups 1.325 1 1.325 . 644 . 
424 
activity your company - via Within Groups 277.609 135 2.056 
your supplier - has benefited Total 
from better access to skilled 278.934 136 
personnel. 
Objec4: By outsourcing the Between Groups . 041 
1 . 041 . 
017 . 896 
activity, your company has Within Groups 321.959 135 2.385 
benefited from greater scale Total 
economies achievable by 322.000 136 
your supplier. 
Objec5: By outsourcing the Between Groups . 007 
1 . 007 . 
002 . 965 
activity, your company has Within Groups 463.731 135 3.435 
removed the need to invest in Total 
certain equipment (now under 
the governance of your 
supplier) and reduced the risk 
463.737 136 
of technological 
obsolescence. 
Objec6R: Your company has Between Groups . 036 
1 . 036 . 
018 . 892 
NOT achieved the target level Within Groups 259.848 135 1.925 
of cost savings expected by Total 
outsourcing this activity. 
259.883 136 
Objec7: Overall, the Between Groups 2.220 1 2.220 1.870 . 174 
objectives set by your Within Groups 160.276 135 1.187 
company in relation to the Total 
outsourcing project have 162.496 136 
been met. 
356 
collabl : Your company and Between Groups . 503 
1 . 503 . 
324 570 
he supplier have an Within Groups 209.716 135 1.553 
extremely collaborative 
relationship. 
Total 
. 
210.219 136 
collab2: Your company and Between Groups 1.206 1 1.206 . 600 
440 
he supplier share both short- Within Groups 271.159 135 2.009 
and long-term goals. 
Total 272.365 136 
collab3: No major disputes Between Groups 2.828 1 2.828 . 
867 . 353 
have so far taken place Within Groups 440.252 135 3.261 
between your company and 
Total 
this supplier. 
443.080 136 
collab4: When your company Between Groups . 010 
1 . 010 . 
006 938 
has queries in relation to the Within Groups 218.209 135 1.616 
service or product provided, 
Total 
the supplier's employees 
promptly respond with 
218.219 136 
Jaccurate information. 
collab5R: Your company and Between Groups 2.314 1 2.314 1.682 197 
the supplier do NOT Within Groups 185.657 135 1.375 
generally keep each other's 
Total 187.971 136 promises. 
collab6: Your supplier is Between Groups 1.139 1 1.139 797 374 
always willing to provide Within Groups 192.890 135 1.429 
assistance to your company. 
Total 194.029 136 
collab7R: Your company Between Groups 3.308 1 3.308 1.100 . 296 
would be inclined to switch to Within Groups 406.123 135 3.008 
an alternative supplier if the 
Total 
latter could provide a service 
comparable to the one 
offered by the current 409.431 
136 
supplier at a slightly lower 
price. 
357 
Appendix 5.2: Non response Bias 
Mann-Whitney U (early and late respondents) 
Test Statistics' 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon WZ tailed) 
hrl b: Your company has 
recruited additional staff for 
the sole purpose of 1604.500 2132.500 -. 483 . 625 
managing the outsourcing 
relationship. 
hr2b: Your company has 
acquired new knowledge in 
order to adapt to the specific 1659.000 2187.000 -. 111 . 911 
technological norms of your 
supplier. 
hr3b: Your company has 
invested considerably in the 
training of personnel for the 1519.000 2047.000 -. 867 . 386 
purpose of the relationship 
with your supplier. 
hr3s: Your supplier has 
made a high degree of 
adaptation (e. g. via training) 1660.500 2188.500 -. 100 . 920 in order to provide the 
customised service required 
by your company. 
hr4s: If you were to change 
your supplier, it would take a 
long time for a new supplier 1409.500 1937.500 -1.392 . 164 
to serve you as well as the 
current one. 
ph1 b: Your company has 
invested in highly specialised 
equipment for the sole 1455.000 1983.000 -1.481 . 139 
purpose of dealing with your 
supplier. 
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ph2b: A significant amount of 
your company's equipment 
would need to be scrapped 
should your outsourcing 
relationship with this supplier 
cease. 
phls: Your supplier has 
invested in highly specialised 
equipment and facilities that 
were required for the 
purpose of the relationship 
with your company. 
ph2s: Your supplier has 
invested in highly specialised 
equipment and facilities that 
cannot easily be used in 
other applications outside 
the relationship with your 
sitel s: Your supplier has 
relocated the whole or part of 
its operations for the purpose 
of being nearer to your 
company since close 
proximity is important to the 
outsourcing relationship. 
site2s: Your supplier has 
relocated the whole or part of 
its operations for the sole 
purpose of the outsourcing 
relationship with your 
company and, hence, this 
relocation has little value 
outside this relationship. 
site3sYour supplier has 
relocated some of its 
operations or assets in order 
to improve its services 
towards your company. 
1616.000 
1389.000 
1578.000 
1553.000 
1545.5001 
1585.5001 
2144.00 
1917 
21 
711 
7110.500 
71 
359 
-. 51 
-1.61 
-. 601 
-. 872 
. 61 
.1 
site4s: The outsourcing 
relationship requires your 
supplier to be located near 
your company. 
dedi1s: Your supplier has 
made extra investments in 
order to expand its 
production capacity and to 
be able to meet your needs. 
dedi2s: Your supplier has 
expanded its production 
capacity in the hope of a 
long-term relationship with 
your company. 
dedi3s: Your supplier's sales 
to your company represent 
an important share of your 
supplier's total sales. 
dedi4sR: Your supplier could 
easily re-sell extra output or 
make use of additional 
capacity in other applications 
outside the outsourcing 
relationship with your 
company. 
dedi5s: Should your 
outsourcing relationship 
cease, your supplier would 
be left with substantial 
unsold output or excess 
capacity (e. g. extra staff). 
dedil b: For the purpose of 
the outsourcing relationship, 
your company has made 
additional investments that 
would result in excess 
capacity in the event of 
contract termination. 
1551.5001 71 
1557 
1569.000 
1578.50C 
151 8.00C 
1594.000 
2097.000 
2106.500 
I 
1 2122 
360 
.. /J. 7 
-. acv 
-1.329 
-. 863 
-. 512 
. 448 
. 51 
. 1841 
. 388 
dedi2b: For the purpose of 
the outsourcing relationship, 
your company has made 
additional investments in 
quality control facilities which 
are likely to result in excess 
capacity in the event of 
contract termination. 
dedi3b: In order to cope with 
the 'weight' of the 
relationship with this 
supplier, your company has 
made additional investments 
in communication facilities 
that are likely to result in 
excess capacity in the event 
of contract termination. 
hr6sR: Your supplier could 
easily re-use any specific 
knowledge that is required in 
the relationship with your 
company (e. g. knowledge of 
the industry). 
templb: The product or 
service provided by your 
supplier requires timely 
temp2b: ln the relationship 
with your supplier, precise 
scheduling is very important. 
temp3b: Punctual delivery 
from your supplier is crucial; 
hence any delay will result in 
a significant cost to your 
company (e. g. loss of 
p4bR: In the event of 
3y from your supplier, 
r company can easily get 
same product / service 
i another supplier. 
1570. 
1 
I 
71 
2187 
21 
-. 114 
-. 101 
1607.000 2135.000 
1663.000 7228.000 
1507 
1527 2055.000 
361 
. 51 
. 69G 
'3711 
brandlb: ln the industry in 
which your company 
operates, you cannot afford 
receiving a low quality 
product or service from your 
supplier since this will 
negatively affect your own 
reputation. 
brand2b: Given the 
importance of your company 
in the market, your supplier 
must do its utmost to 
maintain the quality of 
service provided to your 
company. 
brand3b: Any 
underperformance from your 
supplier will result in a highly 
negative effect on your 
company's reputation. 
hrl s: Your supplier has 
customised its own 
workflows and routines to the 
peculiarities of your 
company. 
hr2s: Your supplier faced 
initial difficulties in learning 
and adapting to your 
company's way of doing 
things. 
procdl b: Your company has 
established procedures and 
routines tailored to the 
relationship with your 
supplier. 
procd2bR: The outsourcing 
relationship has entailed NO 
changes for your employees. 
1509.000 2037.1 
1416.000 1944. ( 
1659.000 2187.000 
1603.000 2131.000 
1377.5001 1 
1524.5001 2052.5001 
1574.0001 21 
-. 915 
-1 
-. 11o 
-1.559 
. 171 
912 
. 11 
362 
procd3b: The outsourcing 
relationship has entailed 
significant changes for the 
overall operations of your 
company. 
procd4b: The outsourcing 
relationship has entailed 
significant restructuring and 
downsizing (e. g. 
redundancies) in your 
company. 
collabl: Your company and 
the supplier have an 
extremely collaborative 
relationship. 
collab2: Your company and 
the supplier share both 
short- and long-term goals. 
collab3: No major disputes 
have so far taken place 
between your company and 
this supplier. 
collab4: When your company 
has queries in relation to the 
service or product provided, 
the supplier's employees 
promptly respond with 
accurate information. 
collab5R: Your company and 
the supplier do NOT 
generally keep each other's 
promises. 
collab6: Your supplier is 
always willing to provide 
assistance to your company. 
1304.5001 1832.500 
1475.000 7040.000 
1557.000 2085.000 
1541.500 7106.500 
1550.0001 7115.00( 
I 
1 
2131.500 
1620.5001 71 
363 
-1.950 
-1.079 . 281 
-. 648 
-. 724 . 46E 
-. 677 . 49E 
-1.323 . 1861 
collab7R: Your company 
would be inclined to switch t o 
an alternative supplier if the 
latter could provide a service 1472.00 0 7037.00 0 -1.081 comparable to the one 
offered by the current 
supplier at a slightly lower 
price. 
Objecl: Outsourcing the 
activity of reference has 
allowed your company to 1602.000 2130.00 0 -. 408 
concentrate own resources 
( e. g. staff) on core activities. 
I 
Objec2: By outsourcing the 
activity your company has 1464.500 1992.500 -1.122 
benefited from higher quality. 
Objec3: By outsourcing the 
activity your company - via 
your supplier - has benefited 1524.500 2052.500 -. 808 
from better access to skilled 
personnel. 
Objec4: By outsourcing the 
activity, your company has 
benefited from greater scale 1619.000 2147.000 -. 320 
economies achievable by 
your supplier. 
Objec5: By outsourcing the 
activity, your company has 
removed the need to invest 
in certain equipment (now 
1676.500 2204.500 -. 018 under the governance of 
your supplier) and reduced 
the risk of technological 
obsolescence. 
Objec6R: Your company has 
NOT achieved the target 
level of cost savings 1663.500 2191.500 -. 086 
expected by outsourcing this 
. 749 
. 9311 
364 
Objec7: Overall, the 
objectives set by your 
company in relation to the 1430.500 1958.500 -1.316 . 188 
outsourcing project have 
been met. 
a. Grouping Variable: Before Follow up or after follow up 
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Appendix 5.4: Assessment of the randomness of the missing data in 
relation to "turnover" 
Diann-Whitney U Test 
Test Statistics' 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon WZ tailed) 
hrl b: Your company has 
recruited additional staff for 
the sole purpose of 
managing the outsourcing 
hr2b: Your company has 
acquired new knowledge in 
order to adapt to the specific 
technological norms of your 
supplier. 
hr3b: Your company has 
invested considerably in the 
training of personnel for the 
purpose of the relationship 
with your supplier. 
hr3s: Your supplier has 
made a high degree of 
adaptation (e. g. via training) 
in order to provide the 
customised service required 
by your company. 
hr4s: If you were to change 
your supplier, it would take a 
long time for a new supplier 
to serve you as well as the 
current one. 
phi b: Your company has 
invested in highly specialised 
equipment for the sole 
purpose of dealing with your 
supplier. 
835.000 955.000 -. 693 
826.500 946.500 -. 636 
760.000 880.000 -1.131 
846.000 966.000 -. 481 
771.000 891.000 -1.004 
848.500 968.500 -. 593 
. 315 
377 
ph2b: A significant amount of 
your company's equipment 
would need to be scrapped 
should your outsourcing 
relationship with this supplier 
ph1s: Your supplier has 
invested in highly specialised 
equipment and facilities that 
were required for the 
purpose of the relationship 
with your company. 
ph2s: Your supplier has 
invested in highly specialised 
equipment and facilities that 
cannot easily be used in 
other applications outside 
the relationship with your 
site I s: Your supplier has 
relocated the whole or part 
its operations for the purpo: 
of being nearer to your 
company since close 
proximity is important to the 
outsourcing relationship. 
site2s: Your supplier has 
relocated the whole or part 
its operations for the sole 
purpose of the outsourcing 
relationship with your 
company and, hence, this 
relocation has little value 
outside this relationship. 
e3sYour supplier has 
ocated some of its 
erations or assets in order 
improve its services 
yards your company. 
867 
91 
890.5001 
857 
8301.500 
987.000 
I 
8397 
977. 
378 
-1.25 
-. 012 
-. 1 
-. 2311 
. 71 
. 818 
site4s: The outsourcing 
relationship requires your 
supplier to be located near 
your company. 
dedi1s: Your supplier has 
made extra investments in 
order to expand its 
production capacity and to 
be able to meet your needs. 
dedi2s: Your supplier has 
expanded its production 
capacity in the hope of a 
long-term relationship with 
your company. 
dedi3s: Your supplier's sales 
to your company represent 
an important share of your 
supplier's total sales. 
dedi4sR: Your supplier could 
easily re-sell extra output or 
make use of additional 
capacity in other applications 
outside the outsourcing 
relationship with your 
eaios: snouia your 
utsourcing relationship 
ease, your supplier would 
e left with substantial 
nsold output or excess 
apacity (e. g. extra staff). 
edilb: For the purpose of 
ie outsourcing relationship, 
our company has made 
dditional investments that 
'ould result in excess 
apacity in the event of 
ontract termination. 
OOO. VUV O13OO. 000 -. -tu) 
857.500 8360.500 -. 412 . 681 
818 8321 
419 
820.000 
623.000 
8337 
8126.000 -2.357 
5 
01 
379 
dedi2b: For the purpose of 
the outsourcing relationship, 
your company has made 
additional investments in 
quality control facilities which 
are likely to result in excess 
capacity in the event of 
contract termination. 
dedi3b: ln order to cope with 
the 'weight' of the 
relationship with this 
supplier, your company has 
made additional investments 
in communication facilities 
that are likely to result in 
excess capacity in the event 
of contract termination. 
hr6sR: Your supplier could 
easily re-use any specific 
knowledge that is required in 
the relationship with your 
company (e. g. knowledge of 
the industry). 
temp1 b: The product or 
service provided by your 
supplier requires timely 
delivery. 
temp2b: ln the relationship 
with your supplier, precise 
scheduling is very important. 
temp3b: Punctual delivery 
from your supplier is crucial; 
hence any delay will result in 
a significant cost to your 
company (e. g. loss of 
clients). 
temp4bR: ln the event of 
delay from your supplier, 
your company can easily get 
the same product / service 
from another supplier. 
850.50C 
865 
903.500 
985.000 
102 
582.0001 8085 
81 
756.0001 8259 
889.000 1 8392.000 
380 
-. 5141 
-. 378 
-. 080 
-z 
-1.115 
-. 184 
. 
6071 
017 
041 
85 
brandlb: ln the industry in 
which your company 
operates, you cannot afford 
receiving a low quality 
product or service from you 
supplier since this will 
negatively affect your own 
reputation. 
brand2b: Given the 
importance of your company 
in the market, your supplier 
must do its utmost to 
maintain the quality of 
service provided to your 
company. 
brand3b: Any 
underperformance from you 
supplier will result in a highll 
negative effect on your 
company's reputation. 
hrl s: Your supplier has 
customised its own 
workflows and routines to the 
peculiarities of your 
company. 
hr2s: Your supplier faced 
initial difficulties in learning 
and adapting to your 
company's way of doing 
things. 
procdl b: Your company has 
established procedures and 
routines tailored to the 
relationship with your 
supplier. 
procd2bR: The outsourcing 
relationship has entailed NO 
changes for your employees. 
806.000 
707 
91 
861 
821 
841 
-. 794 
-1.458 
-. 035 
-. 3751 
895.000 1015.000 -. 140 
861.500 981.500 -. 374 
727.0001 847.0001 -1.3151 
381 
I 
rocd3b: The outsourcing 
elationship has entailed 
, ignificant changes for the 
iverall operations of your 
ompany. 
'rocd4b: The outsourcing 
elationship has entailed 
significant restructuring and 
lownsizing (e. g. 
edundancies) in your 
ompany. 
ollabl: Your company and 
he supplier have an 
xtremely collaborative 
elation ship. 
ollab2: Your company and 
. he supplier share both 
short- and long-term goals. 
, ollab3: No major disputes 
ave so far taken place 
between your company and 
This supplier. 
-ollab4: When your company 
has queries in relation to the 
service or product provided, 
the supplier's employees 
promptly respond with 
accurate information. 
collab5R: Your company and 
the supplier do NOT 
generally keep each other's 
promises. 
collab6: Your supplier is 
always willing to provide 
assistance to your company. 
891.500 
1006.5001 
1011.500 
770.500 890. 500 
715.000 835. 000 
831.000 951. 000 
787.500 
771.500 
885.000 
8290.500 
8274.50C 
382 
lk 
-. 2011 
-. 1681 
-1.031 
-1.417 
-1.052 
-. 218 
. 
841 
. 
8671 
1 
. 
82 
lab7R: Your company 
uld be inclined to switch to 
alternative supplier if the 
er could provide a service 
nparable to the one 
: red by the current 
)plier at a slightly lower 
Objecl: Outsourcing the 
activity of reference has 
allowed your company to 
concentrate own resources 
(e. g. staff) on core activities. 
Objec2: By outsourcing the 
activity your company has 
benefited from higher quality. 
Objec3: By outsourcing the 
activity your company - via 
your supplier - has benefited 
from better access to skilled 
Djec4: By outsourcing the 
tivity, your company has 
nefited from greater scale 
Monomies achievable by 
ur supplier. 
)jec5: By outsourcing the 
tivity, your company has 
moved the need to invest 
certain equipment (now 
der the governance of 
ur supplier) and reduced 
s risk of technological 
£R: Your company has 
achieved the target 
of cost savings 
cted by outsourcing this 
751.000 871 
795.500 915.500 
822.000 8325.000 
763.500 883.500 
837.000 957.000 
8408.500 
8331 
383 
-1.1 
-. 656 
-1.067 
-. 614 
. 398 
. 51: 
. 28E 
Objec7: Overall, the 
objectives set by your 
company in relation to the 774.500 894.500 -1.004 . 315 
outsourcing project have 
been met. 
Satisl: Your company is very 
satisfied with the overall 872.000 992.000 -. 304 . 761 benefits obtained from 
outsourcing this activity. 
Satis2: You company is very 
satisfied with the quality of 
the service received in terms 839.500 959.500 -. 532 . 595 
of consistency, timeliness 
and accuracy. 
Satis3: Your company is very 
satisfied with this suppliers 859.000 979.000 -. 395 . 693 responsiveness to problems 
or queries. 
Satis4: The service level 
received from this supplier 790.500 910.500 -. 876 . 381 has exceeded your 
company's expectations. 
a. Grouping Variable: Missing values Turnover 
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Appendix 6.1: The remaining interaction terms in relation to 
reciprocal investments 
b SE Beta Sig 
Humb*HumS -. 026 0.38 . 051 . 506 
DediB*DediS 
. 012 . 037 . 027 . 
736 
HumBDediS 
. 004 . 036 . 009 . 
918 
DediB*SiteS -. 032 . 037 -0.75 . 
380 
TempB*HumS 
. 003 . 037 . 007 . 
931 
ProcdB*DediS -. 002 . 037 . -. 005 . 949 
BrandB*DediS 
-. 045 . 039 -. 107 . 253 
HumB*SiteS 
. 080 . 043 . 109 . 168 
ProcdB*HumS 
. 046 . 040 . 090 . 249 
ProcdB*SiteS 
. 011 . 038 . 023 . 766 
BrandB*HumS 
. 071 . 043 . 137 . 101 
BrandB*SiteS 
. 067 . 054 . 147 . 212 
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